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Abstract 
China's reform and open door policy in the post-Mao era has prompted a 
number of social changes in the Pearl River Delta. The immigration of highly 
educated intellectuals to this area is one such prominent change. Foshan, a city at the 
center of the Delta, has likewise experienced an influx of intellectuals. Officially 
called rencai (人才)，these people have been categorized by the state as contributors 
to the economic improvement and modernization of China. However, in the arena of 
actual interaction with the local people, they have been often marginalized. 
Moreover, because Foshan boasts a highly commercial ethos, they fmd that many 
cultural differences exist between themselves and the local people, and that their 
"cultural authoritativeness", though legitimated by the state, is simply 
underestimated and even neglected by Foshan locals. 
Unlike migrant laborers, migrant intellectuals claim a higher educational 
level and technical skills as their social resources. In local society, however, it is the 
locals who occupy power by making use of their own social resources—commercial 
ability and political and economic power. In this intertwining of social resources, 
each of the two groups assigns greater value to its own resources than those of its 
counterpart. What upholds and sustains this attitude is the ultimate state goal to 
develop and modernize China. By this goal, both groups gain justification of their 
accomplishments. Although people conceptualize Foshan's progress largely in terms 
of such practical issues as living standard and greater freedom of choice, they form 
their understanding not solely within a personal or local context but also within the 
larger framework of the nation state. 
\ 
Recent prosperity and commercialization in Foshan has favored Foshan 
people with more cultural choices than before, including choices from the 
"mainstream" Chinese culture. Not only do migrant intellectuals enjoy accepting 
these options as their own culture, but the locals themselves are beginning to choose 
these alternatives. In this cultural shift, though slow and subtle, migrant intellectuals 
tend to claim this as their contribution to the "improvement" of local culture, while 
the locals tend to consume these new cultural options purely as symbols of their 
prosperity. This cultural shift, which seems to be a result of people's free choice, 
actually to some extent coincides with the state intention to lead its people toward a 
certain direction—"civilization"—in the process of its modernization. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1. Research Problem and Its Background 
Research Problem 
Since 1979, Chinese gaige kaifang (改革開放）or reform and open door policy 
has brought about many social changes to the Pearl River Delta in South China. 
Economic liberalization led to a relatively freer atmosphere, less state intervention, 
and migration. While migrant laborers going to the Pearl River Delta is a well-
known phenomenon studied by a number of social scientists (see, for example, 
Solinger 1991, Zhou 1992，Guldin 1995), little attention has been paid to another 
type of migrant~highly educated immigrants who fill professional and technical 
positions. What I discuss in this thesis is college graduates who migrated to Foshan, 
a city in the Pearl River Delta. I will focus especially on the cultural differences 
between these migrant college graduates and local Foshan people, because this is one 
of the central issues which actually occupies people's minds regarding migration to 
Foshan. 
Highly educated immigrants to Foshan, whom I call migrant intellectuals, are 
a part of rencai (人才）categorized by the PRC government. Such a concept is unique 
to the PRC, which in recent years has made its top priority一the development and 
modernization of the state. In order to achieve this goal, the PRC government in the 
reform period has developed a system of evaluating，treating, and making use of 
rencai. These rencai are regarded as contributors to state development. In other 
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words, their higher education background and intellectual ability are legitimated by 
the state as resources for them to claim. After introducing the fieldsite setting in 
Chapter 2，I will summarize the sociocultural meaning of the concept rencai as 
created by the Chinese state in Chapter 3. 
In this thesis, I use the English term "intellectual" for indicating highly 
educated immigrants to Foshan. It is mainly for linguistic reasons that I call them 
migrant intellectuals; I use this term purely as a translation of the Chinese term zhishi 
fenzi (知識分子).The meaning of "intellectual" in my usage does not fully connote 
the typical meaning of "intellectual" in a Western sense一intelligentsia who act as 
critics of state and society (see, for example, Tu 1994, for a discussion of Chinese 
intellectuals in this Western sense of "intellectual"). In the official concept of the 
present PRC, the concept zhishi fenzi actually does not include this aspect of 
"intellectual". What is emphasized is more functional一highly educated scarce 
human resources who are expected to lead the social and economic development. I 
do not intend to support this official concept, which consequently oppresses 
dissidents. Yet it is clear from my field research that most zhishi fenzi do not live 
their lives as social critics or dissidents, but as intellectual contributors, who want to 
better their own lives, and make society better as well by making use of their 
knowledge and skills. They do all these in the larger environment which defines 
them as functional contributors. It is precisely this aspect of these migrant zhishi 
fenzi that attracted my interest, and this is what made me decide to investigate them 
as individuals with personal goals rather than ideologues. For this reason, the term 
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migrant intellectuals in this thesis refers to a different concept of intellectual than the 
meaning of intellectual as understood in the Western sense. 
I chose to study migrant intellectuals because this specific group shows us 
some notable sociocultural transformation. This not only illustrates a distinct 
regional issue of South China in the reform period but also involves a more general 
question about how human shape a society and the society shapes human. First, the 
individuals who are categorized into rencai reflect the dialectical relations between 
human free will and the frame set up by the larger social structure一the state. I will 
explore this in Chapter 4. Through these individuals' actual experiences, I attempt to 
discuss their perception and social position in local Foshan society. We will find 
migrant intellectuals' “sense of loss" and “sense of cultural authoritativeness", which 
are upheld by the state policy, from their stories. 
Second, local ethnic relations between these migrant intellectuals and local 
Foshan people entail two referential factors: regional difference and class difference. 
These differences, which are visible as cultural differences in people's everyday life, 
involve the different resources owned by each group. Looking at intricate social 
relations between these two differences through the two factors will enable us to 
understand how people of the two groups interpret and make use of these different 
resources in their interaction, as well as how they assert their significance through 
these resources. Chapter 5 will be about this discussion. I will explore cultural 
differences so that migrant intellectuals' “sense of cultural authoritativeness" will 
take clearer shape. 
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Regional difference, including language and patterns of thought and 
behavior, is one marker which highlights the metaphorical distance of migrant 
intellectuals from the power in the local society which is controlled by the local 
people. Needless to say, it results from Foshan's rapid economic improvement over 
the last ten years, which made local society prosperous on the one hand and attracted 
immigrants on the other. That is, regional difference is an advantage to local Foshan 
people by definition. Their definition of resource is simple: economic ability. 
According to this easily visible and practical notion, resource simply belongs to 
those who have more money than others, or to those who occupy high positions in 
workunits. Therefore, about migrant intellectuals, they regard them as only gaoji 
dagongzai (高級打工仔）or high-class employees they hire, and who help them 
achieve more profit and improvement. Migrant intellectuals' knowledge and skills, 
which are acknowledged by the state and they themselves think are their resources, 
are often ignored. 
As for class difference, I would not use this term in the strict sense as 
Marxists or sociologists do. Instead, I use this concept in a quite loose way, in line 
with that of my informants' interpretation of class which may actually be equivalent 
to such concepts as social status or hierarchy. What I pay attention to in my study is 
Chinese people's class-consciousness, understood as title-consciousness. To them, 
stratification of titles or ranks is a very important determinant of social relations. In 
Chinese workunits, different types of official equipment~cars, telephone, etc.一and 
social welfare—housing, for example—are allocated according to personnel's rank 
(see, for example, Zhang and Chen 1992:171). Being accustomed to this 
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stratification, the Chinese tend to understand people's social positions in this way. It 
is precisely on this basis that both migrant intellectuals and the locals define 
themselves as being of higher status than their counterparts. 
Through my field research, I find that there are two criteria in Foshan society 
that people think are class: class in terms of political/economic power, and class in 
terms of intellectual level and professional skill. According to the first criterion, it is 
of course local Foshan people who are of the higher class. According to the second, 
it is migrant intellectuals who have higher class status. We see that the officially 
made category rencai is gradually adopted within the local society, as I will discuss 
later. We can see here an intertwined relation of difference resources. Within the 
context of local Foshan society, migrant intellectuals are intellectually elites yet are 
marginalized as outsiders in the local society. In other words, they have resources in 
terms of professional skills yet are subordinate in terms of the local power structure. 
What happens here is a half-conscious and half-unconscious struggle for dominancy 
and power between the two groups in Foshan society. 
In sum, the relations between migrant intellectuals and the locals in Foshan 
contain many intriguing questions one can explore with anthropological research. 
Through looking at migrant intellectuals' agency and perspective in Foshan, I 
hopefully shed light on how people interpret and assert their social resources within 
a larger social structure by which they are shaped. 
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Background 
The People's Republic of China in the post-Mao era has executed a series of 
new policies to materialize a total modernization of the state. Known as “reform and 
open door policy", the policies aimed, among other things, to "...achieve a 
comparatively comfortable standard of living by the end of the century", which 
means "per capita GNP will reach US$800"/ One of the means of achieving 
modernization was to facilitate economic improvement mainly by replacing the 
previous planned economy with a market-oriented economic system. South China 
was delegated as the starting point for this replacement. Economic liberalization 
soon spread in Guangdong province, which generated a higher level of participation 
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in commerce on the part of local-level workunits and individual entrepreneurs. 
Guangdong people's economic ability also helped the rapid development. As Vogel 
reports with the example ofYu Fei，Mayor ofFoshan from 1979 to 1985 (1989: 182-
186), Foshan's top leaders were very sensitive to the central policies being loosened, 
and were bold enough to put these new policies into practice immediately. When the 
majority of Chinese local leaders did not dare to apply for a loan to activate local 
economy because they could not set themselves free from the concept and practice of 
planned economy, Foshan leaders launched into loan economy with ease. The 
economic change effected by the above factors naturally brought about another 
1 Deng Xiaoping's explanation answering the Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira's question 
in 1979 (Li 1995:423). 
2 For economic reform in Guangdong, see Vogel (1989)，Zeng et al. (1993)，Lin et al. (1995). Siu 
(1989b) also provides a detailed ethnographic depiction about economic liberalization in a 
Guangdong market town. 
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phenomenon~migration. Individual workers began to migrate to economically more 
active places, but only to work in such places on a temporary basis. Such migration 
was allowed，even encouraged, by the state, because it would help fulfill the needs of 
expanding economy. Migration of intellectuals, aside from peasant laborers, thus 
came to be prevalent. 
China's recent improvement of national-wide transportation, 
telecommunication, and the increasing flow of people, commodities, and information 
stimulated urbanization and modernization in Chinese cities, especially ones which 
moved on “one step ahead" (Vogel 1989. See also Xu and Li 1990, Xu 1993). 
Infrastructures including measures to facilitate interaction have been more and more 
prevalent among ordinary people. Foshan was of course one typical example. 
Together with other drastic social changes of South China, some social 
scientists take these phenomena as the split of Guangdong/south China from the 
central regime. For example, political scientist Friedman argues that he sees a 
"north-south crash"一a regional/cultural division in China. He assumes that southern 
culture is subverting northern culture, and such a subversion represents the 
emergence of a new "south-oriented" national identity (1995:3-22). To me, it seems 
opposite at least from the perspective of Foshan: gradually, and in a very subtle way, 
Foshan came to experience a shift towards becoming a more “nationally 
standardized" local community than it was before. Of course, this shift is not easily 
visible, nor is it so rapid. Foshan does remain a Guangdong city wherein immigrants 
will continue to be assimilated, regardless of the length of time needed for full 
assimilation to occur. However, as Foshan becomes well known all over the country 
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within the context of economic achievement and following city management, Foshan 
is no longer an isolated Guangdong town. It is repositioned within the framework of 
the state, and Foshan people must be conscious of the fact that Foshan is a Chinese 
city. Applying Anderson's concept of the nation as an "imagined community" (1991) 
to a local-level society，modernization has helped people “imagine” a larger 
"community" to which they belong. At the same time，we can say that urbanized area 
of China such as Foshan are becoming less and less isolated from the presence of the 
larger society (Fox 1977). 
Within the range of Foshan, it may be migrant intellectuals who as a result 
help this “national standardization", if indirectly. This "national standardization" 
occurs in various social arenas in Foshan. Slight and slow diversification of cultural 
choice is one aspect. It does not mean the decline or disappearance of local culture, 
but the increase in alternatives. More and more alternatives came to be available in 
Foshan. Some of them are cultures from other Chinese regions，others are various 
kinds of popular culture from Hong Kong and Taiwan; and the another alternative is 
one I would call “mainstream” culture—information, entertainment, and activities 
which fit intellectual elites' preference. This culture is usually provided via central 
media such as CCTV/radio and nationwide printed media. Correspondingly, the 
thought and behavior of those who support this “mainstream culture"—for example, 
those who have a relatively high degree of interest in national affairs and state 
policies rather than interest only in practical-material issue—also forms a part of this 
culture (see Chapter 5). I suspect that migrant intellectuals may be key people who 
think themselves as being conveyers of non-Cantonese culture, especially 
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"mainstream" culture. I pay attention to this point because it reflects migrant 
intellectuals' “sense of cultural authoritativeness" by which they subjectively 
demarcate themselves from local Foshan people. Depending on this sense, they can 
claim the legitimacy of their culture. 
2. Theoretical Considerations 
Ethnicity and Nationalism 
In the PRC, Han Chinese, opposed to minority nationalities, is defined as one 
ethnic category. In reality, however, Han Chinese is not a homogeneous entity at all. 
There is a great deal of diversity among Han Chinese according to many different 
backgrounds, such as geographical condition, climate, historical background, cultural 
preference, local social context, and local language difference. 
In the case of migrant intellectuals in Foshan, they also have many different 
traits from local Foshan people. They mostly speak Mandarin while the locals mostly 
speak Cantonese; they have cultural tastes which differ from the locals, including 
food, customs in everyday life, cultural activities and entertainment. Most 
importantly, both migrant intellectuals and the locals are quite conscious of these 
differences. Both feel that there are differences between themselves and their 
counterparts in many aspects, and find metaphorical distance between the two groups 
(see Chapter 5). In other words, the difference between migrant intellectuals in 
Foshan and the locals has a certain degree of similarity to ethnic difference. Thus, I 
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think it is appropriate to take ethnicity issue into consideration when studying this 
topic. 
The earliest ethnicity study was essentially a study of race issues in American 
society，which was expected to help solve racial problems. Naturally, ethnicity was 
regarded as race, or groups of immigrants from the same place of origin, e.g. Italian, 
Irish, Chinese, etc. It was after this phase that ethnicity studies began to pay attention 
to sociocultural aspects of ethnicity. Some daily-life realities were thus re-thought 
and proved academically, like the fact that one race or one nation often contains 
many ethnic groups. Berreman's case study on urban India is an example (Berreman 
1972). In the later stages of ethnicity study, the concern of ethnicity shifted to a 
direction attaching importance to its subjectivity. According to this notion, ethnicity 
can be imagined, created, presented and manipulated by a group of people. I 
consider my investigation to be one of ethnicity. 
There are an enormous number of studies on the nature of ethnicity. In the 
work of previous scholars, ethnicity has been analyzed in terms of two factors: 
primordial quality and instrumental quality. 
Primordial quality of ethnic identity was first proposed by Geertz. He defined 
primordial attachment as “one that stems from the 'givens'—or, more precisely, as 
culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed 'givens'—of social 
existence." (1963a:109) Primordialists think that individuals' attachment to their 
own ethnic group is given at birth, and their ideas and behavior related to ethnic 
issues are the products of their inherent possession of this sentiment. 
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Instrumental approach emerged in order to explain some actual ethnic cases 
that primordial interpretation failed to explain. It focuses on people's inclination to 
use their ethnicity as one of their resources. When necessary, they make use of their 
ethnicity as a resource to create a desirable condition, that is, to acquire more interest 
or power. In this sense, Cohen described ethnic group as interest group (1974a，b). 
Lyman and Douglass discussed that ethnic identity is acquired and used both on an 
individual level and on a collective level (1973). 
The primordial quality of ethnicity seems reasonable when people's ethnic 
identity is seen as sole and static. By defining "individuals' attachment to their own 
ethnic group" as “given at birth", primordialists imply that each individual has only 
one ethnic group, which belonged to him/her when born, and which will not alter for 
the rest of his/her life. I suspect that this is not applicable to ethnically complex 
societies where individuals have more than one ethnic identity. South China is 
precisely one such example. In both Guangdong and Hong Kong, different local 
ethnic criteria intricately coexist and people manipulate them selectively in different 
situations. According to Guldin, those criteria have different levels, and form a 
stratified structure. His formulation of this stratified model of ethnic identities in 
Hong Kong and South China (1984, 1995) has significance in showing this 
stratification. 
Instrumentalists' view of ethnicity also has its limitations. Cohen discussed 
an instrumental aspect of ethnicity within the context of American society in the 
1970s where race issue was a central concern. In this ethnic situation he claimed that 
ethnicity was interpreted as an instrument to acquire interest. This leads to a structure 
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of competition and confrontation among ethnic groups. It might be true for the USA, 
yet I doubt that this simple instrumental approach is applicable to ethnic relations in 
China. The Chinese are diverse yet integrated by definition; in other words, they 
hold ethnic diversity and similarity at the same time (Siu 1993). Increasing domestic 
migration over the last ten years makes the matter even more complicated. 
It is remarkable that many studies on this aspect of ethnicity are about 
Chinese, particularly Han Chinese (see, for example, Gladney 1991, Honig 1992， 
and Tu [ed.] 1994). The “meaning ofbeing Chinese today" (Tu [ed.] 1994) became a 
new concern of Chinese ethnicity, and it gradually replaces the previous ethnological 
convention that studying Chinese ethnicity only means studying minority 
nationalities. My research problem can be examined in this light. The people I 
studied in Foshan are all Han Chinese who are officially defined as a homogeneous 
ethnic group, but the reality is that there are considerable differences between the 
migrant intellectuals and locals which both groups consciously acknowledge. I 
believe that it is relevant to study the social relations between these two groups in 
terms of ethnicity, as it is now formulated. 
Recent studies on ethnicity have shifted their central concern to one of re-
examining ethnicity within a larger social structure where people interpret the 
meaning of their own as well as others' ethnicity. The concept of the nation is one 
such larger environment. In this approach, Gladney made a considerable contribution 
with his book Muslim Chinese (1991). He focused on the emergence of the Hui 
identity in the recent PRC to explore how the Hui people deal with the state by 
making use of their power, and how the interaction between them and the state 
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dialectically constructs and reinforces the idea of nationalism. Gladney revealed the 
process by which the concept of Hui has been held, maintained and reinforced as a 
common ground of identity among people who share the same roots, but who now 
actually have diverse nationalities, live in diverse areas, speak diverse dialects, and 
present the idea of Muslim in diverse ways. In this process, he argues, there is a 
dialectic between the Hui and the state that constructs the Hui identity. The state 
shapes the Hui identity by executing relevant policies on the one hand, and the Hui 
also influences the state policy by representing that shaped identity on the other 
hand. 
Through this approach, we see that ethnic identity may be constructed, 
reinterpreted, and used instrumentally when the people concerned think necessary. 
Yet the situation in China right now is more than a simple confrontation between 
different ethnic groups or between an ethnic minority and the state. And the same 
may be true for my case. In Foshan, different groups of Han Chinese, who can be 
classified according to more than one criterion, are interacting in the community. I 
cannot ignore Chinese nationalism in Foshan people's perceptions and actions since 
it is penetrated in their everyday life subtly yet deeply. Therefore, I think that it is 
relevant to keep this framework in mind—ethnicity and nationalism. 
As for nationalism, Anderson's influential work “Imagined Communities" 
proposed a concept of the nation as “an imagined community" (1991:6). He points 
out that nationalism is historically fatal, and imagined through language. This can be 
applied to contemporary China well. The sense of its historicity and fatality is 
considerably strong among Chinese people. The fact that China has the one of the 
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earliest civilizations and longest histories in the world, and that it was the Chinese 
who were responsible for those earliest great inventions such as paper-making and 
• • 3 
printing technology, has thoroughly penetrated their minds. 
China in post-1949 has been one typical example of official nationalism 
(Anderson 1991:83-112). China had no lack of national legend, for its people believe 
in the establishment of their state by the victory in the Anti-Japanese War and the 
Civil War.4 Although it seems to have been diluted very much today, I assume this 
legend is still the foundation of the PRC on the deepest level. 1995 was a year in 
which this legend was embodied prominently. It was the fiftieth anniversary of the 
victory in the Anti-Japanese War. Throughout the summer, the season of the victory, 
an enormous number of symbols of this legend appeared on the media: series of TV 
programs, old resistance war movies, karaoke videos of resistance songs, series of 
reports in newspapers, etc. Various styles of activities to commemorate this history 
were also held by many units in many places in China. These symbols of nationalism 
3 This is also tme for the Chinese identity of many overseas Chinese (see, for example, Wang 1994， 
Wang 1994，Wu 1994). This sense of pride tends to be even stronger in the case of overseas 
Chinese. Clifford further discusses emigrants' sharing of the historical memory of their own ethnic 
groups as a common practice of diaspora in general (1994). To expand the subject of this discussion 
to overseas compatriots may digress from Anderson's definition of the nation. Yet I find it is also 
tme for diasporas: not only the nations but compatriot conununities are imagined. In the case of 
overseas Chinese, they imagine China as their motherland: China is the motherland and Beijing is 
the heart of it, except for the case of conscious pro-ROC. Note the fact that it is always Beijing, not 
Xi'an nor Nanjing, nor Kaifeng~cities which had previous capitals. By doing so, they link their 
nationalism with the present state. 
41 do not mean by the term legend that the war in China was merely a fictitious story. I refer to a 
historical fact of a country which attracts its people so strongly that all of them share it as a legend 
of nation-establishment. 
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are continuously educating its people in an implicit way. A person in Foshan told me 
that his five-year-old son knows the characters of these resistance movies very well 
though his parents have never taught him anything. He can separate balujun 0、路軍) 
or the Eighth Route Army from Riben guizi (日本鬼子）or Japanese devils, and knows 
which is the hero and which is the enemy. Even if he enjoys these movies simply as 
one choice of the entertainment programs like other violent cartoons, he surely 
shares the memory of nation-building as a legend with the elder generations. 
This is one aspect I should bear in mind when thinking about diversities and 
differences among Chinese culture. I do not mean that it is important because 
inheriting the legend of revolution produces PRC patriots. I am simply skeptical 
about those immediate assumptions of cultural split in China between north and 
south that Friedman postulates. No matter how diverse and uncontrolled it seems, 
China keeps something to bind its people together in terms of attachment. 
Power Relation of Differences: Regional and Class 
It was not until the last ten years that social scientists began to be concerned 
with power relations within ethnic diversity among the Chinese. For example, 
historian Honig (1989, 1992) released her works on "Subei people", a migrant Han 
Chinese group in Shanghai who have been discriminated against since the nineteenth 
century. She pointed out how the category "Subei people" was created, and how this 
category has shaped and reinforced the local social structure that has been placing 
them in the lower class. Her works are significant in revealing academically that 
there has been actual class difference among Han in contemporary China. 
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In the Subei people's case, regional status is consistent with class status. That 
is，members of host society (local residents of Shanghai) occupy the dominant 
position and immigrants (Subei people) are placed in a subordinate class. The case I 
studied is not as simple as this. As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, 
regional dominance/subordinacy and class are intertwined. Migrant intellectuals are 
marginalized as new-comers although they are scarce and valuable because of their 
higher educational level. Despite their importance, they are subordinate. 
What this means is that educational level is not the only standard of class 
difference. Actually in Foshan, we see two kinds of class concepts intertwining: class 
in intellectual terms versus class in political/economical terms. Migrant intellectuals 
are intellectual elites yet have no practical power; members of local Foshan sectors 
have vested interest in the local society yet lack intellectual resources. My claim is 
that power relations between these two groups depend on how each group's 
resources—intellectual knowledge for migrant intellectuals, and political/economical 
power for locals—are evaluated within the context of the local society in this period 
of time. That is to say, whether or not a group thinks is a resource can be really a 
resource depends on how it is evaluated in the society. This involves the fact in 
Foshan that different groups have different values, which I will discuss in Chapter 5. 
In the Pearl River Delta region throughout its history, people have attached less 
importance to education due mainly to its advanced commercial foundation. Then, 
what is likely to happen in Foshan is that local people do not care about immigrants 
with an academic degree. What changed this attitude is the needs for the professional 
knowledge and technical skill, which was generated by the state goal. Thus, I argue 
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that the evaluation of resources is in fact influenced by the larger environment 
established under the state. Each group presents its identity and asserts its power 
within this environment. 
State Involution in Urban South China 
In this regard, I rely on the concept of "state involution" used by Siu. She 
reveals intricately intertwined relationships between state power and human agency 
in a south China village. In Agents and Victims in South China (1989a)，she reviews 
the transformation of power relations in changing social systems from the late 
imperial period to the post-revolution period. She claims, in opposition to some 
scholars' doubt about the communist revolution's effect to prevail in rural areas, that 
communization since the 1950s has penetrated into local rural areas, and 
consequently made the local-level leadership act more as state agents rather than as 
political brokers between the state and the local society, a role which local gentry 
before the revolution had enjoyed. In this sense, she argues, rural people were 
involved in the establishment and reinforcement of the socialist state through their 
daily lives over the last thirty years, though it brought pain and predicament to them 
at the same time. This is what Siu calls state involution一state intervention which 
involves its people in state-building in their daily lives naturally, unconsciously, and 
inevitably. In "Socialist Peddlers and Princes in a Chinese Market Town", the same 
predicament caused by this state involution is revealed in the 1980s south China 
under reform, in which "state involution may have assumed new and varied guises." 
(1989b) 
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Before Siu, two scholars had discussed the concept of involution. It was first 
proposed by Geertz in his study of Javanese wet-field agriculture (1963b), as a self-
defeating process whereby cultural patterns fail to transform themselves into a new 
pattern even after it has become a certain fixed form. On the basis of this concept, 
Duara elaborated an idea of state involution, and applied it to the study of China. In 
his research on local finances in north China in the republican period (1987), he 
defmed state involution considering the actual financial situation of north China at 
that time—a process in which the formal structure of the state fails to increase its 
share of the total resources collected. In contrast to state making which generates 
effective expansion depending on the formal structure of the state, Duara evaluated 
state involution negatively from a functional viewpoint. 
From Geertz to Duara to Siu, the concept of involution has changed and been 
further elaborated upon. In this thesis, I refer exclusively to Siu's concept of state 
involution, because it is directly relevant to the study of the role and practice of 
migrant intellectuals as well as locals in Foshan. Migrant intellectuals found the 
source of their legitimacy in the values of the state: their ability fostered by higher 
education was what both the state and local society needed immediately, their 
knowledge and technology was what Foshan seriously lacked, and their cultural taste 
was more authoritative—or, closer to “central culture"—than local people's. Even 
the Mandarin they speak, the official spoken Chinese language, was an indication of 
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a proper and elite Chinese national.^ In short, they depended on the evaluation by the 
state for their authoritativeness over locals. 
On the other hand, local Foshan people also had their practice for occupying 
the central position in the city. They tended not to care about migrant intellectuals' 
discourse of "authoritativeness" because they had their own set of values and 
principles. They were proud of their rapid economic development, of their quick and 
bold action in capturing the moment when the authorities loosened the policies and 
regulations, and of their ability to make use of such an opportunity shrewdly and 
effectively. They would say, "Without this ability, how could one achieve success, 
even if one was given flexible policies to enable one to make money?" This ability 
was enough for them to remain dominant over outsiders. 
This discussion actually overlaps with the central discourse of practice 
theory. In The Social Construction of Reality, Berger and Luckmann state: “Society 
is a human product. Societies are objective reality. Man is a social product." 
(1967:61) Siu's discussion in her works, as well as my view of the Foshan case, 
obviously relates to the first component of this set. Giddens discusses “duality of 
structure", which means "the essential recursiveness of social life, as constituted in 
social practice: structure is both medium and outcome of the reproduction of 
practice." (1979:5) According to him, the duality of structure “relates to the 
5 Although they have had difficulties in their daily lives in Foshan because they lack the ability to 
speak Cantonese, a local dialect which is incomprehensible for Mandarin speakers, they still tended 
towards thinking that their "authoritativeness" covered this deficiency. See Chapter 5. 
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fundamentally recursive character of social life, and expresses the mutual 
dependence of structure and agency." (1979:69) 
It seems that Foshan's shrewd and flexible practice for stimulating economy 
is the leading people's product as free choice opposed to the migrant intellectuals' 
claim which relies on the state legitimacy. Actually, however, those outstandingly 
shrewd practices in an open atmosphere do not imply an absolute freedom from state 
intervention, because such practices are possible only under the system effected by 
the state. Cantonese practicality may by simply be a regional character; but it may be 
also relevant to consider how this character is made use of within the sociopolitical 
context in this period of time in Foshan. Commercial success is encouraged and 
justified by the state. Furthermore, economic achievement will function to prove the 
correctness of the state policies, and to justify that the state一and the Party~"was 
leading them correctly. Ironically enough, in the very sense that they act, no matter 
how shrewdly, by making use of the freer policies as much as the state allows them, 
they, simultaneously, as a result, play the role of executors of the state policies as 
well as benefiters of the reform. 
The present occurrences in Foshan seems to consist of two contradictory 
practices of the peoples. On the one hand, they enjoy an economic/cultural advantage 
that enables them to ignore the Beijing regime's attempt to control them. However, 
on the other hand, they do not cease to position themselves within the framework of 
the PRC, not because of central authoritarian forces but because of their image of 
community. Under the national goal of economic development which the entire 
nation considers a top priority, Foshan has competed with other cities in China, and 
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when it performs better, not only are Foshan people proud of their achievement, but 
their preference also satisfies the state regime. Hence, they can enjoy their earlier 
prosperity and cultural freedom from the Beijing regime within the framework of 
China. 
3. Methodology 
I collected my information primarily through my fieldwork at the city proper 
of Foshan from June to September, 1995. My previous stay in this city, for three 
months in 1985 and for two years from 1989 to 1991 respectively, also gave me 
much basic information about this site. The major methods I used were three: 
participant observation, interviews, and study of media. 
Participant Observation and Interviews 
As is true for many other ethnographic studies, I had many sites for 
participant observation: college campus, people's homes, streets, offices, stores, and 
in any other public and private places I have been in Foshan. I ate with people, 
talked with them, did what they were doing, and heard what they were talking about. 
I spoke Cantonese to Cantonese speakers and spoke Mandarin to Mandarin speakers. 
When necessary, which was actually most of the time, I chose to be treated as either 
a local or a non-local Chinese in public places. I did not pretend intentionally to be 
any of them, but usually people simply thought that I was a Chinese. Obviously it 
was much more natural for me to be taken as a Chinese rather than as a foreigner 
who was doing social research. 
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Mostly I conducted participant observation, but I also interviewed twenty-
four migrant intellectuals during my fieldwork. The definition of a migrant 
intellectual is a person exhibiting all of the following characteristics: 1) a person 
originating from a place other than the Cantonese-speaking area of Guangdong 
province and who considers him/herself non-Cantonese; 2) a college graduate or 
above; 3) a person who migrated to Foshan after his/her education period for any 
reason other than coercion. Eighteen of the interviewees are male and six of them are 
female. Twenty-one of them are in their twenties to thirties, and three of them are 
older ranging from their forties to sixties. I did interview other migrants but do not 
count them, because they do not fulfill all of the definitions of a migrant intellectual. 
Due greatly to my Foshan friends' help, approaching interviewees was fairly easy. 
Some of them themselves are migrant intellectuals, and they were willing to accept 
my requests for interviews. Many other friends also introduced their colleagues, 
friends, and relatives who are migrant intellectuals. Thus, I reached most of them 
depending on personal connections which worked quite smoothly. People whom I 
accessed officially during my fieldwork were also cooperative and introduced me to 
other migrant intellectuals they knew. This enabled me to conduct some interviews 
which otherwise would be impossible. 
Aside from migrants, I formally interviewed four local intellectuals. I also 
talked with approximately twenty locals most of whom were of high educational 
background; but I preferred talking with them freely opposed to a formal interview. I 
think this was a more effective way to learn about the locals' common ideas about 
migrant issue. For one thing, local Foshan people are generally less interested in 
23 
discussing a serious topic at a formal situation than migrant intellectuals are. Also, in 
terms of social status, they are in the position of being the dominant host society and 
generally have a contradictory attitude towards the migrants~they feel guilty for 
looking down on the migrants on the one hand, and they continue to maintain a sense 
of superiority on the other. Thus it might not be very good idea to ask them 
explicitly to talk about it to me, a researcher with a notepad in her hand. Migrant 
intellectuals, on the contrary, have been generally suffering from the locals' attitude, 
so they were eager enough to tell me their experience. Some of them even expressed 
a slight mood of accusing locals. 
Some informants are difficult to categorize into any group since they have 
traits of both local and non-local, for such a reason as being born in the north and 
migrated to Guangdong when they were little. Despite the difficulty in categorizing, 
talking with them was very helpful. They were generally conscious of their double 
identities, and told me many empirical insights about what it is like to be a local, as 
well as what it is like to be a non-local, through their cool view. 
Five employers and/or leaders of work units, as well as six bureaucrats and 
political leaders in relevant positions, also accepted my interview. Considering their 
position and busy schedule, these interviews were valuable, even if there might be 
some sense of officialism in their formal answers. I am still not certain about the 
extent which these official answers convey the reality; still, these officials gave me a 
great deal of information. I also obtained many insights from some elder intellectuals 
and college lecturers, to which I am deeply grateful. 
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The interviews I conducted were open-ended, though I asked a set of 
questions I had prepared, which includes why the interviewees decided to migrate to 
Foshan, whether they learned how to speak Cantonese, how much Mandarin and 
how much Cantonese they speak in their everyday life, and how they perceive local 
Foshan people's thought and practice different from their own. I strongly agree with 
Takezawa (1994:33-35) in stating the advantage of a qualitative approach—open-
ended question interviews, for example—in a study of ethnic identity.^ Each 
interview took from roughly one and a half to two and a half hours. After the 
interview I usually had a period of free talk with the interviewee. Although some 
scholars recommend taping the interviews (see, for example, Takezawa 1994:33)，I 
did not do this except for the first two interviews with very young informants who 
had no work experience and simply did not mind being taped. Before beginning the 
third interview, however, I found that this would not work for "adults". Work 
experience involves more than work itself; it means intricate human relations which 
involve power and interests. By that time, I also began to share the atmosphere with 
my interviewees that migration experience was a kind of sensitive topic which would 
possibly lead to unpleasant issues such as inequality and discrimination. In short, 
taping was dangerous intrusion to them. I gave up my plan of taping interviews 
immediately and chose the alternative of letting them say whatever they wanted; 
nobody minded my taking notes instead of taping. Since then, it became my routine 
6 Takezawa holds that to understand the research subjects' ethnic identity essentially requires an 
emic point of view instead of etic; thus, it is more appropriate to write an ethnography and lead it 
inductively to a theoretical development. 
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to write long accounts immediately after each interview so that I preserve what and 
how the interviewees told me as much as possible. The statements I will quote in 
later chapters are all from these accounts. I do realize that this is not a perfect way to 
do interviews in terms of preserving records. Nonetheless, I do not think that I 
should have taped our conversations, purely because of the nature of the topic. 
Compared with the information I gained in my notes and accounts, I should take 
some loss of information as a necessary cost, given the topic about which I was 
interviewing. Whether taping the interviews is helpful may depend on what we talk 
about. 
Written Materials and Media Study 
The main written materials I used are annals. I went to libraries for these 
official materials; but I met two fortunate happenings during my stay. The first thing 
was the publication of the Annal of the Foshan City after almost many years' delay. 
This saved me from having to refer to the far older book, written in classic Chinese, 
Foshan Zhongyi Xiangzhi or the Local History of the Loyal and Righteous Xiang of 
Foshan, which all those who study Foshan's history should use (see Faure 1990, Luo 
1994). As for the basic historical background, the Annal mostly depends on the local 
history, which was enough for my study. The second and even more incredible 
occurrence was that various kinds of annals on special subjects which were originally 
not for sale were sold at a bookstore in September, the last phase of my stay. These 
annals originally had no price, thus a small label was stuck at the back of the book 
26 
and the price was put down on it. I wonder if it was a by-product of the shift to a 
market economy. 
Local printed media is a fascinating source of information about what is 
happening to this city, what people are thinking about, and how Foshan is changing 
in accordance with the change of the outside world. I reviewed the local newspaper 
"Foshan Daily" for the past ten years, which brought much basic knowledge of this 
place to me. This made me understand more about what I have experienced during 
my stays. Magazines published in Foshan also helped me gain relevant information. 
Local TV and radio are another good source to understand people's ethos. 
Radio is particularly attractive because it enabled me to listen to ordinary people's 
voice everyday—many programs had telephone conversations between the DJ and 
listeners. An enormous number of lively topics and concerns were on air twenty-four 
hours a day to reflect the reality of the local society. Issues on migrants and regional 
differences came out from time to time, and some programs were even made for 
migrants. I could not follow all radio programs, but I listened to them as much as 
possible. One thing of which I am sure is that public broadcast in my fieldsite in 
1995 was far more than official propaganda; this discourse is affluent and lively 
enough to be an excellent source for anthropological research. 
27 
Chapter 2. Setting 
Foshan (佛山）is a city located in the center of the Pearl River Delta, 
Guangdong Province (see Figure 1). According to the present administrative 
definition, it consists of the Urban district (城區)，Shiwan district (石灣區)，and four 
county-level cities (see Figure 2) with a total land area of 3,813.64 square kilometers 
and a population of 3,110,600 people (The Statistics Bureau of the Foshan City 
1996). However, conventional conception of Foshan included a much smaller area. 
Historically Foshan was known as a hao (堡)or fort in early times, and as a zhen (鎮) 
or town since the North Song (AD 970) (AF:3). What was Foshan zhen is now 
equivalent only to today's Urban district. Now the two districts, Urban and Shiwan, 
with a combined population of 413,800 and occupying 77.4 square kilometers 
(FY:299), are not only together formally defined as shiqu (市區）or the city proper, 
but also are often regarded as Foshan in a narrow sense by local people. 
Foshan today is an impressive city for its unique contrast of oldness and 
newness. In the midst of the transformation from a traditional commercial town to a 
modern urban city, the city is under rapid renewal: pulling down old buildings 
mainly at the north and east parts of the city proper, the previous center of the town, 
and newly developing periurban agricultural area mainly at the south and west. In 
the city proper, we often see an outstanding skyscraper of marble and mirror glasses 
right next to old brick buildings. However, once stepping out of the main street to an 
alley, we find another world here: tiny brick houses with wooden doors neatly line 
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both sides of the alley which is so narrow that only motorbikes can drive through. 
Clothes are hung on ropes in the alley, and elder people are sitting in or around the 
house quietly. Though we smell less charcoal in kitchens than we did ten years ago 
by virtue of LPG, the aroma of Chinese medicine and incense is ever-present in these 
neighborhoods. In the northern area of the city, previous main streets between the 
old buildings still remain functional, yet they are so narrow that they always cause a 
chaotic trafficjam at rush-hour with pedestrians, bicycles, tricycles, motorbikes and 
all kinds of automobiles. In the southern area, newly built forty-meter straight roads 
provide smooth transportation for large trucks and buses, if only temporary 
smoothness until the ongoing construction at both sides the roads will be all done 
and every unit in these buildings will be filled with tenants. 
If focusing on its relation with world consumption culture, I would say that 
Foshan is one of the few Chinese cities that has a branch of McDonald's. Run by the 
leading state-owned local department store as a franchise, this world-famous fast 
food restaurant attracts the children, while its high price for food which does not fit 
local dietary preference rouses their parents' disgust. 
It is because of these various aspects of change in Foshan that the migration 
of intellectuals, which is the object of this study, occurred. In order to know the 
comprehensive profile of this site, it is necessary to start from its history. 
1 1 : l ' ,
 • : :
 : ! l n f [ _ ^ - : i
 _ i -
 , , •
 ^ 
I P 3 R i p " " ^ " ^ ^ ^ " " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " " J ^ ^ ^ " " " " " " " " T i r " " " " " l o f . « ® ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ f % ^ f ， c ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
 I 
r _ . ^ ^ ^ p . .







 g w x r ^ ^ ^ p ^
 . . ¾ . ^ ^ . ^ !
 ^ 
4 3 ^ N ^
 x n ^ ^ ^ % p x s
 -
. . \ ^
 ^














 i , ^ ^ ^ ^ g _ J l i l l 
^ A 1 #
 
^
^ 1 . ^ ^ ^ ¾
 1 
J
」 1 ¾ ¾ ¾ . ,
 : m f s ^











 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ¾ 
1 - ¾ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ w 
®
 p r o v 5 c i a l
 c a p i t a l
 f
 i : " r j : w ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
® f a -
 c i W
 w ,
 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ w 
o C o u n t y
 c a p i t a l
 ^ ^ ^ y
 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
. H i . . ^ ^ ^ ^ k ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ J ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ l • S p e c i a l
 E c o n o m i c
 Z o n e










^ ^ 三施 \ 
\ Sanshui County ^ ^ ^ y-^"^>>s^ 
i X \ I 
\ XinanTown / 南海縣 _ « ' S ‘ 
v,^^ Nanhai County Wmm J 
\ • I Guicheng T o ^ / 
y r Y ^ ^ � 
L 广 *^ 城區广. ^^ 
\ \ 石港區 FoshanOty[ ^ N 
A \ - ^ n ^ ^ 
^ ^ v^ ^ ^ 〉 順德縣 \ 
\ \ „ ^ ^ ^ / Shunde County L ^ 
/ 高 明 鎮 參 、 \ 參 ^ " ^ T ^ 
J Gaoming Town \ V 娘 鎮 > 
/ f y ^ v Daliang Town / 
/ 高明縣 「 ^ ^ ^ " “ ^ r ^ ^ 
Gaoming County \ \ [ . . ^ ^ ^ 
1 ^ ^ 
Figure 2 Schematic Map of Foshan 






1. Historical Background ofFoshan 
A Long History 
Foshan has a history of more than 1,300 years, which can be traced back to 
the Jin Dynasty (AD 265-420), and it gained its name in the Tang Dynasty (AD 618-
902) (Foshan Foreign Propaganda Leading Office et al. [eds.]:6). In the Dong Jin 
Dynasty, Long'an Year 2 (AD 398)，a Buddhist monk brought three Buddha statues 
from Cashmere to Tapogang, a hill in Foshan, and built a temple. After he left, 
nobody took care of the temple for many years and the temple collapsed. During the 
Tang Dynasty, Zhenguan Year 2 (AD 628), residents dug up the three Buddha 
statues from the ruins of this temple as well as stone monuments bearing inscriptions 
conceiving the Buddha and the hill. Later on when people rebuilt a Buddhist temple 
at the same site, they hung a new stone plate engraved "Foshan, Tang Zhenguan 
Year 2” It was at this time that people began calling the town "Foshan," which 
literally means "Buddha mountain." (AF:165) 
Development as a Commercial Town 
Back in the Tang and Song Dynasties, Foshan had already become a 
prosperous town of commerce and handicraft industry. Foshan, Jindezhen (景德鎮）in 
Jiangxi (江西）province, Hankouzhen (漢口鎮）in Hubei (湖二匕）and Zhuxianzhen 
(朱仙鎮)in Henan (、河南)were known together as the four famous towns (四大名鎮)in 
those days. Later in the Ming and Qing Dynasties, Foshan ranked first among these 
four towns and became the biggest collecting and distributing center of merchandise 
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in South China. It was then known as one of the four merchandise centers, which 
were Beijing (二匕京)in the North, Foshan in the South, Suzhou (蘇州)in the East and 
Hankou in the West, also called the four metropolises (Foshan Cultural Exchange 
Association with Foreign Countries et al. [eds.] 1991: 6, Lau 1994:439-442). 
Aside from commerce and trade, Foshan was well known for its industry. 
Pottery manufacturing began in Shiwan, a village in Foshan, by the Han Dynasty. 
During the Tang, Shiwan was known as an important pottery production center in 
Linnan district. In the Ming and Qing era, there was a remarkable development in 
the pottery industry which made the whole town socially stable and prosperous. This 
development continued until the Opium War (AF:870-871, Lau 1994:438-439, Luo 
1994:206-207，Scollard 1978:104). Another important industry was iron casting. 
Foshan in the late Ming and early Qing emerged as an important town famous for 
producing iron wares (Lau 1994:439). Cannons were the main products along with 
pans, statues, and incense burners. Foshan cannons were the main weapons used by 
the Chinese in the Opium War, some of which we can see today in many ex-
battlefields in the Pearl River Delta (AF:940-944, Luo 1994:196-206). 
In the above process, Foshan attracted many newcomers from outer areas in 
Guangdong as well as neighboring provinces. It is amazing that merchants came 
from distant places such as Shanxi and Shaanxi to engage in commerce and trade in 
Foshan (Luo 1994:333-346，The Chinese Ancient History Research Office of The 
Guangdong Social Science Academy's History Research Center et al. [eds.] 
1987:126-127, 144-153). In the domain of those prosperous industries such as 
pottery manufacturing and iron casting，poor outsiders flocked to Foshan to be 
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employed as laborers (AF:871, 943). This influx of population undoubtedly gave 
Foshan one of its distinctive characters: it was a town of immigrants. Accordingly, 
there was a rapid increase in the population of Foshan during the Qing dynasty. 
From 1674 to 1684, the population increased from 60,000 to 100,000; from 1684 to 
1830, it expanded to 600,000. While the population increased by only 40,000 in two 
hundred and twenty-two years between 1451 and 1674, it increased by the same 
volume in the ten years between 1674 and 1684 (Office of Annals of Foshan et al. 
[eds.] 1990:6). 
Zu Miao (祖廟）or the Temple of Ancestry, originally known as Beidi Miao or 
The Temple of the Northern Emperor, was built as Foshan gained the rudimentary 
form of a town. Zu Miao was important to people at that time both practically and 
symbolically, since it was the center of religious and community activities; it 
reinforced the residents' sentimental tie to Foshan (Luo 1994:141-149). It is said that 
its construction began in the years of the reign of Yuanfeng in the north Song 
Dynasty (AD 1078-1085). It was burnt down at the end ofYuan Dynasty (AD 1271-
1368) and was rebuilt in the fifth year of the reign of Hongwu (1372) at the 
beginning of Ming Dynasty (Foshan Municipal Museum 1994:6). Since then, it has 
functioned as a landmark of Foshan as well as a symbol of the local identity of the 
Foshan people. In the Qing era when emerging non-local merchants who settled in 
Foshan participated in community issues through large donations to Zu Miao (Luo 
1994:309), it even became the ancestral hall of all Foshan residents including both 
native residents and the new-comers. Today, Zu Miao is famous as Foshan's most 
important tourist attraction. 
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During the Ming Dynasty, the town of Foshan obtained an honor. It was the 
name zhongyi xiang (忠義鄕）or "Neighborhood of Loyalty and Righteousness" that 
was awarded by the Ming emperor in 1452 in recognition of the resistance that 
Foshan mustered when attacked by the rebel Huang Xiaoyang in 1449 (Faure 
1990:4). Since then, both Foshan and Zhongyi Xiang were used together to refer to 
the town— Foshan was often called Foshan Zhongyi Xiang. (AF:166). 
The above events are evidences of the dynamic process through Foshan 
society has maintained its existence, if not in the same form. Foshan continuously 
absorbed sociocultural changes, and interpreted these changes as its new traditions 
(Hobsbawm 1983) so it would keep its continuity—yet the nature of Foshan society 
inevitably became more and more complex. 
Once flourishing production and trade in Foshan gradually decreased in its 
growth in the late Qing and the Mingguo era. The whole industry in Foshan was 
greatly damaged by the invasion of the Western powers as well as the occupation by 
Japan from 1938 to 1945. 
Post 1949 Period 
According to the official historical record, the People's Liberation Army 
expelled the Kuomintang army and liberated Foshan during the night of October 14, 
1949 (AF:76). From this time on, Foshan came to be led by cadres of the Communist 
Party, many of whom were dispatched from the northern provinces. Called nanxia 
ganbu (南下干咅艮)or "Cadres Down to the South," they led local cadres and worked 
for establishing the new sociopolitical system under the policy of Communist Party 
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of China. These cadres, a regional/cultural minority yet had strong political power, 
were more than stranger in local society. They brought much complexity to the 
social relations in Foshan, which even provoked a political struggle between them 
and native political leaders (see Chapter 4). 
Like other Guangdong cities, Foshan at this time was strongly controlled by 
the state policy. Being peripheral and remote from its national capital, Guangdong 
was left of a primary site of development in the country. Social infrastructure was 
not well-established in this region; the limited resources of China were distributed to 
those areas the authorities thought important. Furthermore, since the 1960's when 
the state started rendering the plan of sanxian jianshe (三綫建設)or Third Tier 
Construction, Guangdong was defined as "the first tier," an area geographically 
facing their enemy一imperialists一and thus responsible for defending the state from 
them. Because main industries were relocated to the hinterland, Guangdong, 
including Foshan, was left relatively backward in terms of industrial production, 
which was a major index of development at that time (Li 1995:379-380)7 
The Cultural Revolution led the people in Foshan to participate 
enthusiastically in the political movements at that time as it did at other China cities. 
7 Li explains "third tier construction" as follows: "During the 1960s because of the animosity 
between China and the Soviet Union, Mao Zedong insisted that China must prepare itself for war to 
build up its infrastructure and national defense systems in Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Shaanxi, 
Qinghai， and Ningxia, and in the westem parts of Shanxi, Henan, Hubei, and 
Hmian....Geographically speaking, the areas targeted for large construction were considered the 
hinterland of China; they were areas in the ‘third tier. ‘ The ‘first tier，was the coastal areas, 
Xinjiang, and bmer Mongolia. The land in between the first and the third tiers was the ‘second 
tier.'" 
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The result was chaos; the whole society, including industry, economy, administration 
and education, ceased to function. One remarkably exceptional incident was that Zu 
Miao was saved from destruction by the Red Guards. Although the Red Guards 
g 
intended to destroy it in order to eliminate sijiu (四舊）or "the four olds" , local 
people's dissuasion in many ways prevented them from doing it (AF:676). It is true 
that the locals had a strong attachment to Zu Miao. However, mere sentiment was 
not enough; the people needed considerable political power, enough power to 
dissuade the Red Guards. The local leaders put their power to use, and thus enabled 
the Foshan people to save their local landmark instead of obeying a national political 
order. From this incident we can see Foshan people's consistent ethos that attached 
less importance to national politics than to what they think important in their own 
community. It is somewhat ironic that Zu Miao is now one of the most famous 
sightseeing points in Foshan which serves to attract travelers as well as to make the 
name of Foshan more widely known. It also reinforces local people's pride in their 
long history. 
8 One of the objects of elimination during the Cultural Revolution, which includes old ideas, old 
culture, old customs, and old habits. See Li (1995: 426-428). 
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2. Reform and Opening: A Rush to Modernization 
Economic Achievement and Prosperous Life 
Since 1978, when Guangdong was instructed by the state to formulate 
"special and flexible policies" (Woo 1994:335), Foshan has begun its rapid 
economic development in economic terms. One year after the demarcation of three 
Special Economic Zones—at Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou—in 1984，the Pearl 
River Delta Economic Open Region, which includes Foshan, was founded. This 
enabled Foshan to pursue its own development more autonomously. Making use of 
this advantage, Foshan immediately practiced a series of measures to achieve its 
development. As Vogel reports (1989:181-189), they worked very well. Gross 
industrial and agricultural output value in the city proper between 1980，1985 and 
1990 increased from RMB 904.93 million to RMB 2,600.11 million, to RMB 
6,006.25 million respectively. National income in 1980 was RMB 307.87 million， 
which increased to RMB 1,006.59 million in 1985 and to RMB 3,015.04 million in 
1990. Average wage including state and collective ownership showed remarkable 
increase as well: it was 843 yuan in 1980, 1,645 yuan in 1985 and 3,531 yuan in 
1990 (The Statistics Bureau of the Guangdong Province [ed.] 1991). Gross industrial 
and agricultural output of the whole city in 1994 was RMB 91,580 million; average 
annual wage of staff and workers was 8,426 yuan (The Government Work Report 
1995) while the national average was 4,538 yuan (The State Statistical Bureau [ed.] 
1995). Besides maximizing its connection with Hong Kong and Macao to improve 
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foreign trade (Sit 1995), Foshan promoted its own products in the domestic market. 
By the late 1980s，Guangdong products such as food and drinks, electric appliances 
and other light industry products, which of course included Foshan products, were so 
prevalent that they almost dominated the Chinese market. The products were of 
relatively better quality, had a fancier appearance, or were simply things that had 
never been provided by local manufacturers before. The sales commission system—a 
system that brings commission to sales agencies and which people think symbolizes 
the cleverness of Cantonese businessmen~further accelerated the promotion of their 
products. In some sense those products symbolized the new wind of reform and 
openness. Together with its remarkable achievement in economic development, the 
name of Foshan gradually became well known all over China. 
Statistics indicate the remarkable economic development of Foshan. For one 
thing, people's living standards showed unusual improvement for a Chinese city. 
Average per capita living area at the end of 1994 was 13.67 square meters (The 
Statistics Bureau of the Foshan City 1995), while the national average in 1994 was 
7.8 square meters (The State Statistical Bureau [ed.] 1995). Table 1 shows urban 
household possession of major durable consumer goods per one hundred households 
in Foshan, in other large cities and in the nation as a whole at the end of 1994. In 
1994, every 100 people in the city proper had 29.7 telephones (The Editing 
Committee for Foshan Yearbook [ed.] 1995:129). Compared with the national level 
in the same year, 2.2 telephones per 100 people (The State Statistical Bureau [ed.] 
1995), as well as with the goal proposed by the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications that every 100 people will have five to six phones by the end of 
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this century (The Editing Committee for Foshan Yearbook [ed.] 1995:129), Foshan's 
achievement is remarkable. 
Table 1 
Urban Household Year-End Possession of 
Major Durable Consumer Goods Per 100 Households (1994)^ 
%^%%SnNNVSN%%VS%^«kV%SVLH%%^%%%nV%NVWSNKVSK%VS,%H%KHK%%%N^ V^^  
Color TV Refriger- VCRs Washing Motor- Air Con-
Sets ators Machines cycles ditioners 
"Nadond 86T2T 62.T6 K96 8 ^ 126 sToF 
Beijing 111.80 104.40 49.80 102.80 2.40 5.00 
Shanghai 101.40 95.40 47.80 73.00 0.60 19.60 
Guangdong 98.00 70.20 33.73 92.68 16.77 30.11 
Foshan* (‘94) 126 99 58 104 43 69 
(^95) 129 99 56 103 56 68 
* Licludes the city proper only. 
Resource: The Statistics Bureau of the City ofFoshan 1995, 1996 (for Foshan) 
The State Statistical Bureau (ed.) 1995 (for others) 
Statistics may not surprise us; the actual practice of the people certainly does. 
Pagers are as prevalent as they are in Hong Kong. Cellular phones are also becoming 
more and more common, though people tend to be provided one by their workplace 
rather than purchasing one by themselves. Various options of consumption are 
available in every domain; eating, clothing, housing and entertainment. Traveling is 
another new trend people have begun to enjoy. Many workplaces conduct collective 
tours to sightseeing points in other provinces, and individuals go traveling as well. 
91 show this table to emphasize Foshan's relative material achievement within the PRC, not to make 
a comparison with other countries. 
40 
Some even go abroad. It was on January 1, 1989 when Foshan city opened the door 
to traveling to Thailand and/or Hong Kong for visiting travelers' relatives (FD 
January 1 1989). Very soon, the destinations increased and more and more people 
took part in tours, not necessarily to visit their relatives but simply to travel. In 1995， 
travel to more distant and costly places such as Japan, the United States, and Europe 
are available if one can afford it/° 
In short, Foshan became a nationally famous medium-sized city for its very 
successful improvement by the early 1990s. The modern appearance of the city and 
high living standards of its residents were the envy of other cities in China. 
Foshan has become so rich that it has even begun donating money over the 
last two years towards the building of elementary schools in the poor districts of the 
province. Responding to the "Hope Project" initiated by the state, the Foshan 
Committee of the Communist Youth League rendered this project. In 1994, the 
League sent a group to Ruyuan county in northern Guangdong to help more than six 
thousand children who could not financially afford to attend elementary school. The 
members of the group offered activities as well as donating 24,000 yuan which they 
collected from the public (FD October 4 1994, January 17 1995)/^ The same series 
of project is ongoing this year. The League decided in June to build a "Foshan Hope 
10 Although more and more overseas travel is available in Foshan, traveling is still not so convenient 
as is travel in places like Hong Kong or Japan. Obtaining a visa to one's destination remains 
difficult. It needs time and intricate procedures, which often affects the time of departure, and there 
is always the possibility of one's visa application being rejected. 
u The voluntary work was conducted with some representatives of Hong Kong Playlands 
Association. 
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Elementary School" at Nanwan village, Luhe county, Shanwei city by the new year 
of 1996. Aside from visiting the venue to learn the situation, they are asking the 
public to donate around 600,000 yuan (FD June 10, June 13, and June 20 1995). The 
young generation in Foshan begins to see poverty as something distant and unreal. 
Poverty is something that lies in another world than their own and all they should do 
is to consider and help the poor. It is never their business. 
Incentive toward High-Tech Industry 
Despite its miraculous economic jump in the second half of the 1980s, 
Foshan's top leaders in the 1990s were not too optimistic about the city's future. 
Partly because Foshan had another goal at that time of catching up with “Asian Four 
Little Dragons"-Nffis by 2005 (Foshan Branch of C.P.P.C.C., et al. [eds.])/^ and 
because there emerged some signs of its economy declining (Zhong 1994), Foshan 
needed to find a new strategy for a further improvement. Like many other provinces, 
cities, counties, and villages, Foshan had also proposed a top-down principle “keji 
xingshi,,(禾斗技興市）or "establishing the city depending on science and technology" as 
early as in 1986. According to Zhong Guangchao, the mayor of Foshan, as the Pearl 
River Delta gradually lost its past advantages of preferential policies and cheap 
labor, Foshan came to realize that this principle would be the key to the further 
development (Zhong 1994). Thus, in the 1990s，Foshan began to emphasize the 
12 This goal is based on Deng Xiaoping's speech in 1992 about his inspection of Guangdong. He 
said that Guatigdong should catch up with "Asian Four Little Dragons" in twenty years. Ambitious 
Foshan set its own goal for five years shorter than this goal. 
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importance of science and technology much more eagerly than before. In the local 
newspapers in 1991，one finds an exceptionally large number of articles advocating 
science and technology as a key to bringing another miracle to Foshan. 
Very soon, keji or science and technology transformed into gaoxin jishu 
(高新技術）or advanced technology (high-technology). It was an attempt to shift 
Foshan industries from labor-intensive industries to technology-intensive industries. 
In January 1993，the State Council approved that Foshan establish a High-Tech 
Industries Development Zone as one of fifty-two national-level zones in China. 
Zhong Guangchao stated that High-Tech industries will be the hope of the Pearl 
River Delta, thus Foshan must establish the Development Zone, so it will be a 
13 
permanent base of a body of High-Tech industries (Zhong 1994). 
Foshan's pursuit of high-technology is even more ambitious. In May 1995， 
the State Council approved that Foshan establish Foshan Enterprises Post Doctors 
Work Station. Previously in China, only universities and research institutions with 
doctoral courses were allowed to have Post-Doctoral Workshop in Foshan's 
Enterprises, emphasized basic studies. Recently Foshan obtained an information that 
the state has loosened this regulation. Thus, the Personnel Bureau immediately began 
13 In reality，Guangdong akeady had six national-level Development Zones including Foshan's one 
and two provincial-level Zones in 1993 (FD 28 August 1993). Like the case of Industrial 
Development Zones in rural area many of which failed to attract as large a number of investors as 
had been expected, there seems to be a sign of over-competition, although one leader of a 
governmental association denied my concern when I interviewed him. Liu et al. (1992) also strongly 
concerns that the Pearl River Delta's hasty shift from labor-intensive industry to High-Tech industry 
is premature and risky. 
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to work on establishing a post-doctoral workshop for applied studies. According to 
the Personnel Bureau, this station will not only make contribution toward technical 
improvement of Foshan High-Tech enterprises, but also will foster High-Tech 
engineers. Actual works are performed by an administrative committee which 
consists of state-level staff and Foshan leaders. Foshan provides the research funds, 
necessary environments including working facilities, living facilities, and other 
related resources. (FD August 23 1995)^ ^ 
Two points seem exceptionally prominent as Foshan's ethos. First, a quick 
shift of policy for development from industrialization to High-Tech industrialization, 
though it is an open question whether it will be successfully materialized. Second, 
Foshan is sensitive to the trend of state policies, and shrewd to put a new project into 
practice. 
Immigration: Intellectuals and Laborers 
In the process of the economic development, Foshan has experienced many 
changes. One of them is the influx of outsiders into the city. As has been happening 
in the whole Pearl River Delta, waves of immigrants have flocked into Foshan since 
the late 1980s. They consisted of two types of people; physical laborers, many of 
who were ex-peasants, and white-collar people who are more highly educated. Most 
of the immigrants of both types were young, many of who were men, yet there was a 
considerable number of women as well. Foshan needed both types of labor for its 
14 This article reports an interview with Kuang Dongcai, Director of the Personnel Bureau. I also 
refer to an interview with one leader of the related department. 
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development; immigrants needed a place like Foshan to achieve their own plan. 
According to Zhou (1992), the city proper of Foshan in 1990 and 1991 had 350,000 
immigrants while the population of local residents was 365,700/^ As for the number 
of educated workers, it is commonly said that it included from 30,000 in the early 
1980s to approximately 120,000 in ten years. An authoritative source told me that 
about half of them are in the city proper and another half dispersed in its county-
level cities.i6 
It is obvious that both types of immigrant workers have made a certain 
degree of contribution towards the development of Foshan. The city authorities 
repeatedly emphasize their contribution through local media (see, for example, FD 
September 28 1991, November 13 1993, January 30 1995, March 22 1995). 
Nonetheless, long-time residents of Foshan have not necessarily been aware of their 
contribution. The typical reaction of the Foshan people to the outsiders was either 
disgust or indifference, which would be an unexpectedly unfavorable reception for 
the migrants. It would be especially so for the intellectual workers, since they were 
generally proud enough to have been hired by Foshan because of the city's lack of 
experts. Despite the historical fact that Foshan was once a town of immigrants, it was 
forgotten after the descendants of the immigrants got assimilated into this place. 
Now it seems that history is being repeated. In the situation that resource, 
information, money as well as people no longer stay in their original places but get 
15 Zhou defines this category as follows: those who do not have permanent household record in 
Foshan yet are engaged in any kind of labor and stay for a relatively long period of time in Foshan. 
16 Merview with the leader mentioned at note 14. 
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activated to travel and interact, it is important to learn what is happening to the 
people of this "traditional" yet newly emerging city, how they perceive all these 
events, and what they perceive their culture is. 
46 
Chapter 3. Rencai and Migration of Rencai: 
Its Sociocultural Meaning 
There is a term rencai (人才）in Chinese language, which has equivalent 
English terms such as “a person of ability", “a talented person，’，“talent，，，"qualified 
personnel" as found in a dictionary. All of these terms overlap the common idea of 
intellectuals in modern China. The term rencai appeared very early in Chinese, but 
in the last fifteen years it has acquired a particular social meaning within the context 
of the state's goal—development and modernization. In this chapter, I first attempt 
to discuss the concept rencai in present China. Then I will focus on the sociocultural 
significance of the migration of rencai to the Pearl River Delta. 
1. WhatlsRencai? 
Literally speaking, ren means a person or people, cai ability, talent or gift. 
Consequently the term rencai is usually translated in accordance with the above 
quotes. Lei (1986:5-6) explains the meaning of this term from the standpoint of a 
critical interpretation of ancient texts: “Cai means relatively materialized capability 
as well as capability that will continuously develop to be materialized. Therefore, 
rencai refers to a person who has relatively materialized one's latent capability and 
will improve further. It also means a person who has achieved a relatively high 
degree of improvement." 
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Yet these explanations do not cover what the term really refers to within the 
contemporary context of the PRC. First of all, such a category as rencai~the able 
and qualified in general—is unique to the PRC. Precisely as one leader of a 
governmental department which is in charge of rencai affairs {Foshanshi Rencai 
77.以^)//权^^6/2权//佛山市人才交流協會）stated, only China has such a concept because in 
China the subdivision of professions is not well established yet. In other advanced 
countries like the US or Japan, they have various names of different professions, but 
have no such category as rencai. 
This naturally involves the problem of translation. In Foshan, I asked some 
local bureaucrats about the definition of this term and its equivalent in English. The 
answers given by these bureaucrats, who held positions in the rencai office were 
perplexing. They, including one of the top leaders of the department, told me that it 
is very difficult to give a single definition for the term. When translating it into 
English, they would mainly use the terms "talent" or “personnel，,，yet neither of 
these terms fully express the meaning of rencai.’ this often makes them simply use 
the Chinese term rencai rather than translating it. One of them was an English 
interpreter. His card had English names of the sections to which he belongs. It reads 
Foshan Municipal Office of Introducing Foreign Talent {Foshanshi Guowai Rencai 
Yinjin 3口"容0«^ "5/"7佛山市國夕卜人才引進辦公室） and Foshan Association for 
International Personnel Exchange {Foshanshi Gnoji Rencai Jiaoliu 
^^ /•6/71///佛山市國際人才交流協會）(underlining mine). Consistent with their 
explanation, he uses both talent and personnel according to different contexts when 
translating the term rencai. The term talent implies that this type of rencai is so rare 
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that Foshan depends upon its importation from other countries, while personnel 
indicates the rencai they already have yet need to exchange with other countries for 
more training. The fact is that this is precisely the main reason this association was 
established: they primarily wanted to dispatch Foshan domestic personnel to foreign 
countries to receive training and/or to experience the outside world. 
The above facts indicate two points. First, it seems that no English term is 
perfectly equivalent to the concept of rencai; second, the meaning of the term rencai 
has large fluidity. Taking the first point into consideration, I will use the original 
term rencai in the following discussion instead of translating it into any English 
term. As for the second point, this fluidity undoubtedly stems from the sociocultural 
context of Foshan as well as of China in this specific period of time—reform and 
open door policy. In order to make the meaning and position of rencai in Foshan 
clearer, I will first review the notion of the concept rencai in China. 
Cadre and Rencai: Sociopolitical Aspect 
The PRC is a state established by communist revolution, which is a major 
premise of the state system of China since 1949. Those who participated in 
revolutionary activities were called cadres in the Communist Party of China, and 
hence became the leading class in Chinese society after the revolution. The problem 
was that most cadres were far from highly educated. Most of the participants in the 
Chinese revolution were peasants who had little access to education. The result was 
that a huge number of uneducated—even illiterate—local party secretaries and 
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17 bureaucrats had the responsibility of leading the whole community. The subsequent 
Cultural Revolution denied the importance of education by defining intellectuals as 
one of the main class enemies to who must be overthrown. By the Gang of Four, 
intellectuals were listed at the bottom of nine categories of undesirables, and were 
called chou lao jiu (臭老九）or "stinking Number Nine" (Li 1995:27-28). 
The necessity for rencai did not emerge until the termination of the Cultural 
Revolution. Reform and open door policy since 1979 made the Chinese realize that 
their country was seriously backward compared with many other foreign countries. 
In their eyes, the gap in the domain of science and technology was crucial. It was 
this crisis situation that created the sudden need for highly educated intellectuals 
jg 
who, the state expected, would help develop China. An Introduction to Rencaixue 
(Ye et al. 1983) points out in its first section “The Rise of Rencaixue,, how modern 
Japan and the United States achieved economic development by shifting its stress 
from labor to science and technology (1-2), and how much importance the Unites 
States, Japan and England attach to the study of rencai (3). It is obvious from here 
that China's impatient need for the leaders of science and technology stems from its 
strong intention to catch up with the advanced countries. Though science and 
17 Institutes for higher education did exist in post-revolution China, yet they were hardly accessible 
for local cadres. Nor were they encouraged to be highly educated. At that time，the predominant 
thought in China did not attach importance to knowledge. Some typical propaganda materials reflect 
tMs point: the slogan "Unity is strength (圑結就是力量)，，was shouted and the stoty "The Foolish Old 
Man removed the mountains (愚公移山)，，was told, both of which embodied Mao Zedong's thought 
in attaching more importance to collective power and labor than knowledge and education. 
18 Rencaixue means "the study of rencai,, (see the later section). 
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technology is the primarily field rencai is immediately needed, the concept rencai 
actually includes a much wider range of professions, some of which are more than 
science and technology in our sense: foreign languages, economics, accountancy, etc. 
In fact, all highly educated people in any field may be categorized as rencai in the 
sense that they are relatively knowledgeable, qualified, and skillful. 
Economic reform also prompted drastic changes in the personnel 
management system. As new forms of non-state ownership were approved, college 
graduates obtained another option: to be either a national cadre or a non-cadre. Aside 
from spending a lifetime in the assigned state ownership units, there was the 
possibility of working for other sectors such as joint venture, township enterprise, 
etc., which were not of national cadre status. This means that they effectively 
escaped the previous personnel management system of hukou (户口）or residence 
registration and dang 'an (檔案）or personal files, since these new types of ownership 
did not entail the same degree of government surveillance. At the same time, 
however, there is a negative side; they must abandon what had been thought the only 
absolute measure of a good life in China~a permanently stable social status that 
brings satisfactory welfare. The surprising thing is that some cadres began daring to 
abandon these profits. 
The increase in social mobility, which is a by-product of the activation of the 
economy, made it more difficult for the government to manage personnel. The result 
was that the Personnel Bureau, a department originally in charge only of cadre 
affairs, took on the work of managing educated people who had escaped from the 
government sector. It opened new sections within the Personnel Bureau which had 
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the term rencai in their name一rencai yinjin hangongshi (人才引進辦公室)，rencai 
jiaoliu xiehui (人才交流協會)，etc. The dang 'an or personal document management 
system gradually improved to fit the actual situation. Consequently, these measures 
functioned to approve the social status of rencai by embodying its social position: 
rencai is equivalent to cadre in terms of its ability and eligibility to lead the 
development of the nation, yet it is not necessarily equal to national cadres in terms 
of its occupational status. Rencai were both inside and out of governmental domains. 
Separate administration of rencai and laborers by the government also 
upholds this. The Personnel Bureau is in charge of managing rencai while the Labor 
Bureau is in charge of managing laborers. As the Personnel Bureau oversees the 
rencai market for intellectuals, the Labor Bureau runs the equivalent market for 
laborers called laowu shichang (勞務市場).Although the two bureaus are of 
comparable status, such separation fosters the idea that the two groups are different 
classes. 
From the above cases we can find one meaning of rencai: it is a derivation of 
cadre, or, quasi-cadre. 
Rencabcue: The Study of Rencai 
At the same time as the above need for rencai sprang up, the study of rencai 
emerged in the Chinese social sciences. Called rencaixue (人才學)in Chinese, this 
study aims at fostering and making use of rencai in order to make China a more 
advanced, prosperous and strong state. For the same reason that I use the original 
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term rencai, I will give no English translation for the term rencaixue but just use it 
below. 
Rencaixue first emerged in China at exactly the same time as reform and 
open policy was executed. According to Ye (et al.), the Preparatory Group of the 
National Research Association of Rencaixue was established in October 1979, 
followed by a nationwide symposium in December 1980. The next year was the time 
of the establishment of a periodical ‘‘Rencai” as well as The Research Association 
on Chinese Talents, which urged a further development of rencaixue in the 
upcoming year (1983:6-8). It was some cadres in relevant domains, educators and 
scholars who initiated the movement in the early phase; very soon it obtained the 
support of the state authorities. 
One of the introductory books of rencaixue defines rencai as: "a 
person/people who makes/make a certain relatively large contribution toward the 
development of society and the improvement of human beings through his/their 
creative labor in a certain social condition. Rencai are the cream, the most advanced 
among human beings, and are representative of people who push history forward^^" 
(Wang et al. [eds.]1985:l). The same book and another declare the range and subject 
of rencaixue as follows: 1. The study of rencai and the structure of rencai, which 
19 The term rencai can be either singular or plural due to the basic character of the Chinese 
language. Both concepts of rencai are possible: rencai as individual and as collective existence. One 
scholar of rencaixue mentions both in his discussion of the model of rencai in modem China. He 
defines the individual model of rencai as "comprehensive and harmonious development of morals, 
knowledge, ability, learning and body" while the collective model of rencai as “rencai the majority 
ofwhom workfor construction of economy" O i^ 1992:53-54). 
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includes the concept, basic factors and patterns of rencai. 2. The study of the 
development of rencai and the principles and patterns of its development. 3. The 
study of the law of rencafs coming forth in large numbers. 4. The study of making 
use of rencai, including discernment, selecting, training, using, management, and 
calculating (Ye et al. 1983:8-9, Wang et al.[eds.] 1985:24-25). 
In the study of these subjects, rencaixue reviews historical thought as well as 
rencai issues in contemporary Chinese society. At the same time, of course, it studies 
different types of rencai in different domains of contemporary China in order to 
make use of their capability to the maximum extent. 
We can assume that the emergence and development of rencaixue has been 
working in concert with the state, even though at the very beginning it was 
established independently of the state authority. Rencaixue reflects the nation's 
attitude towards rencai: a useful component for constructing an advanced country. 
Zhicheng: A Visible Criterion of Rencai 
As the government has acquired the idea of rencai with the help of rencaixue, 
it came to realize the necessity of establishing a visible standard of rencai. 
Therefore, the State Council set up the zhicheng (職稱)system. 
Zhicheng, literally translated as “name of profession," is the title of a post 
issued to cadres by the government which reflects the level of work the cadre 
engages in and the ability he has. The zhicheng system is a uniform measure of 
managing cadres which grants an appropriate ranking and title to cadres after an 
evaluation. Each profession has a set of ranked titles which consists of four or five 
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levels. Although different professions have the titles of different names, the titles in 
the same rank are regarded as the same level in terms of treatment. According to The 
Dictionary of the Party Cadres, the purpose of establishing the zhicheng system is: 1. 
to help the unified management of cadres, including education, checking on， 
selection, deployment, and interchange; 2. to mobilize the eagerness of cadres 
(1989:103). 
This zhicheng system is applied to cadres in various domains; yet it is 
obvious that this system is established mainly to manage intellectuals and 
technocrats. The following facts illustrate this point: the State Council started issuing 
the regulations on the titles after the National Meeting of Science in March 1978; the 
ranked titles of lecturers in colleges and universities—professor, associate professor, 
lecturer and assistant lecturer~~was the basis of the formulation of the titles for other 
professions (Ibid.:103). The state assign twenty-five professions to have their own 
zhicheng ranking: lecturers in colleges and universities, engineers and technicians, 
medical workers, agricultural technicians, accountants, statisticians, economic 
experts, editors, interpreters, news reporters, artists and craftsmen, sports coach, etc. 
(Ibid.:103，633-634).20 
In short, zhicheng is a visible label of qualified national cadre. But this does 
not cover all rencai, since some rencai are not national cadre. As more and more 
alternatives of choosing one's working place are available for young college 
graduates, some ambitious people begin to prefer not becoming a national cadre by 
2° Besides the written materials I cited, I also owe to personal communication with Foshan 
biu:eaucrats about this knowledge. 
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which a zhicheng is guaranteed. In the case that cadre who already has a zhicheng 
transfer to a private enterprise or a foreign enterprise, they are not counted as 
zhicheng holders, either. At any rate, despite its limitation that includes only national 
cadre, we can see the aim and function of zhicheng system: it was put into practice in 
order to evaluate and administrate qualified technical leaders adequately. 
Now we know that the zhicheng system is a concrete measure by which the 
government can manage rencai. As the State Council aimed, zhicheng has a certain 
degree of authoritativeness: it works as a qualification for one's career. One 
interesting point is that it works as such not only in the state-owned workplaces but 
also in non-state workplaces. If one has a zhicheng, it is often an advantage when 
one tries to move from a state-owned workplace to the non-state-owned sector. The 
changing economy influences the popular use of zhicheng. At the same time，it 
seems that society reinforces the value of rencai by adopting the idea of zhicheng. 
Popular Notion of Rencai 
Popular notion of rencai came to be prevalent in a different way from official 
notion. In lay people's understanding, rencai simply means competent people due to 
their higher educational background. Rencai are relatively scarce because higher 
education is scarce. If one is a college graduate, he is classified under the category 
“rencai,” whatever his major, or whether or not he really has talent. Higher 
educational background often means any type of particular skill that people think 
will help them to get a betterjob. Vocational schools, some of which are equivalent 
to college level and others to high school level, give students access to skills besides 
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colleges do. By the same token, zhicheng is a clear badge of competence. Many 
kinds of skills are thought to make one more skillful and competent: foreign 
language, computer, trade and business, company management, accounting, 
secretarial, etc. Quite often, these skills are valuable simply because they are scarce. 
There is one noteworthy fact I should mention here: ordinary people rarely 
use the term rencai in their daily conversation. They tend to use daxuesheng (大學生） 
or college graduates, or zhishifenzi (知識分子）or intellectuals instead. For one thing, 
it seems that the term rencai is essentially a term used to praise others rather than to 
refer to oneself. People use it like this: “I know he is an English interpreter. What, is 
his brother a Japanese interpreter? Oh, my! Both of the two brothers are rencai�” Yet 
they never refer to themselves by the term rencai. In this sense, rencai is a somewhat 
contrived term. I would like to mention a further point. This term sounds unreal not 
only when used for praising others by individuals; it sounds unreal because it is used 
by the state government. It is a small yet important point to indicate that rencai is 
now an officially-promoted term in the sociopolitical context of China. It also shows 
that the concept of rencai implies an official viewpoint to judge if each national is 
competent enough to make contribution to the nation. Ordinary people's notion of 
rencai lacks this view: they attach importance simply to one's competence in society. 
It is educational background that they think the best marker of one's competence. 
The term daxuesheng rather than rencai is commonly used to refer to these 
competent people. 
However, this does not mean that people hate the term rencai. As I will 
introduce later, the government provides a series of services under the name of 
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rencai —such as rencai shichang or rencai market一so that highly educated people 
can obtain better opportunities by making use of their capability and skill. When 
they search thejob market for a betterjob, they do not mind being treated as a rencai 
and just use the services provided there. 
At any rate, in both official and popular notion of rencai, there is a clear 
distinction between rencai and ordinary people. Various factors work as both the 
cause and the effect of this distinction. The popular notion mentioned above is one; 
separate administration of rencai and laborers by the different departments一the 
Personnel Bureau for the former and the Labor Bureau for the latter~"is another. 
Colloquial language, which mainly appears in the media, embodies this idea as well. 
When referring to the migration of intellectuals to the south, a certain phrase is 
always used: kongque dongnan fei (孔雀東南飛）or "Peacocks flying to the southeast." 
While college graduates are called "peacocks", less highly educated laborers are 
analogized as maque (麻雀)or "sparrows." 
Economic Development and Rencai 
What we saw above is the nature of the concept of rencai as a political 
product. On a practical level, it is the economy which most needs rencai. The two 
points are not contradictory. As a scholar of rencaixue says: “Due to the shift of the 
focal point of the work of the CPC, the center and the main battlefield of the social 
life in our country has shifted from political struggle to construction of the 
economy...The structure of collective rencai naturally shifts from being centered on 
political struggle to being centered on construction of the economy" (Li 1992:54). 
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To the state, improving the economy is the most important task to achieve; to 
individuals, the changing economy provides a condition for potential economic 
success. By examining the idea of rencai in the economic realm, we can understand 
much about what this word means. 
One shift this economic reform has brought to rencai policies is the gradual 
change in the distribution system of college graduates. A unified state planning 
system for distributing college graduates to workplaces had caused the rigid binding 
of graduates to one workplace and did not allow them to select a better workplace. 
Unlike the intellectuals in "the good old days"~namely from the 1950s to the early 
1960s，the present college graduates have no such an idea that they should do 
willingly just anything assigned to them by the state. More accurately, their personal 
goals no longer coincide with the state goals. Unfavorable work environment caused 
by the unified personnel distribution system accelerates this shift. Constant and 
serious imbalance of deploying personnel in almost all workplaces are incredibly 
prevalent in Chinese work units. Overstaffing is miserably common on the one hand; 
on the other hand, one's professional skill, if one has any, may not be relevant to the 
workplace to which one is assigned. If one's workplace does not need one's skill, 
one simply has nothing to do. If one's skill is needed, then, another miserable 
situation will happen. One will be the only busy person among one's colleagues who 
are just killing time at the office by reading newspapers and chatting over cups of tea 
21 
or who even try to pull the rug from under one's feet. This has seriously destroyed 
21 It is hard for me to understand that those idle people would get jealous of an outstanding 
colleague. However, more than one informant told me that this is very often the case. 
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the intellectuals' motivation toward their work, which in turn affects economic 
development. It was not until China started pursuing efficient economic development 
that people became aware of the essential problem of the rigid human resources 
distribution system. 
During my fieldwork, I saw much that indicated to me the importance of 
rencai to China's economic development. Foshan's local newspaper over the last ten 
years reflects this very clearly. It kept emphasizing the importance of rencai; over 
the past five years, discourse on rencai became so prominent that every time the 
newspaper reported the good achievement of any factory or company, it almost 
always would praise it by referring to its effective use of rencai. Such episodes were 
reported so often that there seemed to be a certain degree of expansion in the 
meaning of the term~mention of this term leads to self-praise. I say "self-praise" 
because the articles on factories and companies are usually provided by the 
propaganda department of the factories and companies. Here I saw a process 
whereby the term gradually changed into a ready-made component of the 
propaganda advocated by the state authority. Because of the faithful adoption of this 
term by the local grass-roots units, this process was brought about quite successfully. 
Slogans reflect the state's attitude as well: "Competition in the market is the 
competition of rencai (市場競爭到底是人才的競爭)，，，"Knowledge is strength 
(^ ！識就是力量)” The latter is particularly impressive to me since it reminds me of a 
very famous slogan in previous times, “Unity is strength (圑結就是力量，see footnote 
17)” What we see here is a very clear political shift from the ideas set forth by Mao 
Zedong to that of Deng Xiaoping. Another familiar slogan, "Esteem knowledge, 
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Plate 1 Slogan: "Knowledge is strength." 
(at Rencai Exchange Fair in Shunde city, July 28 1995) 
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esteem rencai (尊重知識，尊重人才)，，is also a phrase stated by Deng (Chen 
1988:101-105). This shift, which increasingly stresses science and technology, 
clearly reveals the practical and realistic character of Deng's policy. This slogan 
explains everything: "Science and technology is the first productivity 
(科技是第一生産力)”22 
The Commoditization and Marketization of Rencai: Rencai Job Market 
The existence of more options in working status stimulated young 
intellectuals in their pursuit of better positions. This required them to prove and 
display their competence. From this capitalistic situation the new notions of rencai 
emerged: the commoditization and marketization of rencai. Since the PRC had just 
started learning the idea of the commodity economy in order to catch up with the 
advanced capitalist countries, it did not take long for the notion of rencai as a 
commodity to become prevalent: competence deserves money and people can sell 
this competence. Once rencai became a commodity, it was very easy for the idea of 
opening a market to trade rencai to emerge. An article from a nationally-read 
newspaper edited and published by the Communist Youth League of China best 
22 The discourse of rencai itself is clearly a product of Chinese Marxist ideology. However, we see 
that the actual practices of this ideology are not so strictly dogmatic any more as it was before the 
Cultural Revolution, bistead, it adopts realistic and practical thoughts and practices which will 
possibly facilitate economic improvement. In other words, it actually justifies to follow the basic 
ideas of modem capitalism~economic efficiency, cost and benefit, and free competition, etc. Under 
China's ultimate goal to make itself prosperous and strong, the authority apparently thinks, there is 
no discrepancy in this justification. If this practice successfully achieves its goal, the leaders will 
ascribe it to the correctness of their Marxist ideology. 
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presents this notion. Entitled “Rencai as stock," it discusses the idea that rencai 
should be a resource that people deal in the market just as they speculate in stock. 
The author says: “Rencai is like stock; if there is no trade, there is no value. Trade 
means mobilization." (Chinese Youth Daily January 1，1993) The author's point is 
that China should facilitate the mobility of rencai by setting up rencai shichang or 
rencai job markets. Many other advocates support this notion in their books and 
other printed media (see, for example, Zhang et al. [eds.] 1994). 
Rencai job market consists of two categories: permanently held markets and 
temporary markets. In Foshan, the permanent Rencai Job Market was opened by the 
Personnel Bureau on June 1, 1993. As other Job Markets in China do，it emphasizes 
the advantage of a "two-way choice": the individuals who look for ajob can choose 
employers and employers can choose applicants, which is crucially different from 
the previous distribution system (FD June 2 1993，February 4 1994，Nanfang Daily 
July 5 1995). Both the applicants and the companies register their information and 
preferences at the market office, and only those who registered are eligible to search 
the registered information. At the entrance lobby, there are a large number of 
23 
anonymous job offers posted. Individuals can enter and check these offers freely; if 
one wants to know more about any one of these offers, one needs to buy a 
registration form for ten yuan and register in order to get more detailed information. 
23 Many Rencai Job Markets in China require visitors to show their ED when entering (Pepartment 
of Mobilization and Deployment, Ministry of Personnel 1993). However, Foshan rencai market has 
no such check, bi case of selling entrance tickets for the "faif ' , anybody can buy one and enter the 
lobby. I assume this is one marker of Foshan's relatively free atmosphere. 
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Once a week, the market opens the "fair"—an opportunity for company 
recruiters and applicants to see each other directly. At the “fair，，，several recruiters 
occupy a desk in the lobby, and anybody interested can talk to them. Usually it is 
free of charge to enter this lobby; but on the day of the “fair，，，one needs to buy an 
entrance ticket for five yuan. Still, the “fair，，is always crowded with applicants, 
some of whom speak Cantonese and others who speak Mandarin. This is precisely 
the form that temporary markets are held. When Foshan city held one such market in 
February 1995, more than 10,000 applicants flocked during the first half day, which 
was far more than the government's original estimation of around 700 visitors (FD 
February 11 1995). In late July of the same year, I visited one market of this type at 
Shunde city in Foshan, which attracted more than 260 employers and 7,291 
applicants from more than twenty provinces (FD August 24 1995). 
One of my informants changed to her present job through the weekly "fair" 
of Foshan Rencai Job Market. 
(Shao Li, accountant in a Sino-foreign joint ventures manufacturer, in her early 
thirties) 
Every Wednesday, the company people set up booths at the “fair” to 
see people who want ajob. Finding an opportunity is much easier this way than 
through making a contact through registered information. I found my present 
work in this “fair，，. It is very helpful to know each other directly. I let them 
know in the first interview at the "fair" that I have a zhicheng of accountant, 
which means that I am a nationally qualified accountant. 
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Plate 2 Advertisement of Foshan Rencai Job Market at a bus stop. 
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集 市 招 聘 曰 / 
门 票 ！ 
说明： 
1.逢星期三集市招聘日，求职者须购门票入场。 
2 . 求职者凭门票可到市场管理部查询一个招聘 
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Now they have many rencai markets—Shenzhen, Guangzhou, wherever. Inland 
(midi)...no, not many there. In neidi’ we find a new job depending on 
connections. I didn't know rencai market, either. I took it for granted that I 
should find one in the conventional way. I had no such connections [because I 
had lived in Foshan only three years], you know. So, I was thinking that I would 
work patiently some more until I would have more acquaintances, so that I 
would have more opportunities to change my job. Then I happened to flnd out 
that there is a job market and that I can try it...In my case, it took about one 
month total since I began to act until I got a post [which was remarkably fast]. 
As Shao's experience shows, one important change brought by rencai job 
market is the possibility of finding a newjob without depending on relations. This is 
something people never expected before. It is true not only for individuals but also 
for employers. The market system of recruiting personnel enabled the employers to 
make a comparison and a choice after seeing many applicants, which was impossible 
before. As for newly established sectors such as foreign companies and private 
entrepreneurs, they needed to recruit staff anyway, since the national distribution 
system was not available from the beginning. Therefore, this market system is an 
official policy which fmally caught up with actual needs over the last several years. 
From the above discussion, we may see some characteristic points of the 
notion of rencai in contemporary China. First, it is a political notion though it is 
applied mostly in the domain of economy. Second, it is an officially-created notion. 
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In order to help the actual management of rencai, the zhicheng system is applied. 
Ordinary people do not follow it, but do hold another version of the same idea. 
Third, it is used by both the state and individuals in different ways to achieve their 
respective goals: economic development for the state, personal improvement for 
individuals. In the latter case, zhicheng is used by individuals also in order to acquire 
their opportunities. 
2. The Migration of Rencai into the Pearl River Delta 
Who Are They? Why Do They Come? 
Migrant rencai to the Pearl River Delta consist roughly of three types of 
people: middle-aged Cantonese people who graduated from college during the 1950s 
and the 1960s, non-Cantonese people of the same generation as the first group, and 
intellectuals in their twenties and thirties who were educated in college after 1979. 
Intellectuals of the first group had left Guangdong for a high level college in another 
province and then worked there or at another assigned site than their hometown for 
many years. Apparently this was a main stream practice of intellectuals at that time. 
For them, therefore, moving to the Pearl River Delta is return to their home place 
rather than migration. Needless to say, the improvement in the economic conditions 
of the Pearl River Delta is the main reason for their return. Thus, this type of 
intellectuals is jokingly called huanxiangtuan (還郷圑）or home-coming legion. The 
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second group consists of non-Cantonese intellectuals who have migrated with their 
24 
spouse or the whole family, being attracted by the reputation of Foshan. 
The third group is the younger generation who grew up with the reform and 
open policy. A rough profile of this type of person is: has been educated in college 
after the Cultural Revolution. Unlike the elder generation, he/she does not mind 
pursuing personal aspiration and collective contribution at the same time，or even 
attaching more importance to the former. Disappointed by their assigned workplace 
because the place was sleeping and the work was boring; the intricate human 
relations and power structure always annoyed him/her. Attracted by the Pearl River 
Delta whose rapid construction provides various opportunities: career, higher 
income, better material and cultural life. Or, in the case of the new graduates, they 
are ones who were successfully assigned to a workplace at the Pearl River Delta. 
In my research, I mostly focus on the third group~~the young generation, 
although I interviewed a few elder intellectuals. The reasons are two: the third group 
best represents the migrant rencai as a whole because it is numerically largest; and 
this group is more purely non-local than the first; thus, ethnic relations between this 
group and the local people may be seen more clearly. 
Here are some typical previous backgrounds of my informants that urged 
them to try more opportunities at the Pearl River Delta. 
24 Interview with chief secretary ofFoshan Society for Applied High-Tech Studies. 
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(Yao Bin, engineer in a radio station, in his thirties) 
In the research institute [under the Ministry of Electronics Industry] I 
worked for，I had a large amount of work to do. Yet I was not satisfied. 
Somehow I couldn't get a feeling of achievement. This domain is of rapid and 
continuous technological innovation, so we must work hard to catch up with the 
stream. But the whole institute lacked this attitude and everything was so rigid. 
We just worked on the assigned research topics and had no choice about what to 
study. 
(Luo Hao, architectural designer in a collective-owned company, in her mid-
twenties) 
The designs I work on here are totally different from those I did in the 
north. Guangdong is much richer than our place after all; there are various 
orders for designing skyscrapers, to which I can apply many new technologies 
and innovative designs I have learned in college. What I designed in my former 
workplace were just boring buildings with fixed specification and fixed design. 
We only had those projects and I never had any choice. Nor did I need any new 
knowledge when working on them. 
There is a saying very often quoted by the advocates of rencai mobilization: 
Shu nuo si, ren nuo huo (樹插[$死，人挪活)，or “A tree becomes withered if you move 
it; a man becomes activated if you move him." I heard this from at least three of my 
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informants in addition to reading it in books. This phrase reflects the ethos of 
• 25 
intellectuals who pursue a better opportunity. 
Why Are They Hired? 
As I have discussed earlier, Guangdong has not been a center of production, 
nor was it a place of higher education. It has been a backward province in terms of 
science and technology. Liu (et al.) points out that the education level in Guangdong 
is lower than other areas in China. In 1990, Guangdong province had only 134 
college graduates among 10,000 population, while China had 142, Beijing had 930, 
and Shanghai 653 respectively (Liu et al. 1992).^ ^ Foshan had 141.3 among 10,000 
(The Statistics Bureau of the Foshan City 1990). Moreover, Foshan's centuries-old 
tradition of commerce and trade fostered an ethos which puts less emphasis on 
education. When the new economic policy was put into practice, it turned out that 
the Foshan workunits did not have enough technological competence and knowledge 
to deal with the competition. As the whole economic sector expanded, this 
25 Not only south China is the destination of "move" for a better opportunity: chuguo (出國）or going 
abroad is another option. To go out of China for study is a common means of moving; as for many 
Guangdong intellectuals, they even have one more alternative by virtue of their relatives in 
overseas—emigration. Over last several years, I have seen many local Foshan intellectuals 
emigrating. It is a quite common pattem that migrant intellectuals take over the post of left local 
intellectuals. As we see from local people's saying "The Cantonese leave for foreign countries and 
the non-Cantonese leave for Guangdong", there seems to be a clear gap between the world for 
Cantonese and non-Cantonese. This may be one reason for Cantonese people's sense of regional 
superiority, which may be at the same time non-Cantonese people's longing for Guangdong. 
26 Pearl River Delta shows as a large number as 267 college graduates among 10,000 population. 
However, this depends mostly on Guangzhou (546)，Shenzhen (447), and Zhuhai (256); the average 
of the rest is only 91. 
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deficiency became even more obvious. The lack of a foundation of education, 
science and technology was crucial; how could they have time to establish a whole 
set of new circumstance? Fostering competent technocrats by themselves takes time; 
then, the solution is to borrow some. The idea of jie naodai facai (借腦袋發貝才）or 
"making money by borrowing others' brains" therefore emerged. This is a Foshan 
practice praised in "People's Daily" as early as in 1986 (April 13 1986. See also FD 
April 18 1986). Very soon hiring college graduates from outside became a kind of 
fashion among various kinds of units. College students were extremely scarce in 
most units. It was not uncommon at all for even the leaders of the units were not 
highly educated. Some of my informants prove this point: 
(Lin Yaopeng, machinery technician in a construction company, in his early 
thirties) 
I was the first outsider as well as the first college graduate in my 
company. Everybody was local and had only a junior-high education 
background when I joined the company at the beginning of 1993. Now we have 
some more college graduates and high school graduates; things are getting 
better. Yet at that time, all people were of low education background and my 
existence was really extraordinary. 
(Xian Hua, department manager in a domestic trading company, in her early 
thirties) 
They interviewed me in the morning, then in the afternoon, and they 
prepared for me all the documents I needed for the transfer. Apparently the 
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company desperately wanted college graduates at that time. They saw my 
resume and liked my background very much, so they decided to hire me at once. 
One question remains: why do the Foshan companies especially hire 
outsiders instead of hiring local college graduates? They do hire local intellectuals. 
However, compared with the volume of rencai flocking in from all over the country, 
the number is small. For one thing, the Pearl River Delta is in absolute short of 
professional personnel. For another, Guangdong people's mercantile value prevented 
this area from fostering enough number of qualified professionals. A popular saying 
"Education is of no use," which is often criticized by critiques, is still prevalent 
among local Guangdong people. From time to time, local people told me jokingly: 
"Among Guangdong people, how many are willing to study as many years as it takes 
to complete college? You can make much money when others are still imprisoned on 
campus." Besides the number, local rencai cannot rival migrant rencai in terms of 
quality. Coming from all over the country, the latter has much more variety of 
specialty; because of the fact that nationally-recognized colleges are mostly at places 
other than Guangdong, migrant rencafs level seems to be relatively higher than the 
local rencafs. One of my informants is one of fewer than forty masters degree 
holders in calligraphy since 1979 in China. It seems strange that a person with such a 
background is in Foshan. What this shows is that the migration boom has attracted so 
various kinds of qualified intellectuals to the Pearl River Delta. Compared with this 
group of migrant intellectuals, the power of local intellectuals is relatively small. 
75 
Considering the recent tide of requiring qualified professionals to engage in High-
Tech industry，the need for migrant intellectuals is even more urgent (Dai 1992). 
What Are They Expected to Do in Foshan? 
Intellectuals were hired to fulfill the professional and highly technical part of 
each profession which had not worked well before. Therefore, in the research 
department of a manufacturing company，scientists are expected to develop a new 
product that will possibly bring wealth to the company. At the production line in 
factories, technicians are required to manage workers and production facilities to 
make sure that they produce qualified products without waste. In design offices, 
architectural designers do their work with the CAD system, which otherwise no one 
would know how to operate. At the construction sites, machine engineers are 
responsible for taking care of the scarce and expensive machines to ensure the 
quality as well as the punctual completion of the project. In offices, executives deal 
with high-level administrative works which often require such skills as accounting, 
foreign language and computer operation. 
In any case, what they are expected to do is to improve productivity through 
contributing their knowledge, skills and technology to their workplace. To improve 
productivity leads directly to more profit. Under the national goal of modernization 
which they believe is led by economic success, the improvement of productivity is 
the ultimate goal for every unit to achieve. For the employers, in other words, 
achieving modernization by holding rencai in their unit is a practical measure to 
acquire economic benefit on the one hand, and an ideological mission to fulfill on 
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the other hand. The primary aim is economic achievement. Employers dream that 
rencai will give them a miraculous success story. One typical example is the “Ma 
Jun legend". A twenty-seven-year-old engineer with a doctoral degree gave up his 
“iron rice bowl" to work for a small township-owned appliance manufacturer in 
Shunde county. Within three months, this young doctor Ma Jun invented a new 
energy-saving air-conditioner, which became a best-seller and brought to his 
company one hundred and thirty million yuan's increase in profit. (FD April 29 
1992，July 20 1992). Now this company became a big name，and we often see its 
advertisements on Hong Kong TV. Earning such a huge amount of profit in such a 
short period of time is certainly a rare case; yet it is hard to deny that the employers 
more or less hope for the kind of luck that Ma Jun brought to his company. 
There is a problem here: while the intellectuals are expected to be 
professional and technological experts, they are generally kept away from the center 
of power in their workplace. It is unlikely that a migrant intellectual fills a position 
in a department that is seen as powerful—administration, finance or personnel, for 
example. It is true that many of the rencai are relatively young so far; it is reasonable 
if not all of them are promoted to a powerful position immediately. However, it is 
also true that keji rencai (科技人才）or technical experts generally have less access to 
the positions of power compared with administrative cadres. We can still infer the 
existence of a sense of competition between local rencai and migrant rencai of 
comparable ability and status. Though it is very difficult to prove, many people share 
the impression that locals are routinely favored over migrants. The news report like 
“A Bold Promotion of Scientific and Technological Rencai to a Position of 
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Leadership: Fotao Group Company Applies Good Steel to the Blade" (FD 
September 4 1992) implies, despite the editor's aim, how exceptional this case is. It 
is exceptional in the sense that scientific technocrats became the leaders. It even 
reveals another point at the same time: the details of the article tell us that the 
promoted rencai are not outsiders but locals. During my fieldwork, I often heard the 
migrant intellectuals pointing this out. By local interviewees, on the other hand, I 
was told that it was basically true, but it was necessary and reasonable rather than 
unequal. The existence of an enormous number of low-class migrant workers makes 
the matter more complicated. Since they are always dagongzai or employees, local 
people tend to regard migrated intellectuals in a similar fashion. This led to a new 
term gaoji dagongzai or high-class employees, which does not sound very good for 
the Chinese who value to be a laoban (老板）or a boss. 
It is not my aim to judge which side is right. One point we should pay 
attention is that there is a clear boundary between the two groups, locals and 
migrants, which the dominant ethnic group makes use of when they think it 
necessary. Yet this boundary does not simply refer to power relations between the 
two groups. The migrant rencai is actually an important part of Foshan's 
improvement. It was local people who had hired them because of their resources一 
professional knowledge and skills. In this sense, we can assume that both groups 
have the membership in the city under the rapid development. Both of them are 
contributing toward the improvement by making use of their own resources. 
Nonetheless we see the contradiction between the two groups—and I assume we see 
it because the two groups have different interpretations of their resources. Examining 
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their experience of interaction, taking this point into consideration, may tell us much 
about the process whereby Foshan people acquire a new concept of their city. 
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Chapter 4. Migrant Intellectuals in Foshan: 
Their Social Position and Individual Perspective 
1- Terminology 
In Foshan, like other places in the Pearl River Delta, there are various terms 
which are used to refer to local residents on the one hand and newly migrated people 
on the other. The terms for each category exist in more than one layer when 
mentioning their own or others' ethnic identity, since people use these terms 
selectively according to different situations (Guldin 1984, 1995). This concept of 
situational ethnic identity is very common in the whole Delta area, and it is these 
identity terms that reveal the situational aspect of ethnic identity in the people's daily 
life. In other words, the terms function as a window to see the structure of “veiled 
identity" (Guldin 1984) in Foshan. Therefore, it is appropriate to examine some main 




Local people, as opposed to newly arrived immigrants, are often referred to by the 
term bendi ren (本地人）or locals. As the general meaning of this Chinese word 
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indicates，however, the range of "local" does not have a distinct definition. It is 
dynamic, situational and relative. For example, I once saw a handwritten signboard 
at a food market: bendiji or local chicken. This sign in itself did not tell me how 
wide of an area “bendf, refers to. Beside this board is another signboard that reads 
Shiqiji or chicken from Shiqi (石岐，the center of Zhongshan [中山],approximately 
60 kilometers south of Foshan). Only with this reference information could I guess 
that bendi here meant the agricultural area in or around the Foshan city proper which 
is much closer to the city than is Shiqi. Yet the distinct boundary of bendi still 
remains unclear. Such a boundary may not be necessary, since the point is that, in 
the people's mind, the chicken is regarded as a bendi, meaning local Foshan product, 
and not a Shiqi one. Another example: the postboxes on the streets have two slots, 
one for mail to bendi and another for mail to waidi or areas other than bendi area. 
This perplexed me~what area does bendi refer to after all? Since they do not define 
bendi, how can I distinguish the two categories? The clue was on the back of the 
box. I found a sign there: “bendi zip code: 528000." Presumably bendi in this case 
means the area with the zip code 528000, which actually includes only the city 
proper and the suburbs around it and not the county-level cities. 
One noteworthy point is that it seems that the range of bendi often coincides 
with the boundary of "ethno-linguistic identity" (Guldin 1984，1995). All Cantonese 
speakers are usually classified into the category of bendi, no matter which 
Cantonese-speaking area one is from. Various accents are often ignored or are 
assigned little importance: differentiation is less important than identification in this 
case. Accents gain attention when differentiation is necessary. This is consistent with 
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the previous studies on situational saliency of ethnic identity (see, for example, 
Berreman 1972, Lyman and Douglass 1973, Wu [ed.] 1982). 
Foshan ren 
Another label for local people, or, a higher level of classification, is Foshan 
ren (佛山人).This seems clear and distinctive, in the sense that people living in 
Foshan are included into this category. However, the reality is that this term is also 
polysemous. This place-name label implies several criteria of classification, such as 
geographical delimitation, spatial administration, residential administration, zuji 
(祖籍）or Place of Origin, etc. Ethnolinguistic or cultural demarcation often overlaps 
this label as well. Since the name Foshan at the present time refers to an officially 
defined administrative area, what the label Foshan ren refers to is often understood 
as those legally registered residents in Foshan city, or, those who have a hukou or 
household registration in Foshan. This is true in a sense; yet clearly it does not cover 
the entire nature of locals. 
Guangdong ren 
The label of a further higher level of referring to local people is Guangdong 
ren (廣東人).Because of its name, this label sounds equal to what Guldin calls 
"provincial identity." Provincial identity technically refers only to the 
geographical/administrative boundary of Guangdong province. However, there are at 
least two cases in which people do not use Guangdong ren in a strictly technical 
sense. First, as Guldin points out (1995:26), Guangdong ren does not specify to 
which ethnicity one belongs—e.g. Hakka, Chaozhou, minority nationalities in 
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mountainous area, etc. In this case, the ethnic/cultural boundary becomes more 
salient than the geographical/administrative boundary, and people would specify the 
difference while they mention Guangdong: “I am Guangdong ren，but I am Hakka." 
The second case involves Guangdong as an ethnic label of zuji or Place of Origin. 
To the Chinese, one's Place of Origin~where one's ancestors originate from—is an 
important element of one's ethnic identity. Local people tend not to move out of 
their hometown unless they have some particular need to do so. Therefore, their 
Place of Origin is coincident with their present residence and ethnolinguistic area: 
“Of course he is a native speaker of Cantonese, because he is a Guangdong ren 
(namely, his Place of Origin is Guangdong), and he was born in Guangdong, grew 
up in Guangdong!" In the case of the Guangdong people who do not live in 
Guangdong, Place of Origin is sometimes more crucial in identifying themselves 
with Guangdong: "Though Mr. Wang spent twenty-five years in Shanghai, he is 
originally a Guangdong ren.‘‘ 
Migrants 
Waisheng ren 
While the above terms for locals are relatively objective and neutral, labels to 
refer to migrants are value-laden. The term waisheng ren (夕卜省人)or outer province 
people is typically used to refer to immigrants. In contrast with Guangdong ren, this 
term puts all people who are from provinces than Guangdong into a single category. 
In the beginning, its usage did not cause any problems; however, as more and more 
Cantonese laborers migrated to the Pearl River Delta, this term ceased to reflect 
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reality. The number of in-province migrants increased rapidly after the provincial 
government placed restrictions on state-owned units for the hiring of the laborers 
from other provinces. The widening gap in economic prosperity between the Pearl 
River Delta and other places in Guangdong also accelerated this influx. Thus other 
terms to describe this situation eventually emerged: waidi (夕卜地）or outer places, and 
wailai (夕卜來）or outside, nonnative are the typical ones. Both are consistent in 




Beifang ！^匕方）or the north is another term to delineated migrants' origins. 
When this term is used, all migrants except those from Guangdong and Guangxi (An 
1992:16) are called as such because of a simple reason: Guangdong is in nanfang 
(南方）or the south, and Guangxi is as south as Guangdong, but other places are not. 
Even Hunan, the neighboring province of Guangdong that is obviously located in 
South China, is classified into "the north" as is Heilongjiang province which borders 
on Russia. This is confusing, because it contradicts the conventional Chinese 
dichotomy of the north and south. According to this historically well-known 
definition, the country is divided into two—north and south—by the Huaihe River, 
27 The term wailai is often combined with gong (工）or worker. Wailai gong seems to have become 
the most representative term for referring to migrant workers. The media, which reflects the 
intentions of the local government well, contributed to make this term prevalent. When referring to 
highly educated intellectuals with the term wailai, gong is replaced with another relevant word such 
as rencai. 
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one of the branches of the Changjiang River; so, Beijing is in heifang and Shanghai 
is in nanfang. During my stay in Foshan between 1989 and 1991，I was told by some 
local Foshan people: "We Cantonese consider only Cantonese speakers as our own 
people {ziji ren); all those who can't speak Cantonese are heifang ren. Interesting, 
isn't it?" “It can't be helped [that most of non-Cantonese are called heifang ren\ 
since there are so many differences between us (Cantonese) and them (non-
Cantonese). When they come here, they have a hard time adjusting because 
Guangdong is different from beifang.” 
Some migrant intellectuals who are from non-northern provinces such as 
Sichuan, Jiangxi, and Hunan dislike this dichotomy, although not all. They think it 
idiotic since it ignores the above conventional definition of the Chinese north and the 
south, and consequently distorts the simple fact that Sichuan, Jiangxi, and Hunan are 
not the north. Some of these complaining intellectuals perceive that the Cantonese 
are arrogant; such arrogance，they suspect, may result from the fact that they are 
rarely interested in the outside world; or, that they simply lack common sense (see 
Chapter 5). Yet some of my informants claimed that they did not mind being called 
beifang ren. 
Loujai/Loumui 
Besides the above terms which can be defined neutral, there are some 
derogatory pronouns referring to non-Cantonese migrants. For example, Cantonese 
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terms loujai (撈仔)，loumui ( ^¾) mean migrant workers as the poor and mean. Lou 
is a verb that literally means to drag for, to dredge up, and metaphorically, to get 
something good by improper means. Migrant workers came to the Pearl River Delta 
in order to gain profit after the place became rich; thus locals refer to these 
disgusting aspects of the migrant workers by these terms: they are so poor and mean 
that they try to snatch local people's profit. When using these terms, locals tend to 
lump all kinds of migrants, intellectuals or laborers, originally urban dwellers or 
rural peasants, into the category of loujai/mui. Some of migrant intellectuals told me 
that they had been, or were, seen as loujai/mui together with those migrant laborers. 
Beilao (vs. Nanman，Guanglao) 
I should mention another pair of rather derogatory terms which presumably 
would appear only in some exceptional situations. I assume this since I have not 
heard anybody using this pair of terms when directly referring to any individual or 
group. Of course, my experience in the field is very limited. People may use them 
when an outsider is not present. All I can say is that these labels have a clear 
derogatory sense unlike the above originally neutral terms. They are: beilao (3匕{老） 
29 which means northern guy, and nanman (南蠻）or south barbarian. The Cantonese 
28 Jai refers to guys or boys, mui to women or girls. Thus, loujai means male migrant workers while 
loumui refers to female. 
29 The Pinyin Chinese-English Dictionary, edited in Beijing, gives an interesting definition for the 
character man (蠻)："an ancient name for southern nationalities." This reflects the view of the 
Middle Kingdom in which southern nationalities were seen as barbarian. 
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term lou, such as in the well known term gwailou or Caucasians，has a derogatory 
sense. 
This pair of labels came to my attention in two cases: when some of my 
informants told me about the historical background of exclusiveness between 
Cantonese and non-Cantonese, and when I read a series of articles that debated this 
issue in a local literature magazine. In the latter, some active Foshan literati, both 
local and migrant, participated in this debate, and poured out their blunt and even 
somewhat sarcastic views on this issue. Although the content of the debate is highly 
intriguing，here I would like to focus only on the titles of the articles debaters raised. 
Many of the titles deliberately featured the labels beilao, nanman, and guanglao 
(廣{老）/guangzai (^仔）or Cantonese guy, a term derived from beilao., examples 
include “A ‘Beilao, Talks about ‘Beilao”, (An 1992:16)，"A ‘Guangdongzai, Talks 
about ‘Beilao，” (Liu 1992:17). Some of the authors also referred to themselves as 
beilao or nanman in the body of their articles, such as “...anyway I, who is 
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originated from Jiangnan area, am classified as a beilao.” (An 1992:16), “I would 
like to speak as a woman nanman"” (Xiaowen 1992:18). The debate was not simply 
a battle in which each participant defended his/her own ethnic position, but rather an 
objective discussion which included both self-criticism and criticism of one's 
counterpart. 
3° Jiangnan area refers to the lower reaches of Changjiang River which is at the south of Huaihe 
River. It is one of the most typically southern place-names in conventional geographical concept. 
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Neidi ren 
A term such as beilao is used by migrant intellectuals themselves, but quite 
intentionally. What neutral term do they normally use to refer to themselves? They 
use another term neidi (内地)which means inland. This term seems to encompass 
quite wide of an area outside Guangdong—both an engineer from Shaanxi, a lecturer 
from Sichuan, and a bureaucrat from Gansu can be all called "people from neidi,, 
and no one of the three would complain about it. The term mi actually is the exact 
antonym of wai for waidi, waisheng which means outside. There is a clear reversal 
of the idea of the center and the periphery: instead of centralizing Guangdong, the 
term nei marginalizes Guangdong. At the same time，the concept neidi enables 
migrant intellectuals from any places—geographically central or the peripheral—to 
position themselves at the "center" of China in a symbolical sense. 
2. The History ofRepeated Migration in Foshan 
As I mentioned in Chapter 2, migration of outsiders into Foshan is not solely 
a contemporary happening, but rather a phenomenon which Foshan has experienced 
throughout its history. That is, local Foshan community, which now seems like a 
homogeneous Guangdong community, is actually an amalgamation of complex 
cultural contents. New cultural factors came, were accepted, and became a part of 
local culture. This may be the process that tradition is invented (Hobsbawm 1983). 
Before approaching the current events, it may be helpful to reflect on this history so 
that we can better understand what is happening now. There have been different 
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types of migrations in different periods of time which reflect the sociocultural 
background of each period. 
The Late Imperial Period: Migration of Merchants 
The early Qing era was the golden age of Foshan. Flourishing as a 
commercial town, it attracted many merchants and workers from outside. Luo's 
work on the economic development and social change in Foshan during the Ming-
Qing era (1994) contains a vivid description of the position of the migrant merchants 
and their interaction with those in power in Foshan at that time. Here I will quote 
some relevant parts from this book. 
The people from outside Foshan were called qiaoyu (僑寓）or sojourners by 
locals (299). They originated from a wide variety of places, from the area 
immediately surrounding Foshan to provinces as distant as Shanxi and Shaanxi. 
Comparing the background of the outstanding people at that time, many domains had 
more qiaoyu than tuzhu (土著）or local Foshan people (299-304). The influx of 
outsiders brought different sorts of jobs and styles of life to the town. Various 
dialects were heard here and there (305). Since qiaoyu merchants gradually became a 
powerful group in opposition to tuzhu, the tension between these two groups resulted 
in some incidents which were solved in the law-court. However, in the process of the 
qiaoyu group establishing a stable position in the town, both groups came to 
cooperate more (305-310). Economically successful qiaoyu merchants then pursued 
the dream of a leadership status in the community through producing imperial 
bureaucrats in their families, which was a common value at that time. Aside from 
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building their own palatial mansions, they established private schools to educate 
their children. Some of them materialized this dream and became famous and 
powerful families (311-319). They also contributed their financial capability to make 
the town community better: for example, one dominant family donated money to 
establishj/zcawg (義倉）or a voluntary granary (320). 
In short, migration in this era resulted from Foshan's economic power. It was 
a commercial factor that attracted so many merchants and workers to this place; and 
gave some of them prosperity and the subsequent social position in the town 
community. Yet economic success alone was not enough to enjoy real success; after 
becoming prosperous, they needed more than that. What they wanted was a central 
imperial bureaucrat post that was available only with a huge amount of knowledge; 
and it was this knowledge and a formally approved class status that really reinforced 
their success (see also Faure 1990). 
The PRC Period: Migration of Cadres 
In the period immediately after the Communist Party of China carried out the 
revolution, the task of the utmost importance for the new regime was to build a 
strong and unified central leadership. In order to establish a strong and stable nation-
wide political foundation, the CPC dispatched their members to newly liberated 
areas. Guangdong thus came to have these nanxia ganhu (南下干音[$) or Cadres Down 
to the South. In addition to these cadres were ex-military members who settled into 
Guangdong after liberation, who were called jundui zhuanye ganhu (軍隊車事業干部)or 
Cadres Transferred from the Military (the Personnel Bureau of the Foshan City 
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1992:8). The earliest cadres in Foshan were brought by the Chinese People's 
Liberation Army. The eighteen new cadres, led by Tan Liangbin and Fang Meng 
from the PLA, many of whom were students, came into Foshan (Personnel Bureau 
ofthe Foshan City [ed.] 1992:9，AF:537). 
Apparently there was a tension between these cadres from outside 
Guangdong and the local political leaders. Given legitimacy by the central 
authorities, nanxia/zhuanye ganhu should lead local cadres in executing the Party 
policies. Yet the local leaders were already very powerful within their own territory 
wherein they enjoyed their interests and rights. Furthermore, these cadres assigned to 
the south were not necessarily willing to be at Guangdong. Unlike after the 1980s, 
Guangdong at that time was almost the last place people wanted to live: it was 
nothing but a remote, backward, and poor southern province with harsh hot climate. 
“Nanxia ganhu do not want to work at the south" is listed as one of the problems 
debated at zhengdang (整黨）or party consolidation at Foshan in 1953 (CPC Foshan 
Committee Organization Dept. [ed.] 1991:6). On the other hand, local leaders were 
not happy about these cadres' migration, either. To them, nanxia ganhu were as 
unfamiliar as aliens. They might have had in mind a mixed disgust at cultural 
differences plus the matter of power relations. Gradually this unpleasantness grew 
and became difang zhuyi (地方主義）or localism. 
Localism emerged at many places in China in the 1950s，which finally 
became so serious a problem as to be formally denounced by Mao Zedong (Li 
1995:57-58). Guangdong was one of the main places where localism was especially 
prominent. Siu (1989a) mentions Guangdong localism in 1950 that “class tension 
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marred the first major political campaign, aimed at land reform, from the start" (120) 
because "the deputy provincial chairman, Fang Fang, who was Cantonese, urged 
gradualism" (120). Fang Fang, together with Ye Jianying, the provincial chairman 
and the first party secretary of the South China Branch of the party's Central 
Committee, are known as central leaders who supported "localism" (119-121, 324). 
In Foshan, political struggle over localism exploded at the end of 1957 and 
lasted until the beginning of 1958. Under the lead of the Party Committee, every 
administrative unit had a debate on localism. The Annal of Organization of Foshan 
Committee, the Communist Party ofChina contains some details: "The manifestation 
of ‘Localism’ in Foshan lay in the following points: first, to deny the correctness of 
the principle 'depending on the main forces, with cadres down to the south taking 
command' proposed by the Party central. Second, to consider that the City 
Committee's polices on cadres was sectarian. Third, to exclude non-local cadres. 
Forth, to adopt an attitude of negating a series of political campaigns. The debates 
were held within the party first, then outside the party....on the basis of the debate 
inside the party, general meetings of cadres were convened at some fronts which had 
a relatively serious tendency towards ‘localism.，In the process of the debate, nine 
cadres...who had rather serious “localist，，Right-deviationist thinking were 
recalled....one hundred and eight people were the object of the debate" (CPC Foshan 
Committee Organization Dept. [ed.] 1991:68). 
What I would like to emphasize from this historical review are two points: 
first, migration to Foshan at this period was due essentially to a political 
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assignment. Since the entire activities were planned and executed by the central 
government, there was neither the possibility, nor the idea, that individuals could 
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move by their own decision. Second, the tension between the political leaders with 
different local ethnic backgrounds was so conspicuous that it provoked a major 
sociopolitical incident. We should be aware that this type of political tension was not 
unique to Guangdong. Nonetheless, this implies a continuous local ethnic 
consciousness as well as the consequent exclusive attitude towards outsiders of 
Foshan people. 
The Reform Period: Migration of Intellectuals and Peasants 
Migration in the Qing era stemmed from economic motivations and the post-
1949 period of migration was marked by political causes. How about post-1979, 
31 PRC has a history of intentional mobilization of population for political reasons. I wonder if it is 
too forced to fmd its origin in the Long March; even if we focus on the history after 1949, however, 
execution of some important policies could not go on without large-scale migration from the 
beginning. It is not difficult to find some examples: in newly established autonomous districts, such 
as Irnier Mongolia, an enormous number of Han Chinese moved in and overwhelmed the minority 
nationalities in terms of number. Third Tier Construction in the 1950s (see Chapter 2) brought about 
the abrupt emergence of some new industrial centers—artificially made towns and cities一in the 
desolate hinterland. Baoji (寶鷄）in Shaanxi province is one such city. Today we see the same 
example in a previous tiny agricultural village on the south border of the PRC一Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone. 
32 However, it would be misleading if one concludes that the state in this period restricted the 
people's free choice. Instead，we should understand the reality that, for the people at that time, to 
contribute to the state automatically coincided with the sense of individual fuMlllment. As an elder 
intellectual who was educated in Beijing in the late 1950s and then served the remote Qinghai 
province by her own will told me, people at that time took it for granted that they would choose 
their life as the state wanted them to do，and they were satisfied with this choice. 
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then? I assume that the migration in this period is a combination of economic, 
political and personal reasons. It is essentially economical since various kinds of 
economic ventures needed people, both laborers and intellectuals; it is political in the 
sense that the whole precondition of stimulating economic development was 
provided by state policy. And it is also personal in terms of the fact that each 
individual acts on his/her own will. They came not passively by assignment from the 
government but by themselves; they came to the south in order to get something not 
available in their original places, or to get something they believed available only in 
the south. It is a tremendous change compared with the pre-1980s. At least since the 
present social system under the PRC regime has been established, it is the first time 
that the Chinese people can aspire to fulfill their own goals, and, furthermore to act 
according to their own aspiration. This is true not only in the case of migration but 
also for many other matters which relate to choice: people began choosing their 
schools, their clothing, their food, their entertainment, their professions, their place 
of residence; in short, they gained the right to choose what they wanted to do. Some 
of these choices are authorized institutionally and some are not, but people can just 
choose. They do not have complete freedom of choice yet, but do have a much wider 
range of choice than they did twenty years ago. 
The important thing is that these choices are possible only because they are 
allowed and even encouraged by the government. The government allows and 
encourages them since they coincide with the policy of state development. 
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Both economic, political and personal reasons for migration are true and 
influential. I would like to approach the issue of migrant intellectuals' human agency 
which urged them to make their choice to migrate to Foshan. 
3. Stories of Migrant Intellectuals 
It is difficult to assess how many migrant intellectuals live in Foshan. The 
category rencai is a qualitative concept; thus, statistics depend on the equivalence of 
rencai, for example, people who have professional titles issued by the state. The 
most inclusive definition is zhuanye jishu renyuan (專業技術人員)which refers to 
"those who engage in professional-technical work". According to this definition, the 
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number of this category of people was 120,459 in the end of 1994. Over the last 
ten years, it increased from about 30,000 to this number. It is said that approximately 
60,000，a half of the total number, is concentrated in the city proper. The problem is 
that these numbers all include migrant rencai, and it is virtually impossible to figure 
its number. However, what Foshan people—both officials and ordinary people— 
commonly believe is that the increase of the number most likely is due to migration 
of intellectual. That is to say, people believe that rencai increased because they came 
from outer areas to Foshan. The Historical Episodes of Foshan says: “...The transfer 
of these migrant professional-technical cadre has remedied the shortage of science 
and technology expert troops and cadre troops in Foshan..." (The Editing Committee 
for the Local Annal of Foshan [ed.] 1990:50-51). My own experience during my 
33 This number was provided by a leader of a governmental department I interviewed. 
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fieldwork is that I found migrant intellectuals everywhere in Foshan. Many 
workunits have migrant personnel. So many people I talked with told me that they 
have such colleagues—college graduates from other provinces. Thus, I assume that 
intellectuals' migration to Foshan is a very common phenomenon. 
At any rate, the number of migrant intellectuals in Foshan has increased 
drastically in the last ten years. In this section, I will review their stories. Why did 
they aspire to migrate, how did they act to materialize their aspiration, and how do 
they evaluate their migration? 
Aspiration 
What motivated the migrant intellectuals I interviewed to move to 
Guangdong is the prospect of the better opportunities, material or mental, that they 
thought they would be able to gain in the wonderfully developing south. They 
acquired this idea mainly through two channels, other than through a knowledge of 
various Guangdong products sold inland: the media, and the information given to 
them by their acquaintances, particularly from their schoolmates. The more people 
emigrated, the more information—or rumor~was conveyed back to their 
schoolmates and colleagues left inland. Plus any actual trigger is enough to make 
them decide to migrate to the south. 
(Cai Yang, college lecturer/staff, in his late thirties) 
From 1985 to 1989，I was involved in a project at a research institute 
under the Ministry of Railways at Zhuzhou, Hunan, which brought me much 
satisfaction. After this project terminated, I began to hear about the development 
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of Guangdong, such as the rapid change in the Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone. I was impressed by that and wanted to test myself in this place, Foshan. 
Why Foshan? Because it was a paradise in terms of living, while Shenzhen was 
a good place for business. I knew all these things through the media. I narrowed 
down my destination from the beginning. 
(Liao Hong, college lecturer, in his early thirties) 
I was assigned to work for the Education Committee of Jiangxi 
Province after getting my masters degree in education. Why did I migrate here? 
For a half-carefully-considered, half-impulsive reason. At the beginning of 
1992, Deng Xiaoping inspected the south; right after that, in March of that year, 
I had a chance to visit Guangdong on business. I went to every city in the Pearl 
River Delta: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Dongguan, Huizhou, Zhongshan, and, Foshan. I 
was curious about Guangdong. Inland people did not understand the current 
reform well; especially Jiangxi was a conservative place. Still, more and more 
friends of mine had already left for Guangdong. That's why I was interested in 
this place. 
The overwhelmingly advanced economic condition of Guangdong was 
undoubtedly a great attraction. We should note that economic reasons for migration 
entail not only more income and a better treatment. They also include many other 
things—the opportunities for improving one's career, a relatively more sophisticated 
and advanced lifestyle in material sense, and more access to information to the world 
outside China. On the one hand, a better salary with a larger, more beautiful house 
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for the samejob was of course appealing; on the other hand, more intriguing projects 
and more positions for eligible personnel were available. There was also a greater 
variety of consuming activities and entertainment. In short, there were many more 
alternatives in Foshan. 
(Zhou Biao, government official and interpreter, in his late twenties) 
After graduation [from my college in Guangzhou], I had to go back to 
Gansu, my home province, because Gansu was one of the border provinces. 
There was a regulation that the students from these provinces must be assigned 
to return to their home province [to serve for the intensive development of the 
border district]. Because of this regulation, I was in no mood to study hard all 
along. Think about it! My classmates from Guangdong, for example，had no 
such restriction. If your school record was good, you would be assigned to a unit 
on the provincial level and you could live in Guangzhou; if your record was not 
as good, you might be assigned to some city, say, Foshan. It's fair anyway, 
right? But I was totally kept out of this fairness. I made so much effort to pass 
the entrance examinations of this college in order to come to Guangdong. How 
can I not mind just going back? 
An efficient and sophisticated business system was another attraction. Such a 
system was enabled by the reform policy for economic development and, in turn, 
stimulated further economic development. This efficiency was important for them 
since it would guarantee that they have the opportunity to apply their abilities and 
skills to their work and thus maintain their positive work attitude. And it implies 
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that many of them were desperately frustrated by the opposite working conditions 
and desired to change the situation. 
(Liao Hong) 
My previous workplace didn't satisfy me. Although I involved myself 
in my work eagerly and gained some acknowledgment~for instance, the 
periodical I edited won a national award~~I still didn't like the whole way my 
workplace was inefficient and bureaucratic. You must concern yourself with too 
many human relationships and power relationships instead of concentrating on 
the work itself. People in the higher positions put their all energy into managing 
power matters successfully; the vicious thing was that you must be involved in 
them and handle them well even if you hate it; otherwise you can never get your 
work done. Anyway, I was always thinking that this was not a workplace for 
young men. Compared with such a circumstance, Guangdong was truly vital— 
yes, this place was filled with vitality in my eyes. 
(Ye Heping, government official and interpreter, in his early thirties) 
After graduating from university as a Scientific and Technical English 
major, I was assigned to a branch office of a [state-owned] car manufacturing 
factory. It was in the suburb of Hangzhou where there was totally nothing 
except for our office, and I worked in the reference room there. The work was 
really dull~more accurately, I did not have any work to do. Very soon I began 
to realize that I couldn't be here any longer. This workplace did not need my 
professional knowledge at all; the most serious problem was that the whole 
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office was sleeping, there were no movement or change. My office was located 
in a really boring part of town as well. 
(Liang Ying, college lecturer, in his early thirties) 
I worked for my university in Guangzhou after getting my masters 
degree there. I didn't teach but was only involved in research. It was true that I 
was not eligible enough to teach; in any case, there were too many teachers 
above me [in the school hierarchy], so how could I get a post to teach even if I 
was eligible and wanted one? This university was a key university {zhongdian 
daxue), but was of low economic efficiency. That it was a key university means 
that it had a huge number of faculty it must feed and take care of. That it was 
financially insufficient means that it treated its staff very poorly. I was single at 
that time，and the apartment provided for me was an only-one-room one [which 
was actually nothing but a dorm]. My salary was only 170 yuan per month [in 
1986 and 1987]. And I had no acquaintances in Guangzhou [to ask for help:. 
Then I thought: i f I don't like such a deadlock situation, the only way to break it 
is to act by myself. 
So Liang acted—he visited many workunits one by one with his resume until 
he was hired by a factory in Foshan. By the way, his statement is interesting because 
it tells us that a large city is not necessarily a favorable condition of work and life: it 
is too crowded to provide a satisfactory environment to every individual, especially 
to a young individual. Some other informants made similar statements about Beijing 
and Shanghai respectively. 
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Action 
So they came to Foshan一some as early as the mid-1980s, some as recently 
as 1995. A few of the migrant intellectuals I interviewed directly contacted the 
workunits in Foshan without any connection and introduction. However, they are 
rare cases and the majority relied on human networking, that is, they acquired the 
relevant information from acquaintances and contacted the unit through these 
intermediaries. Former schoolmates, being the primary providers of information 
about the developing south, were the most common conveyers of the actual 
information about recruitment. As for the cases of biye fenpei (畢業分配）or job 
assignment on graduation, the same was true. Generally there was a certain degree of 
choice as to where, or to which kind of workunits, one wants to be assigned. The 
graduating students thus collected information about the places where they might be 
possibly distributed and assessed them. 
As for job hunting through the rencai market, not many informants tried it. 
Apparently the markets did not function substantially until these last couple of years, 
nor was it well known. Most of my informants had solved their problems before the 
markets were available, but two informants told me that they transferred to the 
present company through rencai market (see Chapter 3). 
It is interesting to find that despite the establishment and prevalence of job 
market, the conventional way of finding a post~depending on human connections一 
does not vanish. For Chinese, connection has been a crucially important tool to 
acquire some important things; it is not exception for intellectuals. Using 
connections does not always mean bending the rules for materializing an 
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unreasonable demand. Most people know how to use it in a reasonable and 
sophisticated manner within their social context. Maybe they begin from obtaining 
relevant information from someone they know; then, in case it is possible, they 
would step up to the next phase. 
Aside from collecting information from other people, some traveled to the 
Pearl River Delta themselves to see in what ways the place was good. Some of them 
made use business trips for this purpose, while others visited the Pearl River Delta 
cities on their own initiative. They were generally impressed by its attractive 
environment. 
(Yao Bin, engineer in a radio station, in his thirties) 
Half of my schoolmates had moved to Guangdong. One classmate of 
mine was working for this radio station....Since some of my schoolmates were at 
Shanghai, I have been to Pudong Development Zone to see. But I found it not 
very favorable; its actual development was slower than what was rumored about. 
Then, I changed my mind [and decided] to see what Guangdong, in which I had 
some friends as well, was like. I visited some cities such as Shenzhen, 
Zhongshan, etc. But when I visited that classmate of mine in Foshan for a week, 
I truly felt something different. For one thing, the thought and the values of the 
whole place were totally different, as well as the workunit leaders' methods of 
decision-making and managing work. Everything was being done so speedily; 
once the leader thought it good, the matter was put into practice immediately. 
Such style was impossible in any other place. For another, the city was clean and 
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well-designed. It was avery nice environment to live in. In short, Foshan was a 
city of a really rapid development and was so nice in many senses. It gave me a 
deep impression that it was distinct from other cities. 
(Fang Jianji, college lecturer, in his early thirties) 
I had the opportunity to travel to the Pearl River Delta in 1991. I was a 
teacher at the Party school of Jiangxi provincial Party committee, and I attended 
a study trip of a "directors class" to the Pearl River Delta. We visited several 
cities: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Guangzhou, Foshan, and Dongguan, and I got the 
impression that Foshan was a nice place. How nice it was is a matter of 
comparison. Guangzhou was a metropolis with too large of a population; it was 
crowded, and the housing conditions were terrible. Shenzhen was truly an open 
city; yet it seemed too late for me to migrate there as late as 1992. Those who 
migrated earlier had already occupied the favorable posts and there was little 
room for me. Dongguan was not an urban area at all; nor had it a commercial 
foundation. [It simply emerged abruptly in the last ten years.] That is，it was 
nothing but an upstart town. Compared with Dongguan, Foshan had a 
foundation as a city: a long history, an early emergence of commerce and 
handicraft industry. It also entailed a higher level of civilization. 
While Shenzhen was very familiar to the intellectuals who wanted to migrate, 
Foshan was not that well-known. A number of my informants told me that at the 
beginning they searched, or intended to search, for a position in Shenzhen. Foshan 
was one of the secondary alternatives such as Zhongshan or Dongguan. Yet in the 
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process of learning about the actual condition of each city, Foshan began to appeal to 
them. A relatively peaceful living environment, and a remarkably open city 
government policy about migration were the two main factors which attracted them. 
(Shao Li) 
I moved here in 1992 [from Jiangxi], with my husband. Yes, it's true 
that the higher income attracted us....The reason for coming to Foshan? My 
husband had searched some cities [in the Pearl River Delta] such as Shenzhen, 
and we were accepted by several units. We liked Foshan because of its living 
environment~not too many people, relatively quiet. Another reason was the 
household registration record. We intended to move to Shenzhen at the 
beginning; yet Shenzhen imposed a strict restriction on the transferring of 
households into the city. Only either one of a married couple was allowed to 
transfer his/her household to Shenzhen, and his/her spouse had to wait for years 
for this procedure. Many people are queuing up and waiting. Living under a 
status of non-resident, even if we live together at Shenzhen, can't give us a real 
sense of settling in, can it? In Foshan, we could transfer both household records. 
That's why we came to Foshan.^^ 
34 Transferring one's household registration record from one's original place to another means more 
than formal paperwork. All public services are provided, most of which are provided through one's 
workunit, according to household record; thus, if one wants to enjoy these public services, one must 
have one's record at the place one lives. Housing is the most fundamental service provided. 
Although public food supply has been akeady canceled in Foshan, other important services still 
depend upon the household record一subsidized medical service，child-care service, applying for a 
driving license，etc. It is true that if either one of a married couple has a record in a place, one's 
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(Yu Weicao, college lecturer, in his early thirties) 
I was to be assigned to a workunit after I graduated, yet I had some 
alternatives from which to choose: going to Beijing, staying in Shanghai [where 
I was studying for my master's degree], returning to my hometown in Hunan, 
and teaching at a college in Foshan. Either Beijing or Shanghai would definitely 
satisfy my wants in terms of my career. Changsha, my home, would enable me 
to live with my wife and kid [from whom I was living apart]. Yet neither of 
these choices would satisfy my material as well as living needs. Housing 
conditions in both Beijing and Shanghai were terribly poor. As for the migration 
of my wife to Shanghai，I was told that I had to wait for five years. At the 
college in Foshan, where I visited during winter vacation, they promised to 
provide a house for me to live in as well as a salary of 700 to 800 yuan. As for 
my wife's transfer, they told me to arrange it by myself since the college would 
not care about it. [This implies that one has an option in this city to arrange 
one's transfer without depending on the arrangement by related workunits, 
which is surprisingly innovative.] Meanwhile, the policy of the Foshan city was 
that both husband and wife must immigrate to Foshan together. This is an 
incredibly unusual policy, which means an exceptionally high degree of freedom 
spouse can enjoy some basic services as well; at least, the both members of the couple can live in an 
assigned house. One informant told me that now household registration was not that important any 
more as long as one could solve the housing problem. Nonetheless, by virtue of an image of "black 
population" for one thing, proper household status still symbolizes rights and a sense of stability for 
many people. Apparently Shao is one such representative. 
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in this city. They [both workunits and the city government,] allow individuals to 
arrange for themselves a workunit to settle in. That the whole city put such an 
active mobilization into practice means that there will be no such thing as 
• 35 
workunits which block their personnel's transfer. Thanks to my friends' help, 
my wife got a position at a workunit soon. So I moved to Foshan in September 
1991; my wife came several months later because her previous workunit blocked 
her, but we settled in anyway. 
About the policy of the city Yu mentioned，one of the top leaders of the 
related department of the city government spoke as follows: 
The principle of fuqi shuangdiao (夫妻雙調)or transferring both 
husband and wife emerged gradually. Yet it is not a regulation nor obligation, 
but a kind of encouragement so married intellectuals can be devoted to their 
work without worrying about their family life. The migration of intellectuals 
increased between 1983 and 1985, and 1987 was a peak; at that time, some 
migrated with their spouses and others came alone. Eventually we found that in 
the latter case, they tended not to settle in very well because of their unstable 
35 The actual means of "blocking" are often ridiculous, almost senseless. I was told some examples: 
the leader concerned refuses to seal an approval seal on the relevant document without which one 
cannot move, or the personnel concerned refuses to supply the documents without which one cannot 
leave, etc. Quite often, these "blocking" behaviors are not simply a matter of what the leader or the 
personnel concerned want, but result from a much more intricate conspiracy which leads them to 
"block." 
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family situation. Some of them returned home soon. This made us realize the 
importance of an appropriate measure to make them stay on a long term basis. 
Apparently there was an effective collaboration~though it was a fortunate 
coincidence~between the intention of the city government and the actual need for 
intellectuals of workunits in the city. On the one hand, governmental policy alone 
cannot offer a suitable position to whomever might want to migrate if few units want 
new workers. On the other hand, in the situation of recruitment boom, an appropriate 
lead by the government authorities is important. At any rate, these unusually flexible 
policies of Foshan attracted many married couples who preferred living together. 
Unlike Shenzhen, Foshan provided a situation in which a family can settle in first, 
and then each member of the couple devotes him/herself to his/her work in the new 
units. On the contrary, Shenzhen's condition is suitable for single intellectuals who 
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are easily mobile. In short, the flexible local policy and speedy administrative work 
migrant intellectuals experienced while they arranged migration increased their 
expectation that this place would be better. 
36 One of my informants is now suffering living apart from her husband who works in Shenzhen. 
Her formal transfer to Shenzhen takes years even if she successfully finds a unit that is willing to 
hire her. Another possibility, her husband's transfer to Foshan, needs her workunit's temporary 
material support, until her husband can find a good job. The problem is that her unit is not state-




Some of the migrant intellectuals have spent almost ten years in Foshan, 
others have had fewer years' experience. How do they evaluate their choice to 
migrate to Foshan? One general improvement is the material aspect, including 
income and living standard. The salary per month in Foshan is much higher than the 
previous level of most informants. Furthermore, this economically vital Pearl River 
Delta city also provides those who are eligible a number of opportunities for part-
time contract. Thus, if one intends to, one can expect extra income in addition to 
one's monthly salary. Some of them even earn more by moonlighting than they do 
from their official work. 
Most workunits in Foshan offer a much better housing conditions than was 
possible in the migrant intellectuals' original places. 
(Yu Weicao) 
Our housing situation is much better than the previous condition we had 
in Hunan. The house we are living now [, with two bedrooms and one living 
room,] is the smallest apartment to be allocated to young lecturers and staff. But 
in the workunit we previously lived, only those who hold assistant 
professorships were eligible to live in this size of apartment. 
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(Xian Hua, Yu's wife; department manager in a domestic trading company, in 
her early thirties) 
During the years Weicao studied in Shanghai, I stayed in my workunit 
in Hunan with our son and my mother. The three of us lived in a one-room 
house, and did everything in that room. 
Many of them are satisfied by the work they found in Foshan. 
(Yao Bin) 
I,m so satisfied by my working life since I came here. In my previous 
research institute, I was just following the prescribed order; now I never have to 
do this....My work is truly exciting, because I can fulfill myself to the maximum 
extent....Actually, I don't have time to think about arranging my wife's transfer 
to Foshan right now. I'm so busy doing my work, and I have considerable 
pressure as well for working on our new project. I have a large amount of things 
to do. Yet all these projects are making our station more and more famous; the 
most important thing is that they are perfectly fulfilling me. 
(Li Yangsen, architectural designer in a collective-owned company, in his early 
thirties) 
I have learned the CAD system in university. After graduating, I have 
kept studying it by myself because it had something to do with automation, of 
which I was in charge in my assigned workunit [though I didn't like that work 
since automation was not my major]. Now it is the CAD that makes my work 
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really worth doing. I've been working for this company for two years and Fm a 
key staff for [the utilization of] the CAD. I am so happy that I can make use of 
my technical knowledge. 
Not all satisfied migrant intellectuals found a favorable conditions from the 
beginning. They faced many things to overcome—regional difference, prejudice 
against intellectuals. Although many of them were treated as important executives at 
the beginning by the leaders and personnel staff of the new workunit, once they 
really started working, their new colleagues with whom they actually interacted did 
not necessarily respect them in that way. 
(Lin Yaopeng) 
Once I started working in my company, things didn't go well as I had 
expected. Local people had a biased view against migrants. They looked down 
on us as if we were reaping what Cantonese had sown. [They lumped me with 
those migrant laborers.] Another reason for the bias was that they were jealous 
of my educational background. Every eye was watching me at every single 
moment, waiting for my making an error. They also kept me away from 
important affairs. They feared I would do the work better than them had I done 
it, so they wanted me not to be involved in important things...I eventually 
learned how to turn the situation better. I behaved carefully not to be keen on 
my own achievement. I did every work sincerely, I got along with my 
colleagues honestly. Gradually people came to respect me. The guys of 
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construction team changed their attitude and began to count me~Engineer Lin 
{Lin Gong)—any time. They began to ask me questions. 
Yet not all changes brought by their migration were good ones. For some 
intellectuals in academe, the transfer to Foshan from their original unit caused a 
serious loss in terms of their career. 
(Liu Dinghuang, college lecturer, in his late forties) 
My migration here brought to me both gain and loss....One thing I lost 
is my career. I was in a college which had an excellent Economics department 
which is my fleld]. I wonder I would be an authoritative scholar in this realm 
by now if I had stayed there; even my students there are becoming famous. In 
this college, however, it is never possible for me to pursue for such a thing. I 
would call it a loss. 
(Cheng Xilie，college lecturer, in his early thirties) 
For us, the scholars of science and engineering, this college is far from 
an environment for academic research....As long as you are in a local, low-level 
three-year college, you will never have the chance to be involved in an 
interesting, worthwhile research project. The higher the level of an institute, the 
more opportunities exist for doing these fascinating projects. This means that 
here I have no access to such opportunities. Let's say I publish a paper 
somewhere. If it is published in my name and I belong to Q University [in 
Beijing where I got my doctor's degree], I will certainly receive some response. 
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People must read and respond to my work, which may lead me to further 
academic opportunities. But if the same paper is published in my name and I am 
from Foshan University, who on earth reads it? I bet nobody cares it. 
They still chose to migrate to Foshan, despite the possibility of career sacrifices. I 
was not able to find out whether these intellectuals knew prior to migrating to 
Foshan that the move would entail a decrease in academic opportunities. In any case, 
some locals interpret it sarcastically, as I will discuss again in Chapter 5: the 
waisheng ren, knowing that Guangdong salaries were higher, were poor enough to 
give up their original work positions and came here to beg. 
While they appreciate Foshan's work system, which is more business-like 
and effective than that which is inland, some informants find that Foshan still has a 
conventionally inefficient side as well. The following statement is intriguing since it 
reveals the speaker's conception of excellence of highly commercial social system as 
efficient and "modern" opposed to the typically Chinese "connection" system. 
(Fang Jianji) 
Though I'm satisfied by my condition here,] there was some difference 
between what I had expected before I moved here and what the situations here 
were really like. I had thought this way: Guangdong would be a place to enable 
one to fulfill oneself purely in terms of one's ability. Since it was a highly 
commercial society, human relations would be simple and business-like. One 
would not have to rely on connections, but would be able to buy any service 
with money. I had actually found this to be the case when I had first visited 
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here; I enjoyed good services, especially from the people in the food industry. 
The reality was, however, not everything was like this. I think I had not 
observed things very deeply in my first visit. I gradually found after I settled 
here that some bureaucratic places were still bureaucratic... 
We can never be free from connections. We have no choice but to rely 
on this...As long as we are living in this society, we must deal with it, cope with 
it，and enter deeply into it. Such a way of living exhausts us; nonetheless, since 
we can't flee from it, the only thing to do is to deal with it. I find that I was 
wrong in having expected to flee from all these connection matters once I 
moved to Foshan, and I must continue dealing with them. Since it is so, I will 
just continue to do as I have before. 
Sense of Loss and Sense of "Cultural Authoritativeness" 
When talking about the evaluation of migrant intellectuals regarding their 
migration to Foshan, I heard the term shiluogan (失落感）or sense of loss many times. 
Sense of loss means migrant intellectuals' disappointment because they failed to 
acquire what they had expected. As I have discussed earlier, material conditions are 
surely satisfactory for them. Then, the non-material aspects may be the problem. 
It is obvious from my interviews that migrant intellectuals have a sense of 
partial loss or dissatisfaction. Most of the interviewees answered my question in this 
way: "Pretty good, I think. If I had more desires, I may be dissatisfied. But I keep it 
in mind to be content with my lot..." “Yes, I'm fairly satisfied in material terms, 
yeah...well..." “I have nothing to complain about; yet I am not satisfied, either. There 
113 
is a theory in psychology: the opposite of ‘being satisfied' is not 'being unsatisfied，， 
but ‘not being satisfied'. Applying this to my situation, I am neither dissatisfied, nor 
satisfied." Though it is a partial sense of loss or dissatisfaction, it occupies many 
migrant intellectuals' minds. It is partial because it is limited and does not include 
material aspects. Clearly, they expected more than material wealth by their 
migration, but it has not materialized, or materialized only partially. 
Then, what is sense of loss? I think that it comes mainly from the gap 
between their expectation of the "new world" and the reality of their actual life in 
Foshan. Fang Jianji's statement about connections shows this one aspect. His image 
of the Pearl River Delta was only a fantasy, and he realized it after his settlement in 
Foshan. The situation Lin Yaopeng experienced seems very common among migrant 
intellectuals in the Pearl River Delta. He was fortunate that he learned how to cope 
with the reality, and changed his condition for the better; but the most fortunate point 
was that his company really needed him. He became a “necessary man" by his own 
effort, yet the company also thought that he was necessary. Consider the cases of 
Yao Bin and Li Yangsen. They are very satisfied with their working environments 
which allow them to make use of their professional skills. However, it is also 
possible that their bosses might not need them once the present project terminates. In 
case the project fails to gain profit despite the company's investment, it is also 
possible their bosses will quit the project and fire them. I do not mean their bosses 
will really do this, but these kind of incidents are actually quite common. If it 
happens to them, then they will experience a serious sense of loss. For this reason, 
intellectuals and rencaixue ideologues criticize the hasty employers who "neither 
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understand the value of intellectuals nor esteem intellectuals". Migrant intellectuals' 
bad feeling when treated as gaoji dagongzai or high-class employees (see Chapter 3) 
also stems from this point. 
The gap they find between them and the local society exists not only in their 
work and career. In migrant intellectuals' eyes, the local Foshan society as a whole 
does not understand the significance of their presence despite the fact that Foshan 
wanted their superior knowledge and technical skills. On the individual level, they 
are regarded as poor northerners who wanted a better salary in the south, and their 
own talents of which they are well aware themselves are simply ignored by the 
locals. They interpret such treatment as local people's ignorance, and think those 
who treat them in such a way possess a low intellectual level. 
It is from this background that I see migrant intellectuals' sense of "cultural 
authoritativeness". "Cultural authoritativeness" is a notion that it is them who occupy 
the intellectual/cultural mainstream in China. In other words, they consider 
themselves to be intellectual/cultural elites. Compared with them, local people are of 
lower cultural level, less highly enlightened and trained by the cultural notion 
legitimized by the state. This sense of cultural authoritativeness has a dialectical 
relation with the sense of loss. In other words, these two senses reinforce the ideas 
mutually. 
In their everyday lives, not all migrant intellectuals consciously hold this 
sense of cultural authoritativeness. Those who hold it may not be aware of it every 
single moment, either. Nonetheless, everyday interactions with locals do make 
migrant intellectuals conscious of the gap between them and the locals. At least, both 
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groups think that they represent different cultures. I find it impressive that Shenzhen 
is still popular as a possible future destination among migrant intellectuals, despite 
the many aforementioned actual difficulties. More accurately, Shenzhen is regarded 
differently than other Pearl River Delta cities. This newly established city is 
predominantly occupied by neidi ren or non-Cantonese; not only factory laborers but 
also many of the executives are highly educated non-Cantonese elites. For this 
reason, some migrants feel that they will be able to find their own culture in 
Shenzhen. The calligrapher informant I mentioned in Chapter 3，who does not work 
as a calligrapher at the moment, told me that he would have many more 
opportunities in Shenzhen because Shenzhen people need his calligraphy as they 
need "high culture" which differs from "consumption culture" predominant in 
Guangdong. He guesses so because he believes the majority of Shenzhen people to 
be of culturally high class, or, intellectual elites. Such statements obviously show 
their perception that their culture is different from the local culture they are 
experiencing in Foshan. 
This sense of cultural difference, which I speculate is created by the sense of 
"cultural authoritativeness" as well as creates it, is what I will explore in the next 
chapter. Through common cultural differences in such aspects as language, thought, 
and behavior, migrant intellectuals define their own position and interpret their 
significance in local Foshan society; they also position and interpret local people in 
relation with themselves. On the other hand, local people also position and interpret 
themselves and migrant intellectuals, yet in another way. I will focus mainly on the 
migrant intellectuals' side and explore how they judge their position, define the 
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meaning of what they think are their resources, and interpret the relations between 
them and locals. 
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Chapter 5. Different Cultures as Social Resources 
1. Are Migrant Intellectuals Homogeneous? 
Many migrant intellectuals I interviewed told me of a variety of differences 
between them and the local Cantonese. While collecting these statements, a question 
emerged in my mind: these migrant intellectuals are actually from many different 
places, and they also have many different backgrounds; why do they consider all 
migrant intellectuals as a homogeneous group? When I asked this question to flnd 
out what made them subscribe to this viewpoint, their answers varied, but they all 
pointed out one fact: migrant intellectuals are relatively homogeneous. One 
informant said: “As long as we speak Mandarin, we have a great similarity." Another 
said: "Cantonese culture particularly differs from any other Chinese sub culture, so 
compared with the Cantonese, we are relatively similar." Despite their claim that the 
non-Cantonese are not uniform group (see Chapter 4), it seems to be appropriate to 
categorize migrant intellectuals into one group in opposition to Cantonese people. 
Here we should pay attention to another important factor~education and culture. 
My informants tend to divide themselves from the Cantonese not only in regional 
terms but also in cultural/intellectual terms. What underlies this notion is the concept 
that Cantonese are of relatively low cultural level. I will focus on this point later. In 
the discussion of this part, I will adopt the “migrant intellectuals vs. Cantonese" 
dichotomy shown by my informants. 
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2. Interpretations of Cultural Differences 
Language Difference 
Language is undoubtedly the central issue for anyone confronting regional 
differences. Needless to say, language is a crucial component of equipment one 
needs to survive in any one place. Sometimes it also serves as a passport that grants 
one the right to be a member of a society or of an ethnic group. 
Language is a common problem for the migrant intellectuals in Foshan. The 
Cantonese-speaking areas in Guangdong province has been a place where tuipu 
(abbreviation of tuiguang Putonghua [推廣普通話];popularizing Putonghua or 
officially stipulated common spoken Chinese) is most difficult to accomplished. The 
dominant dialect~Cantonese—practically predominates over Mandarin (see, for 
example, FD June 13 1992, September 7 1992, February 19 1994). Naturally, the 
language heard in Foshan is not Mandarin but Cantonese, which is incomprehensible 
for outsiders when they first come. Many local Foshan people know how to speak 
Mandarin by virtue of the national policy and school education, yet few of them are 
willing to speak it in everyday life. To them, Mandarin is the official language, and 
their second language after all. Then, the only solution is that the migrant 
intellectuals learn Cantonese by themselves. 
Most of the migrant intellectuals I interviewed had a hard time dealing with 
Cantonese. To understand what others are saying is the minimum survival skill for 
anyone, so most are able to understand Cantonese when they hear it. This is usually 
119 
enough to communicate with people, since most locals understand Mandarin. Still, 
one should be able to speak Cantonese if one wants to fit into the local circle. 
Speaking skills are developed according to necessity: those who do not need 
Cantonese at their workplace do not speak it very much, because they have no need 
to learn it, nor do they have many opportunities to learn it. The college setting 
particularly does not demand speaking skills. The majority of the Foshan University 
37 
staff come from outside Guangdong. Colleges are required to conduct all classes in 
Mandarin; among colleagues, Mandarin is also prevalent, though Cantonese is also 
used among native Cantonese staff and students. Students are all from within 
Guangdong province, so they speak Cantonese to each other; yet they speak to 
Mandarin-speaking lecturers in Mandarin. 
(Liao Hong, college lecturer, in his early thirties) 
I don't know how to speak Cantonese, though I have been working here 
for three years. I have bought a cassette tape as is I study a foreign language. As 
for listening...，yes, I can understand it basically. 
At school, I speak Mandarin all the time. Lecturers talk to each other in 
Mandarin; my students talk to me in Mandarin also. 
37 I do not have the exact proportion of local staff and non-local staff. Someone told me "the 
majority" of the staff are waidi ren, another said "more than haW," another even told me "most." 
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(Xiao Haojiang，college staff, in his early thirties) 
I always speak Mandarin except when I shop at the food market. In my 
daily life, I mostly speak Mandarin, say, 80% to 90%. At work, I speak only 
Mandarin. Everybody at my workplace speaks Mandarin, local or non-local. 
(Cheng Xilie, college lecturer, in his early thirties) 
I can only speak Cantonese a little bit, though I have no problem in 
listening. It doesn't matter at all. At school, I speak Mandarin. People also talk 
to me in Mandarin. 
On the contrary, those migrant intellectuals who work in conventional 
workunits, where Cantonese predominates, have an immediate need to master the 
speaking of Cantonese. Factories and national-owned companies are typical 
workplaces wherein one cannot survive without Cantonese. 
(Qiu Fendou, workshop director in a ceramic factory, in his early thirties) 
I speak to people in the factory in Cantonese. I learned how to speak 
Cantonese after I came to this factory. At my previous factory in Zhuhai, most 
colleagues were Mandarin speakers, so I did not need Cantonese. Yes, I learned 
Cantonese because of work necessity. You also have an advantage if you can 
speak it; you can be one of their members. 
(Liang Ying, college lecturer, in his early thirties) 
My level of competence is much higher than other migrant lecturers 
here, because I know how to speak Cantonese. Since I spent a few years at a 
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factory [as a production section chief], I had a chance to learn it. You must 
speak Cantonese if you talk to factory people. The workers were all native 
Cantonese. Some of them didn't even understand Mandarin if they listen to it; 
those who understand it couldn't speak it very well, either. So I spoke to them in 
Cantonese. Of course I couldn't speak it well at the beginning, and they laughed 
at me. So what? I never cared. It's totally okay if only you can make yourself 
understood. Gradually I became used to speaking it. The only thing you need to 
make it is to be bold. You don't have to worry butjust speak some. 
(Lai Xiaohua, engineer in post and telecommunications office, in her early 
thirties. She is Cantonese.) 
When we graduated from college P^anjing Institute of Post and 
Telecommunications] in 1986，many post and telecommunications offices in 
Guangdong needed a large number of professionals since Guangdong was 
beginning to introduce program control switching systems. Graduates who were 
from Guangdong would be automatically assigned to work in Guangdong; that's 
why I am here. Besides me, some non-Cantonese college graduates were also 
assigned to my workunit. Our unit had kind of a conventional way of thinking; 
the leaders were all local who were of low educational background. They took it 
for granted that these migrant engineers should master Cantonese. The whole 
workplace was filled with an atmosphere: "What can you do here, not even 
being able to speak Cantonese?" These waisheng guys are really admirable! 
Within half a year, they understood Cantonese, and in a year they learned how 
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to speak it. Though they have an accent, they can communicate with others 
perfectly. In the last couple of years, we have begun to develop an attitude of 
accepting Mandarin; but in the whole workunit, Cantonese is still 
overwhelmingly dominant. 
From these examples we can see the power of locals which requires outsiders 
to assimilate themselves to the environment of the local language. Whether it is 
exercised by lower-class workers or by workunit leaders, this power is much 
stronger than the power that back ups the migrant intellectuals' usage of Mandarin: 
although the latter have official political legitimacy，the former controls Foshan 
society. Thus, the migrant intellectuals must learn Cantonese. 
Yet is this requirement always so simple and straightforward? What about 
this opinion stated by a young local executive? 
(Yan Chaobing, manager of a collective-owned architectural design office, in his 
early thirties. He is Cantonese college graduate who is an employer of some 
migrant intellectuals) 
We [local Cantonese] speak to them [migrant staff] in Mandarin. We 
use Mandarin and Cantonese, depending on to whom we are talking. Most of us 
are college graduates, so all of us can speak Mandarin. Why do we do so? 
Because, you know, if somebody doesn't understand a language, we shouldn't 
use it but instead use another language everybody understands. We Chinese 
must do so [as a common rule]. We use a language comprehensible to 
everybody on the scene, you know. 
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They can't speak Cantonese. Some understand it, some don't. They are 
not keen on learning it, because they have no need to speak it in our office. If 
they are working at a construction site, they have no choice but to learn how to 
speak Cantonese. As a matter of fact, our profession have a number of 
opportunities to interact with those construction guys. It is not good at all to 
speak only Mandarin to them. Neither in actual communication terms nor in 
terms of atmosphere is it favorable. Now that they are living in a new place, it is 
critically important to speak the language spoken there in mixing together with 
local people, just as you are speaking Cantonese right now. If they don't make 
this effort, it is not surprising if they can't enter the local circle. I don't 
appreciate some people's attitude—such as some college lecturers'一of not 
learning Cantonese. 
Yan's statement sounds reasonable in each specific context: all Chinese 
should speak a common language so that all can communicate; speaking the local 
language is the key to get along well with local people. Yet I fmd it internally 
contradictory in the whole framework of his discussion. Would it not bring about a 
somewhat disagreeable situation to expect migrant intellectuals to learn Cantonese 
while letting them use Mandarin as a common language? It is fine that all people 
speak to a newly-arrived intellectual in Mandarin; however, this makes it more 
difficult for him/her to break away from this exceptional situation and become a 
Cantonese speaker. The longer this situation continues, the more established his/her 
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incompetence will become, and thus, he/she will be kept marginalized in the local 
social relations. 
Being positioned at such a status by this local language situation, how do 
migrant intellectuals perceive Cantonese? Most of them seemingly consider it as 
nothing but a tool—a tool for communication, a tool for acquiring some benefit, or a 
tool for obtaining membership in one's interaction circle. Therefore, the majority of 
my informants have no particular sentiment toward Cantonese; there is neither 
attachment nor hostility. Yet a few of them told me about their dislike of it, while a 
fewer number of the interviewees mentioned an attraction to Cantonese. 
(Cai Yang, college lecturer/staff, in his late thirties) 
No Chinese dialects are as unpleasant to hear as Cantonese. I wish it 
would disappear as soon as possible. I realize I'm unfortunate in that I flnd it 
impossible to like Cantonese, but it can't be helped. I never tell locals this. Ijust 
say to them that Cantonese is a nice language, so nobody knows that I hate it. 
Actually I am a person who would omit “one of’ when some people say 
“Cantonese is one of the ugly dialects." 
I learned Cantonese by myself, but I didn't master it. I have bought a 
tape. My wife and daughter learned how to speak it soon....Sometimes they talk 
to each other in Cantonese at home, then I stop them. It is my rule that each 
member of the Cai family must speak Mandarin at home....I speak 99% 
Mandarin in my daily life. 
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(Zhou Biao, government official and interpreter，in his late twenties) 
I can speak Cantonese because I have worked as a Japanese interpreter 
for a factory. In the beginning, the workers needed another interpreter~a 
Mandarin-Cantonese interpreter~because I didn't speak Cantonese, so a local 
engineer translated my Mandarin to Cantonese. It sounds awful, doesn't it? So I 
learned how to speak Cantonese. Another reason was my parents-in-law. They 
are native Cantonese speakers; my mother-in-law even doesn't understand my 
Mandarin. Anyway, I learned it, and now I speak both languages according to 
the situation. BUT, I never like speaking Cantonese. I always feel so awkward 
when I speak it. I prefer speaking Mandarin. 
(Qiu Fendou) 
I haven't thought about whether I like Cantonese or not. A tool...yes, 
it'sjust a tool I use when I need, if you ask me. But I find Cantonese colloquial 
expressions interesting—they have a distinctive flavor. 
(Xian Hua, department manager in a domestic trading company, in her early 
thirties) 
I learned Cantonese through the interaction with my colleagues. In the 
domain of business, the language you speak sometimes affects the result of the 
business, so, you better know how to speak it. I usually speak Cantonese in my 
company; but I couldn't understand it for the first four months. I didn't like it. It 
sounded awful to me and I never intended to learn it....Now I have no such 
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feeling at all. I thought that Cantonese was strained before; now I even feel 
Mandarin is strained. 
Some consider Cantonese to be as distant from Mandarin as a foreign 
language and, as such, act as a very high wall that prevents migrants from entering 
the circle of locals. Others think it as simply a dialect of Chinese which shares a 
common ground with Mandarin and do not take the differences too seriously. 
(Song Nanhua, college lecturer, in her late twenties) 
I consider that Mandarin and Cantonese are two different languages. 
There is a notion that Cantonese is a Chinese dialect. But in my opinion, this 
notion is a product of the policy—the policy to popularize Mandarin as a unified 
common language. Anyway, Cantonese is extremely difficult for us to learn. It 
takes at least half a year to learn to speak, or maybe, just to understand it. We 
had a really, really hard time counting in Cantonese, yat, yih, saam, sei,...gau, 
sahp, and buying food at the market [from the local hawker]. It doesn't work. 
Maybe we have an accent and they can tell we are not native speakers. They? 
They never speak Mandarin, whether it is because they can't speak it or they 
don't want to speak it. They are all peasant hawkers, so it may really be the case 
that they can't speak any Mandarin. In any case, in all these daily interaction we 
have the feeling ofbeing rejected every single moment. 
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(Fang Jianji, college lecturer, in his early thirties) 
The language I speak depends on the place. I speak Mandarin at school, 
but downtown, I always speak Cantonese. Yes, I speak only Cantonese. I 
learned it through daily interaction with local people as well as by watching TV. 
I think Cantonese is nothing but Chinese~unlike foreign languages such as 
English~because it's so easy to master. Suppose I am in a situation for a year 
or so where I am always surrounded by English—is it possible for me to 
understand it and speak it in one year? I guess it's impossible. So, Cantonese is 
[a branch of] Chinese. 
Whether one hates or likes Cantonese, or refuses to feel any sentiment 
towards it, it is universally true for migrant intellectuals that the issue of Cantonese 
is inescapable. It is inescapable since it affects one's position and power in one's 
social space. To migrant intellectuals, Cantonese issue in which they are generally 
incompetent will easily damage one's prestige, as the following statement shows. 
(Song Nanhua) 
One [migrant] teacher I know had this experience. When he bought a 
watermelon at a food market, the [local] hawker told him repeatedly, “XX yuan 
3 8 
for 7 jin watermelon." The hawker said that phrase to him again and again and 
again, as many times as fifteen, yes, in Cantonese, as if he was teaching a child. 
He was very unpleasant and sad to have been treated by a hawker in such a 
38 A unit ofweight. Onejin is equivalent to 500g. 
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manner. He is an intellectual after all; how can he stand to be treated as if he is 
either a kid or an incompetent? 
Many migrant intellectuals I interviewed have tried to turn the situation better 
in various ways. Liang Ying overcame it with his courageous attitude to learn how to 
speak Cantonese, even though he was laughed at by local workers. Yet this solution 
largely depends on each individual's character as well as his/her actual social 
situation, thus is by no means an absolute answer. Another possibility for 
overcoming this contradiction is not to learn it, and to justify one's not learning it. 
Here they apply the idea of the legitimacy of Mandarin, and furthermore, the 
legitimacy of their identity as “intellectual elites”. 
(Yu Weicao, college lecturer, in his early thirties) 
At the beginning, I wanted to master Cantonese. Gradually, however, I 
came to think that I didn't need to do it, because when I talk to people in 
Cantonese, it makes me feel as if I'm yielding，or flattering, to them. 
Furthermore, I can't express what I mean very effectively in Cantonese. Then, 
why not speaking in Mandarin with assurance? I do realize that this attitude is 
not very good, though. 
Consciously or unconsciously, this type of migrant intellectuals depend on 
Mandarin as a tool to present their authoritativeness legitimized by the state standard. 
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(Lin Yaopeng, machinery engineer in a construction company, in his early 
thirties) 
I hope I can speak Cantonese well. However, I don't think I have to 
speak it as well as native speakers do. All I need is to mix together with them 
harmoniously and I don't need to be like a Cantonese. Everybody knows that 
I'm from the north, anyway. That'll be all right, since I'm an elite. 
Consequently, selective or functional use of both Mandarin and Cantonese 
becomes a common practice. For example, "Speaking Cantonese when shopping at 
the food market" is one universal behavior every single interviewee told me. Even 
those who declared themselves “not able to speak" would bargain about the price and 
the amount of vegetables in Cantonese, otherwise, they think they would be cheated 
by the local hawkers. On the other hand, the following example is a highly tactical 
use of both languages. 
(Lin Yaopeng) 
In my workplace, I speak Mandarin approximately 70% of the time and 
Cantonese 30% of the time. When discussing technology, I use Mandarin, so 
that no misunderstanding will occur. To the [construction] workers, I speak 
Cantonese. 
But when I talk to my leaders {lingdao), I do not speak Cantonese but 
speak Mandarin. I intentionally do not speak Cantonese to them [although they 
are all native Cantonese speakers]. Why? Because my Cantonese is not fluent 
enough, about 60% in my own evaluation. To show them this inferior side of 
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myselfwill affect my reputation and value. I want to interact with them with full 
capability. 
What underlies this selective use is a sense of the authoritativeness of 
speaking proper Mandarin. The notion "Speaking Mandarin is a marker of elites who 
are in the mainstream of Chinese culture" has been commonly shared among 
migrant intellectuals to a great extent. They consider empirically that those who 
speak Mandarin properly are automatically respected as educated and intellectual, 
and are treated as such. 
(Zhou Biao) 
In the north, everybody respects those who speak Mandarin. To be able 
to speak Mandarin properly is a marker of intelligence. This is true even for 
those proud and exclusive Shanghai guys; they treat Mandarin speakers nicely. 
They do the same thing in Xiamen in Fujian, too. Yet you can never experience 
it here in Guangdong. 
This contradicts another notion held commonly by locals: Mandarin speakers 
are subordinate because they are all employees from poor rural areas outside. It has 
been a dominant concept in Foshan until the late 1980s. I assume that this 
inconsistency stems from the different definitions of "Mandarin" by migrant 
intellectuals and locals. To intellectuals, Mandarin means the proper official spoken 
Chinese and actually the language they speak; thus, what are spoken by migrant 
peasants are not proper Mandarin but variants of Mandarin. In other words, they 
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demarcate their language from the dialects spoken by non-intellectuals. On the other 
hand, locals tend not to find this diversity in Mandarin. To them, Mandarin is simply 
a Chinese spoken by outsiders; locals primarily speak Cantonese as their first 
language, and they speak Mandarin only when it is demanded as the official spoken 
Chinese. Some migrant intellectuals may say that locals are not able to tell proper 
Mandarin from various dialects. If so, it is not strange: to locals, any languages, 
including Mandarin, are all others' languages. In short, we can see one example that 
the two groups interpret the meaning of one common cultural object in different 
ways. 
Different Thoughts and Behaviors 
In addition to the language difference, there are many other differences 
which reinforce migrant intellectuals' sense of distance from the locals, or vice 
versa. These differences, which may be called cultural differences, mainly involve 
the discrepancy between the thought and behavior of the two groups. Some of these 
differences led to a sense of disgust on both sides and the formation of derogatory 
stereotypes of one another. Here I will describe some typical conceptual/cultural 
differences between the migrant intellectuals and the locals. 
Quite easily, I collected many examples of differences, since people told me 
a numerous number of examples. Obviously both locals and migrant intellectuals 
feel there are much difference between them and their counterparts. 
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Spiritual vs. Material 
Most informants fmd one difference very conspicuous: local Cantonese 
people attach much importance to material and practical value while non-locals are 
less materialistic. Most migrant intellectuals I interviewed told me their impressions 
of the Cantonese people as being much more practical than they were. Some 
mentioned it in a neutral fashion, others told it to me with a sense of wonder and 
disgust. 
(Song Nanhua) 
Yes, practicalness is one prominent characteristic of the Cantonese. 
They are realistic, they are practical, and they attach great importance to 
money...The difference between us and them is obvious when we see our 
ideologies. We cannot share a common topic with them, so we cannot talk with 
them deeply...It is true that we came here for more money; honestly, however, it 
is an agony for me to earn money. Or, I simply don't like it so much. That I 
want money does not mean that I am enthusiastic over money itself, but rather 
means that I would like to manifest my value through money, as well as to 
establish a financial foundation for doing what I really want to do. Cantonese 
people would not think this way; they just want money itself. 
(Du Zhao, college staff/calligrapher, in his late twenties) 
The culture local Foshan people want is "tip culture" or “material 
culture." The opposition of this notion if "spiritual culture", which many inland 
people pursue... 
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To local Cantonese people, the pursuit of culture is not worth the 
abandonment of all else. Some non-Cantonese would dare to do this...Everyone 
needs something to pursue in one's life. I guess such people who pursue material 
things can have a full life. I think they are happy in their own context. Simply, 
what they want is not what I want. 
The prevalent Cantonese notion of mercantilism led locals to attach 
secondary importance to education (see Chapter 3). By the same token, in the case of 
studying in a higher institute of education, their motivations tend to stem from the 
practical advantages gained by obtaining a degree or a diploma. 
(Song Nanhua) 
Last year when I was sent to England to study along with some 
[selected] students from Foshan university, I was shocked by the students [who 
were all Cantonese]. The only thing they aimed at was to acquire their diploma 
and nothing else was on their minds. They totally lacked the idea of making use 
of their opportunity to visit a foreign country and to experience and understand 
England more. To them, such things were a waste. What was important to them 
was to get a diploma when it was available, so that they would have more 
advantages in the future. I found that their thought was fundamentally different 
from mine. 
Migrant intellectuals also perceive great differences between themselves and 
the Cantonese in behavior. All statements were consistent in the point that non-
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Cantonese were more straightforward and open than Cantonese. Such characteristics 
they consider typical of the Cantonese—carefully calculating and strictly budgeting, 
not straightforward, shrewd, stingy, etc.—are viewed in a neutral or in a negative 
light. 
(Ye Heping, government official and interpreter, in his early thirties) 
Non-Cantonese are straightforward, frank and open. Cantonese, on the 
other hand, are exclusive~their localism is too strong. Furthermore, they are so 
cunning that they are difficult to get along with. 
39 
(Wen Zhong, college graduate, in his early twenties) 
I don't understand Cantonese people's attitude. In college, I was always 
a class monitor. When the whole class decided something, we had a discussion 
before making a decision. Just tell us your opinion if you have one, you know? 
But they never gave their opinions even though they had some. Instead they 
hinted at what they wanted. They hinted their preference and wanted me to 
achieve it. I don't understand what they were thinking about. 
The same thing is true for dating a girl. I just want her to tell me 
whether she likes me or not. If she doesn't like me, it's all right, I'll never mind. 
39 Strictly speaking. Wen is not a migrant intellectual I focus on in this study: he migrated from 
Beijing to Foshan with his parents when he was a fourth grader. However, his empirical statements 
about regional differences between Cantonese and non-Cantonese are intriguing and relevant. 
Therefore, I think it appropriate to quote his interview. 
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I simply want to make it clear. Cantonese girls don't do this! Can you believe it? 
She just keeps her attitude vague and tells me neither yes nor no. I can't bear it. 
(Cheng Xilie) 
They are good at calculating~~they are quite exacting in money 
matters. We are not like that; we are much more generous. When I have money, 
I just pay for all of us and never find it problem. 
According to some migrant intellectuals, local people's human relationships 
are also formed on the basis of this material motivation. Although it is a relative 
matter, these migrant intellectuals consider local people's way of interacting with 
others practical and somehow calculating. 
(Qiu Fendou) 
Most of my friends are non-local. Sharing similar customs is one reason 
for that; migrated people are generally less utilitarian than local people are. The 
Cantonese tend to be utilitarian, probably because many of them engage in 
business....When one of our friends is in some sort of trouble, we will help him. 
We have a strong sense of helping each other. I wonder if local people are more 
independent than us; they tend to solve their problems by themselves instead of 
asking their friends' help. Or they may think they can solve their problem by 
purchasing any service they need. Another difference is that we often drop by 




The same thing [that Cantonese are enthusiastic about money] is true 
for love. Usually when we are in love with somebody, the two of us should get 
along with each other very well above all; the two of us should be in love 
because we are simply happy to be together. After this fundamental situation we 
will begin to think about other things~realistic issues. Things should be like 
that, right? To northerners, things are like that. To the Cantonese, however, this 
is not the case. They talk about money first. I f s true. 
(Song Nanhua) 
The way local guys hunt for a girlfriend is practical as well. To them, 
the most important point is whether or not the woman is beautiful, because a 
beautiful girlfriend will give them much face. Then, the next point is whether or 
not she is rich. It seems like they don't care too much about what her character 
is like or if she has something different from other women, etc. They are not like 
us. 
Naturally, it is not very likely that migrant intellectuals have local friends. 
Many informants told me that their friends were mostly migrated people as opposed 
to locals; even if they had local friends, the interaction with them would be by no 
means very close and deep. 
Daily conversations conducted by the people of each group also well reflect 
their different interests. 
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(Cheng Xilie) 
Suppose I talk with a local leader of some workunit. I bet most of his 
topics are about either business or money. When I respond to him on money 
issues, the conversation escalates quickly and he will continue for a long time in 
discussing a business opportunity for quick and easy moneymaking. This shows 
the local Cantonese mind well. Of course, northerners do talk about business and 
money; yet they will not talk that much, nor that long. In short, their manner is 
not so extreme as that of the Cantonese. 
(Yu Weicao) 
My friends are all migrated people. Locals are not easy to get along 
with. We have nothing to talk about with locals. Well, we often discuss national 
affairs, such as current events and politics. This is what intellectuals naturally 
talk about, you know. But locals don't like it. Actually I don't know exactly 
what they usually talk about. Well...eating...or what? Making money and 
spending money...I don't know. 
I assume that they did not state these comments in a biased view. I was 
confident about this point when I had dinner with approximately ten young local 
people. All of them deserved the name of rencai: most were experts in the science 
and technological domains, such as machine manufacturing, automotives, and 
machinery processing. All of them had studied in Japan as either a technical trainee 
or a student, thus everyone spoke Japanese. Some of them currently were working as 
engineers and some as interpreters, or as both; one of them established his own 
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business. During the dinner, these local rencai reminisced about their shared 
memories in Japan, they talked about theirjobs and businesses, about the watch one 
of them had bought in Japan, about cars, about portable phones, about the food and 
drink we were having, yet their topics never covered current events and p o l i t i c s， 
What is wrong with this, then? Are they really so low level that they do not 
deserve the name "intellectuals"? Do all intellectuals have to talk about national 
affairs? It may depend on the definition of "intellectual." Moreover, it seems that 
business is more than a means of earning money for the local Cantonese. To them, I 
assume, business is what one must deal with very seriously; it is rather a kind of 
important "path" from which they learn many lessons of life. Presumably, the notion 
of what an intellectual should be like differs between migrant intellectuals and local 
intellectuals. 
One migrant intellectual pointed out: 
(Xiao Haojiang) 
I did feel strongly about Cantonese people's attachment to money and 
material goods when I first came here...However, I had this impression only at 
the beginning, and now I find I don't feel that so much. I wonder if my feeling 
is becoming weak, or I am gradually understanding them. In the point that they 
40 They also talked about Foshan High-Tech Industries Development Zone (see Chapter 2) because 
they were engineers and some of who had workplaces in the Zone. Nonetheless, the concern was 
preferential treatments provided to the enterprises in the Zone. Therefore, my impression was that 
they purely talked about a business chance. 
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like money, for example, now I am kind of skeptical that it is wrong. What's 
really wrong with it? 
Local Cantonese people themselves also have justification of their 
practicalness. They admit that they are practical, but they interpret it in a different~ 
almost opposite~way. They value their practicality as positive and significant. 
(Liao Shitang, interpreter and secretary in a Sino-foreign joint ventures 
manufacturer, in her early thirties. She is local Cantonese.) 
The Cantonese are good at dealing with things quickly and flexibly. We 
are tactful and shrewd. Non-Cantonese cannot do this. We have a term saigaai 
jai (world kid) in Cantonese, which refers to an image of Cantonese people who 
can handle things flexibly and neatly even if they cross the border into other 
countries. 
Also, Cantonese people know how to enjoy life {sikdak heungsauh 
sangwuht). One evidence of this is that we like to travel. Non-Cantonese would 
begrudge spending money even if they have money. We are good at spending 
money to enjoy life. 
Liao,s statement about spending money is consistent with one migrant 
intellectual's mention of the different lifestyles between the inland and the Pearl 
River Delta but is interpreted in an opposite fashion. 
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(Shao Li, accountant in a Sino-foreign joint ventures manufacturer, in her early 
thirties) 
Difference [in lifestyles] exists not only in the amount of income but 
also in the concept of consumption. In Guangdong, the consumption rate is 
becoming higher and higher; it is not the case inland. Inland people would not 
spend money too easily even if they had money. 
In the debate on migrant intellectuals and locals in the local literature 
magazine I mentioned in Chapter 4，a Foshan literatus Liu Dingjian discusses the 
mindset and practice of the local Cantonese and migrant intellectuals respectively 
from the Cantonese point of view. 
The Cantonese are always practical and realistic, and they do not mind 
stating straightforwardly that they are working for money to live. The Cantonese 
call work wan sihk (楓食);41 in job interviews, they would present their 
motivation for doing thejob using this term without a tiny bit of hesitation. The 
northerners cannot behave like this. They tend to gloss over their motivation to 
migrate, trying to conceal that they were actually attracted by the practical 
advantages of Guangdong by giving many magnificent and magnanimous 
statements. They do not understand that there is nothing wrong with stating their 
material desire honestly, but behave as if they are aloof from material pursuits. 
In the Cantonese eyes, such a way seems nothing but old-fashioned and useless. 
41 This term means "looking for a meal." To Mandarin speakers, this may sound overly 
straightforward. I assume that Liu's mention of this term proves the existence ofthis feeling. 
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When the northerners migrate to the Pearl River Delta, they are usually 
stunned by the prosperity of the Cantonese in the midst of the street market; then 
they begin to criticize the Cantonese for "being so poor that they only have 
42 
money {qiongde zhi shengxia qian [窮得祗剩下錢]),，，as if they themselves are 
pure and aloof from material desires. The Cantonese would respond to them 
with just one word: good-for-nothing!.. .Every single Cantonese knows this well-
known saying: "Money is not almighty; yet without money, it is impossible to 
do anything (qian hushi wanneng, dan mei qian queshi wanwan buneng 
[錢不是萬能，但没錢卻是萬萬不能])” This is different from money worship (Liu 
1992:17)43 
This is also a mirror image of the statements by many migrant intellectuals; 
the crucial difference is that Liu considers this Cantonese straightforwardness toward 
material pursuits by no means negative. After this part, he discusses this Cantonese 
value and behavior as a key to the rapid development of the Pearl River Delta. 
As Liu says, practicalness is a manifestation of the brilliant business sense. 
Some migrant intellectuals admit the locals' commercial ability positively. It is a 
natural regional character on the one hand; on the other, it is also the fruit of a 
successful alignment with the new economic policy of the national government. Now 
that the implementation of this economic policy is gradually becoming a common 
42 "Poor" in the non-material sense: the northerners here are saying that the Cantonese have nothing 
other than money. 
43 TMs is an abridged translation. 
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value of the Chinese, the commercial ability of the Cantonese has a certain degree of 
progressive value. 
Political vs. Economic 
Another difference between the two groups is their differing attitudes towards 
political issues, which can be explained by another set of dichotomy~politics-
oriented behavior versus economy-oriented behavior. While migrant intellectuals are 
relatively eager to discuss social and political topics, the locals are generally not 
keen on them, as my examples show. Material matters imply economy while 
spiritual factors are equivalent to politics; thus, these two pairs of conceptions 
naturally overlap each other. 
(Liao Hong) 
Yesterday CCTV news reported that China would conduct an abrupt 
missile exercise in the sea near Taiwan. This news instantly drew my attention. 
Hey, what does it mean? What's going on? Shortly after the news, my telephone 
rang. It was a call from a friend of mine living in Nanjing. He saw the same 
news and thought the same things as I did, so he made an K)D call to discuss the 
issue with me. "Hi, did you see the news just now?" "Yeah, I did, what do you 
think?" Then we discussed it excitedly, around twenty minutes. 
In my previous place of residence, this kind of discussion was very 
common. Yet here, no one does this. People never want to share the 
cultural/political concerns of the Beijing intellectuals and the government. This 
makes me disappointed. 
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This is a very impressive statement since it shows well how migrant 
intellectuals are eager to consider national affairs. It is not likely at all that a 
Cantonese college graduate would make an DDD call to discuss a missile exercise 
near Taiwan~unlike local calls, H)D costs money. First of all, they would not even 
watch CCTV news. They would know the news from Hong Kong channels. 
For some migrant intellectuals whose social status and living foundation~ 
mainly one's household and housing status—are not stable enough, politics and 
policies are very important issues which they must always take into consideration. In 
addition to the fact that they suffer this unstable situation, they had learned to be 
conscious of politics and policies in their original places as a fundamental pattern of 
thought and attitude. Apparently both of these backgrounds fostered them to think 
and behave in such a fashion. 
(Huo Gangjiang, executive, accountant, and interpreter in a Sino-Foreign joint 
venture enterprise, in his early thirties) 
[He left his household registration in his original province because of 
his company's principle not to take care of the transfer of its personnel's 
household records. Because the company only provides a collective dormitory 
for single workers, he has no choice but to live apart from his wife.] Local 
people are not interested in politics and policies at all; we are totally different. 
We cannot but consider policies. Suppose that the policy will be modified and 
household registration of those who are leaving one's registered place will 
become invalid. In this case, we will lose our household record in our original 
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place, and have no record here either; in other words, we will become "black 
population." I mean that we always have this kind of fear in our minds. That's 
why we often discuss all these things. This is indispensable for us. Yet for 
locals, it is totally out of their range of interest. 
(Luo Hao, architectural designer in a collective-owned company, in her mid-
twenties) 
I didn't move my household registration here, because I don't know 
how the [relevant] policies will change. I can't know it, nor can I control it. 
The young and highly educated local Cantonese with whom I talked gave me 
an image of migrant intellectuals which was consistent with the latter's self-image— 
that they like to discuss national affairs much more than local intellectuals. 
(Liao Shitang) 
Non-Cantonese college students like to discuss national affairs. At the 
time of the Tian'anmen Incident，they were so excited...we Cantonese were not 
like that, even college students. At that time, we were just watching the situation 
to see what would happen. We have no interest in politics after all. Non-
Cantonese are, well, righteous and idealistic....They are simple and 
straightforward. Their clothes is old-fashioned. They remind me of a saying zhi 
da cai shu (志大才疏)一have great ambition but little ability. 
Liu (1992:17) sarcastically depicts some migrant intellectuals who are 
pouring out their feelings on migrating to Guangdong while they are drinking: 
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...[T]hey complain that they originally wholeheartedly intended to 
‘reform，Guangdong, but later thought that local people were so arrogant from 
the power of money and acted like snobs. It sounds like Guangdong is 
desperately backward, and they are so selfless and eager to sacrifice their own 
interests for the sake of others and willing to help the backward; they are acting 
as if they are the professionals from the USSR in the 1950s. 
By referring to the metaphor “the professionals from the USSR in the 1950s”，Liu 
highlights the migrant intellectuals' purported intention to save Guangdong from its 
own ignorance and incompetence, just as the USSR professionals aided China in the 
1950s when it did not possess all the necessary knowledge and skills for its own 
development. The notion of "reforming the backward，，，on the other hand, is typical 
of the thought of the Red Guards. I was told by one informant who was a former 
enthusiastic Red Guard that they believed during the Cultural Revolution that they 
would liberate the whole human race through the revolution, that they had a great 
mission to liberate the other three-fourths of the world's population who do not live 
in the PRC who were suffering from exploitation under capitalism. “To liberate" 
here shares the same implication as “to reform" in the sense that both acts stem from 
a high degree of political consciousness and political commitment. Through playing 
the role of liberator or reformer，such consciousness and commitment possibly 
helped reinforce their self-perception that they are elites as well as leaders. I would 
assume that such political fervor, as manifested by both some of migrant intellectuals 
and the Red Guards, is one characteristic of contemporary China. 
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However, unlike the Red Guard during the Cultural Revolution, migrant 
intellectuals in the Pearl River Delta today do not become a considerable political 
power. In Foshan, such fervor, if there is any such, failed to have efficient power that 
gives influence on the local society, mainly because local Foshan society does not 
share the same values that these migrant intellectuals hold. Political-oriented notion 
was simply ignored by the local people, and these migrant intellectuals had to learn 
that the Pearl River Delta people had another set of value一economy. This is why 
they have to complain about their disappointment while drinking in Liu's depiction. 
We should pay attention to this crucial difference of the sociocultural structure 
surrounding migrant intellectuals from one the Red Guards were in. 
Local intellectuals feel that migrant intellectuals are too serious, and their 
enthusiasm over national affairs is somehow of little use. However, the two groups 
rarely discuss this issue, or any other issues, either; they keep distance, sensing the 
difference between them. In a milieu in which these two attitudes coexist, we may 
see the difference rather clearly. Here is one such milieu shown to me by one of my 
informants. 
Lin Yaopeng has an interesting family situation. In a word, it is a mixture of 
local and non-local culture. He lives with his newly married wife and her family. His 
wife Yang Xiaoping originated from a province near Shanghai; her mother is from 
this province and her father is Cantonese. Xiaoping lived in the province until she 
was fifteen years old, and spent another four years there when she studied in 
university. She and her little sister Xiaoqi acquired cultural traits of both the 
waisheng ren and the Cantonese while they grew up. They speak both Mandarin and 
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Cantonese fluently. At home, the family mainly speaks Mandarin, and occasionally 
speaks Cantonese. To Yaopeng, Xiaoping may be a very suitable spouse in the sense 
that her cultural background was relatively close to his. 
I often visited them during my fieldwork primarily because Xiaoqi and I 
were old friends. When we watched TV, I found this family liked to watch all 
channels. This was quite unusual for a Foshan family: people tend to watch either 
Cantonese channels or Mandarin channels, a few educated people would watch 
English channels occasionally. Yet they watched everything; ATV World news, 
Hong Kong drama on TVB Jade, Taiwanese talk show on Star TV,4 They even 
enjoyed variety shows on CCTV and laughed at Mandarin comic dialogues, which 
local Foshan people would never do. Yaopeng was a good conversationalist, and he, 
Xiaoping, Xiaoqi, and I, sometimes with some friends of theirs, talked about many 
kinds of topics. We once discussed what the largest desert in China was. Nobody 
recalled its name accurately and the heated discussion did not end until they checked 
a big map of China they brought from their room. During the discussion, I felt that 
local Cantonese would not be this excited about recalling the name of the Chinese 
largest desert. They also discussed Chinese history, social problems, current events, 
and politics in the same fashion. But once when Yaopeng began to discuss some 
political incident, Xiaoping and Xiaoqi opposed him, jokingly yelling: “Politics, 
44 ATV and TVB are TV stations in Hong Kong, which have been available for Foshan people for 
more than ten years. ATV World is an English chamel, and TVB Jade provides Cantonese programs 
only. Chinese channel of Star TV mostly provide programs made in Taiwan, some Hong Kong, 
Mainland China and Japanese dramas; all programs are broadcasted in Mandarin. 
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politics! Can't you talk about something else?" The sisters are interesting because 
they are waisheng ren on the one hand and Cantonese on the other, and they can 
cross the boundary between the two categories freely. Sometimes they share the 
same cultural preference as Yaopeng; at other times they act as Cantonese who are 
not keen on discussing “serious” issues. 
Different Cultural Tastes, or Different "Cultural Levels" 
When talking about the regional differences between the local Cantonese and 
migrant intellectuals, many migrant intellectuals pointed out the different cultural 
tastes: that the local Cantonese people's taste was of a lower level than theirs. 
Migrant intellectuals feel that they share little common ground with the locals since 
they believe their own taste is so much better. 
(Du Zhao) 
Foshan people want calligraphy. However, their aesthetic judgment is 
poor; thus they take vulgarity as refinement. I hope I can help them improve 
their level of aesthetic judgment...The proof of the lower cultural level of local 
people are obvious if you pay attention to books. Bookstores in Foshan have a 
very poor selection; there are a number of bookstores, but the variety of books is 
terribly poor. The dominant books are always those light novels which are 
popular among the masses. The same thing is true for CDs; most CDs are 
popular songs. Another evidence is that there are few second-hand bookstores in 
Foshan. This is an important marker, since there would be many second-hand 
bookstores if there were many people who like to read. 
149 
(Zhou Biao) 
The cultural level is lower here一more accurately, there's no culture 
here. For example, newspapers are available at very few places. For 
intellectuals, reading newspapers is a very important routine which one can't do 
without. But people here do not need it. In my original place, we had much 
fewer shops and commodities than they do here, yet we had an enormous 
number of Xinhua Bookstores. Thus we could buy newspapers very easily. 
Zhou's mention of newspapers is interesting. While some locals subscribe to 
newspapers一that is, they do not have to buy one at a shop~~it seems that many 
other locals really do not care about reading newspapers. During my fleldwork, I 
visited a Cantonese friend of mine almost every day. She is a master's degree holder 
and a college lecturer. Yet I have not seen newspapers in her home except for one— 
the Weekly TV Guide. It is not true to assume the she does not care about obtaining 
news and information; she obtains them from TV news. I also know she is interested 
in various cultural issues very much; nonetheless, she does not share what Zhou calls 
“a very important routine for intellectuals"——the habit of reading newspapers. 
In Foshan, Hong Kong popular culture has been strongly influential since the 
1980s. Some migrant intellectuals do not accept it since they consider Hong Kong 
popular culture to be shallow and empty. They think Hong Kong popular culture is 
by no means worth admiring; they in turn deplore locals' cultural preference in 
accepting it willingly. 
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(Cai Yang) 
80% to 90% of migrant intellectuals cannot accept Hong Kong popular 
culture. Hong Kong culture is extremely superficial, which is totally opposite of 
the refined conventional culture we migrant intellectuals appreciate. It is a good 
change that Mandarin became more prevalent in Guangdong; still local people 
think of Hong Kong as the god and themselves as a son of the god. [In this way 
they define their position higher than others, and look down on places other than 
Guangdong.] It's lamentable, it's hateful, it's detestable. The Hong Kong culture 
they admire so enthusiastically is nothing but strange, something which is 
neither Chinese nor Western...I realize that only our generation has this feeling, 
and the younger generation will accept it readily. My nine-year-old daughter is a 
good example. I planned to take her to Beijing during the summer vacation, but 
she said she preferred Hong Kong to Beijing. 
(Zhou Biao) 
I don't like Hong Kong TV programs一they are light, shallow, and 
empty. They can't compare with CCTV programs at all. I watched Hong Kong 
programs only when I needed to learn Cantonese. I didn't care about the content 
of the programs butjust learned the language. Local people love Hong Kong TV 
a lot [, which I don't understand]. 
Two terms were repeatedly used to refer to this difference; suzhi (素質）and 
cengci (層次).Suzhi, originally meaning quality, is usually used to mention the 
general quality of a group of people. What is referred to by the general quality is 
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broad and various, but it basically means a certain level of basic knowledge, ability, 
and social manner, most of which is fostered by education and social training. Suzhi 
refers to a collective level of quality rather than an individual one; thus, people use 
this term like this: “Many Cantonese workunit leaders are of low suzhi.” "The suzhi 
of Shanghai workers is higher than that of Guangdong workers." When this term is 
used together with wenhua or culture, it means more directly the collective quality of 
educational and/or cultural aspects. 
Cengci originally means level. When it is used to describe an individual or a 
group of people, it refers to one's/the group's cultural level. One college person, who 
is a migrant and my later informant, offered to help me shortly after I began my 
fieldwork. He said: “I will introduce some hi^-cengci friends to you later." I asked 
him what type of people he referred to，and he answered me that he intended to 
introduce to me some people who were highly educated and knowledgeable enough 
to talk about culture, arts, academic issues, national and international affairs, etc. 
Furthermore, it turned out later that in his mind this type of hi^-cengci friends were 
mostly migrant intellectuals. 
It is difficult to judge whether or not their criticism is completely true. It is of 
course not true that Guangdong contains no highly educated and knowledgeable 
people. The point we should consider here is that many migrant intellectuals share a 
quite consistent idea that attributes the distance between them and the locals to the 
lower cultural level of the Cantonese, whether it is objectively accurate or not. 
There are clear reasons for this idea. First, the different areas have 
historically fostered different social ethos, i.e. the commerce-oriented ethos of 
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Cantonese society on the one hand, and the northern ethos that attaches strong 
importance to administrative success through passing the imperial examinations on 
the other. Some migrant intellectuals from different provinces一Shanxi, Jiangsu, and 
Hunan一told me that each of their homeplaces had an ethos that regarded education 
as very important. Cantonese mercantilism is not simply a historical phenomenon but 
is also a contemporary one. As one informant told me, right now in the rapidly 
developing Pearl River Delta, industries demand a number of employees 
immediately; for individuals, a more favorable job than the present one is always 
available, yet the whole situation is highly competitive and of high tempo. In such an 
environment，people naturally rush to gain an opportunity rather than spending a 
long time to cultivate oneself. College lecturers' comments on their students reflect 
the gap between the image of how intellectuals should be in the lecturers' minds and 
what the reality of the local Cantonese college students is. For example, one lecturer 
said that the students in his college were not like college students at all. According to 
him, they never like to engage in any type of academic activities which he thinks 
college students would usually do; they have no intellectual curiosity college 
students would usually have. They are not keen on acquiring knowledge and always 
so passive. Another lecturer told me the following insight: 
(Zhang Wangzhao, college lecturer, in his early thirties) 
Every year, our students go on a field trip to East China [for around 
three weeks or so]...I have taken them once. Before going, one student asked me 
whether they had rice in East China. This student assumed that all places other 
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than Guangdong were so poor and backward [that even rice was not available]. I 
cannot understand at all how this student could have such a ridiculous question. 
This student has definitely learned Chinese geography and history before 
entering college...^^ Some students are terribly closed-minded. I suspect that 
their earlier educational environment might have had problems; apparently their 
teachers were closed-minded and of low level. In this sense, our field trip is 
significant [because it helps broaden the students' view]. After seeing that places 
other than Guangdong are prosperous as well, their ignorance decreases. 
The second point I should notice is that, when the migrant intellectuals 
accuse locals of a lower cultural level, they tend to half-unconsciously focus on two 
types of local people as representatives of all Cantonese: upstarts and workunit 
leaders. The typical profiles of the former are millionaire peasants, owners of 
township enterprises, and successful individual managers. These powerful local 
people are exactly opposite of the profile of rencai, but they have either money or 
power. Migrant intellectuals think it very problematic that such uneducated people 
have so much money and/or such strong power, and consider that they do not 
deserve their money and/or power. Or, they worry about such uneducated people 
grasping the power of decision-making in each workunit or enterprise. It is very 
possible that these people will be their bosses. 
(Wen Zhong) 
45 East China is known as yumi zhi xiang (魚米之鄉）or the land of fish and rice—the land ofplenty. 
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The local Cantonese are of culturally low level {suzhi di). Some 
peasants have abruptly become rich by virtue of the individual economy system. 
Yet they are not changed at all except for the fact that they became millionaires. 
I have visited a rich peasant's home—it was really crazy. He built a seven-floor 
building for his family, and the four family members live in the building. This 
seven-floor building had an elevator and a swimming pool. Yet they don't 
understand anything {shenme ye budong)—their brains are totally empty. 
(Qiu Fendou) 
When I first visited Shiwan^^...I found that the leaders and those who 
were in a position of responsibility were of low cultural level. They were all 
peasants originally. 
(Zhou Biao) 
My home province is remote and poor; yet the leaders and bureaucrats 
were truly great~every single person was intelligent, knowledgeable, and 
dignified. What about here?... 
In fact, I cannot judge whether the local Cantonese are all of low cultural 
level. Although most of my informants criticized the local Cantonese for being of 
low cultural level, some exempt Foshan people from this generality by stating that 
Foshan people's manners were actually much better than other Guangdong cities by 
46 A district in the city proper of Foshan. Shiwan has been a production center of pottery for 
centuries (see Chapter 2). Qiu works for a porcelain factory in Shiwan. 
155 
virtue of a "long history of civilization". It is difficult to judge, based solely on my 
own experience of the Foshan people, to what extent the manners of Foshan people 
are different from other Cantonese people or from other Chinese people in general. 
The general manners and attitude of the people who are in charge of interaction with 
citizens and customers一salesclerks in shops, receptionists in public sites such as 
hospitals, entrances of workunits, etc., and drivers of public transportation~varied. 
Some were kind and friendly, but others treated me in an awful manner. I simply 
could not tell whether an uneducated manner was unique to the Cantonese or if it 
was common in other places in China due to some other reasons, e.g. a bureaucratic 
manner stemming from the communistic social system. 
The above discussion involves the evaluation of suzhi. As for the other 
concept cengci, the individual differences in educational/cultural level becomes 
salient as opposed to the collective quality. That is, descriptions like these are 
possible: “a high-cengci Cantonese," "She is much easier to get along, because she is 
educated and of high cengci” When talking about the Cantonese in the framework of 
cengci’ my informants do not brand all Cantonese people as low level, but evaluate 
educated locals positively. This is clear when they talk about their associates. 
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(Liang Ying) 
My friends? Most of my friends are locals. The young generation, I 
mean, the young, educated, and culturally high-level people, are easy to get 
along well. The most difficult to get along with is those who are of a low 
educational background yet of a high position. I cannot cope with them at all. If 
only there was some common ground such as culture or education, I could talk 
with them congenially. 
Xian Hua has been working on propaganda at the Party committee office in 
her factory since she migrated to Foshan. When it was arranged for her to transfer to 
another department, she wanted to be involved in business. Thus, she was assigned 
to the sales department in the company under the factory, which was dominated by 
less highly educated local males. She was a female college graduate who was 
"down" from the upper unit~the Party committee. For this reason she was given a 
title of Vice-Manager, yet no work was assigned to her, nor did she have a trainer to 
teach her the work. In short, she was simply abandoned. After a half-year of 
difficulty in learning the nuts and bolts of the business by herself, she launched into 
a contract business within her company,? She and her three young partners 
undertook the sales for the trading department of their company. Fortunately enough, 
47 A contract business is attractive because one can handle the project in one's own discretion, and 
one can also expect a large amount of profit in the case one makes a success. According to her 
explanation, the system of this contract is that the company lends to the contractor funds and an 
office，and the contractor is to pay a fixed amount of money to the company. After the execution of 
the contracted project, the contractor clears off his/her debt. Thus, the contractor needs to gain more 
profit than the amount he/she must pay to his/her company. 
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they were favored with luck and their project was a great success. They not only 
fulfilled their requirement to pay one hundred thousand yuan to their company, but 
also materialized a one thousand yuan monthly salary for each; furthermore, they 
even purchased a Peugeot sedan for business use. She was promoted to the position 
of Manager, and could handle larger amounts of funds than before. When telling me 
this story, she expressed her satisfaction about their success as well as about the 
partnership between her and her three partners. 
What drew my attention was the partners Xian chose: all of them were local 
Cantonese men. She told me that she had a hard time at the sales company both 
because she was a non-local and because she was a woman. Why did she decided to 
work on the contract project with the local men? She answered my question: 
“Because we had a common ground. All of us were college graduates, and all of us 
were thought by the company people to be not competent enough to deal with 
business successfully. We got together as four marginalized staff, and made a 
decision to surprise them by our success...We request of the company that it move 
the four of us together in the case that they move us to another department." 
Xian's case tells us about an interesting power structure involving the two 
boundaries—regional ethnic difference and educational level. In her workplace in 
which the actual power was held by the less highly educated veteran local personnel, 
newly arrived college graduates, whether local or non-local, were alienated. In this 
situation, the difference in educational level between the intellectuals and those 
veterans was more salient than the regional ethnic difference between Xian and her 
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three partners. Therefore, the four of them formed an marginalized yet outstanding 
business unit~once their success was visible, they gained power in the workplace. 
Migrant intellectuals are also critical about the narrow world view of the 
locals. In a sense, all the above complaints of migrant intellectuals about local 
Foshan people are interwoven together to lead to this point: the exclusiveness and 
arrogance of the Cantonese, which can be called "localism." My informants sense 
this arrogance in many aspects of regional/cultural differences. Many statements I 
quoted above actually include this criticism, therefore I will not repeat them in this 
part. Here I shall raise one statement on the issue of education and manners，which 
reflects their sense of Cantonese localism compared with Shanghai. 
(Yu Weicao) 
I didn't feel too much difference when I lived in Shanghai. People 
often say that Shanghai people are exclusive and tend to look down on outsiders. 
It is true; but they are generally of good manners, so they rarely express it. 
Furthermore, they only look down on those uneducated country bumpkins. If 
you are well-educated, they will not despise you but pay their respect to you. 
What Yu means is that he has never been treated in Foshan as he had been in 
Shanghai. By this statement, he implies Cantonese people's cultural ignorance as 
opposed to Shanghai people's capability of understanding the value of intellectuals. 
At the same time, he also hints at the exclusiveness of Cantonese people. He means 
that in the Cantonese society, unlike in Shanghai, the exclusion of outsiders on the 
basis of regional differences. 
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Exclusiveness means to be unwilling to accept unfamiliar things on the one 
hand, and to be reluctant to broaden one's perspective towards the outside world on 
the other. Some migrant intellectuals mentioned these two aspects from various 
angles. 
(Cheng Xilie) 
One bad thing about the practices of local people is their poor contact 
with worlds other than their own. They somehow lack the concept of 
experiencing other worlds. Selecting a college to send one's children to is a 
good example. Parents here first hope their kids go on to a college in Foshan. If 
it is impossible, the second preference is one in Guangzhou. In case that is 
impossible too, they begin to consider outside places. Yeah, that's what they 
48 
prefer. They are like that. 
(Liang Ying) 
The Cantonese culture is very narrow-minded and limited. For 
example, their mind-set is incredibly narrow. Let's say they leave Guangdong 
for a business trip for three days or five; they will terribly miss Guangdong. It is 
48 Cheng means that these parents pay less attention to their children's academic achievement than 
to their own regional preference. It is reasonable that the parents usually want their children to study 
in a college close to their home. However, in the case that their children's academic record was 
good enough to be eligible for a four-year college in Guangzhou, which is of higher level than one 
in Foshan and not distant from Foshan at all, for instance, the parents would naturally want them to 
go up to this college rather than one in Foshan. What astonished Cheng was the lack of this thought 
among local parents. 
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difficult for them to accept anything new or anything unfamiliar，that is, 
anything other than their own set of cultural patterns. And they have an unusual 
sense of superiority about their own culture. It is almost a blind sense of 
superiority. They cannot see things properly....Yes, exactly, they think they are 
great because they are rich; then，they don't ever try to see other aspects than 
that. 
Consequently, some of the informants became apprehensive that their 
children may be affected by the Cantonese closed-minded culture in an unfavorable 
way. 
(Yu Weicao) 
To tell the truth, I am somehow reluctant to let my son live in 
Guangdong too long. Cantonese culture is not very good. I don't know how to 
describe it...I think it is a kind of rural culture in the sense that it is less friendly 
and tolerant. If we say that there is a category of people named "economic 
people" as opposed to "cultural people," here is a place for "economic people." 
(Cheng Xilie) 
I think I will have a child in the future. "Cantonization" of my child? 
As long as he/she is born and brought up here, it's inevitable....Parents can only 
play a small role in the whole environment in which he/she will be surrounded. 
Yeah, right, it's not too desirable. What is undesirable is, for example, the 
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Cantonese are poor at coping with the outside world. They lack the concept of 
contacting things other than their own. 
The above discussion shows the mutual sense of distinctiveness, distance, and 
contradiction between migrant intellectuals and locals. These contradictions remain 
important for both groups, since they involve a sense of legitimacy on which each 
group depends. Each of the two groups considers that they possess resources, and 
attempts to make use of the resources in the arena of interaction, so that they will 
acquire more power than their counterpart, as I have already discussed. 
3. Resources Legitimated by the State 
In the above discussion, we had a brief look at how migrant intellectuals and 
local Foshan people have different sets of perception of their own sociocultural 
resources. Both groups interpret their own resources in a relevant and significant 
way, and look down upon or do not care about their counterpart's ones. More 
accurately, there is virtually no common ground wherein both groups evaluate and 
compare their resources together. Each group interprets the significance of their 
resources depending on the reason they find selectively and interpret them 
differently. One important point is that, in however different ways they find and 
interpret these resources, they are determined by a sense of legitimacy given by the 
state. 
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Sense of Legitimacy 
Both local Foshan people and migrant intellectuals interpret that their cultural 
characteristics are relevant enough to use as resources, and present these resources 
effectively for their purposes. Within the same logic, both interpret their 
counterpart's characteristics as being irrelevant and inferior, so they emphasize and 
reinforce their superiority. What we have seen in the above chapters are these 
different interpretations of resources asserted by the two groups. Local Foshan 
people claim their actual business ability and economic power that made Foshan 
prosperous, while migrant intellectuals assert their higher intellectual level and their 
closer position to the mainstream culture in China. 
To local Foshan people, their resources to the power are obvious. It is their 
historical-regional dominance~that they have been the master of this place一and an 
enormous degree of economic power that was brought by the miraculous regional 
development. It is commonly thought that their success was not possible without 
their commercial ability; not only locals but also migrant intellectuals admit it. The 
sense of economic superiority naturally spread to other cultural traits of Cantonese; 
"Anything Cantonese is superior." Some of the locals' thoughts and behaviors by 
which migrant intellectuals feel they are insulted is supported by this sense of 
superiority. The derogatory pronouns loujai/loumui for migrant workers, which I 
mentioned in Chapter 4, is one evidence of this superiority. One informant told me: 
163 
(Yu Weicao) 
Local people often talk about us as if we came to snatch their 
prosperity. It is true that we were attracted by the better economic condition 
here; otherwise how would we migrate? Even though it is true, it still makes us 
feel bad to be said in that way. I wish I could change this situation. I want to 
make effort, get a result, acquire what I can acquire really by my own effort and 
devotion; and I wish people will acknowledge it But it is difficult. I often feel 
that we are exploited; I find there is a universal situation that leaders' posts are 
always occupied by locals, and migrants are always employees. No matter how 
much effort we make, it is almost impossible that our effort is acknowledged 
and rewarded. The only evaluation is that we succeeded by virtue of the better 
opportunity we were given in this place [by the locals]; very few people 
consider it a success made by our own ability and effort. 
According to some informants, even some college students treat migrant 
intellectuals in this fashion. One informant working in college told me that he had an 
impression that local students look down on migrant lecturers and staff. I was also 
given similar statements by some Foshan University students. The students, all of 
whom are not local Foshan but from various places in the Pearl River Delta and 
identify themselves as Cantonese, said that many migrant lecturers gave up their 
better previous academic status to work in the Pearl River Delta, and condescended 
to take a lower post offered simply for more money. They even told me that these 
lecturers seized the employment opportunities of FU graduates by getting a position 
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at FU, which is not accurate.^^ At any rate, local people commonly have this local-
centered world view backed up by their local dominancy. Migrant intellectuals' 
criticism about the locals' narrow world view and this sense of superiority are 
precisely a pair of contrary issues as if they are at the opposite sides of a sheet of 
paper. 
Migrant intellectuals, on the other hand, have another interpretation of their 
resources. It consists on two kind: practical or material sense, and cultural or 
spiritual sense. As the notion of “rencai as stock" (see Chapter 3) shows, it is 
accepted increasingly that intellectual knowledge and skill have value. Migrant 
intellectuals to Foshan commonly think that the local workunits and the local 
authorities need their knowledge and skill to improve Foshan's competence. At the 
same time, they consistently share a notion that intellectuals should be respected and 
treated as such because of their higher educational level and technical skill. It seems 
that the conventional idea on the value of literati has combined with the notion of 
"esteem knowledge, esteem rencaf, (see Chapter 3) in the reform situation. 
In this situation, we see that both groups selectively use, although 
unconsciously, different sets of boundaries to demarcate their own group and their 
counterpart. Locals tend to adopt regional ethnic difference between local Cantonese 
and non-Cantonese, so they highlight dominancy and superiority of the Cantonese 
compared with outsiders. On the contrary，migrant intellectuals attach more 
49 Foshan University is a three-year college，and only hires faculty who have a master's degrees or 
above. Thus it is impossible for a graduate of Foshan University to teach in FU. When I mentioned 
this point to the students, their response was "It is the case now, but it was not before." 
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importance to educational level and ability rather than regional difference. This helps 
them minimize their marginality in local Foshan society and illuminate their 
advantage and what they believe is their "culturally higher" status. 
It is easily visible that the resource claimed by migrant intellectuals are 
legitimated by the state. Compared with this, local Cantonese people's commercial 
ability seems to have nothing to do with state legitimation. But we can find it does, 
in the sense that commercial success is encouraged and justified by the state in the 
reform policy. Their commercial success is not achieved totally free from the social 
conditions given by the state. Cantonese practicality may be simply a regional 
character, but it is still regarded as the fruit of a successful alignment with the 
economic policy of the government. Now that the implementation of this economic 
policy is a common value of the whole country, the commercial ability of the 
Cantonese has obtained a certain degree of legitimation. 
Is it class difference or ethnic difference that makes migrant intellectuals 
demarcate themselves from the locals, and makes the locals tell themselves from 
migrant intellectuals? It depends on the situation. But we need to keep in mind that, 
in the case of Foshan, these two differences are not mutually exclusive but both 
involve their demarcation of self and other as well as their judgment of the meaning 
of themselves and their counterpart. That is to say, ethnic difference and class 
difference are intertwined. In the actual interactions we see, these differences are 
selectively used according to different needs. In this case, one difference seems more 
salient (Wu [ed.] 1982). 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion: 
Local Culture and Identity in Transition 
What we have seen in earlier chapters are intricate social relations between 
migrant intellectuals and the locals in Foshan. They were caused by the recent state 
policy, and a half-conscious and half-unconscious struggle for power between them 
in the local society. From the cases I showed in the previous chapters, I speculate 
that this struggle actually stems from the concept of legitimacy of the state. Within 
the situation of reform and open door policy, migrant intellectuals were officially 
defined as rencai—contributors toward the state development, and they consider 
themselves to deserve a higher social status. This idea was reinforced within their 
minds through their migration process I discussed in Chapter 4. In Foshan society, 
however, local people did not treat them as such; instead，they were often regarded 
as only poor workers from the economically backward north/hinterland. The reason 
local Foshan people tend to evaluate social status according only to prosperity also 
lies in the notion popularized by the state: those who earn money are able, 
competent, and contributive. 
How, then, will the social relations between the two groups go on? Are they 
something like tug-or-war which makes the one side win and makes another side 
lose? I do not think they are that simple. Rather, I assume that there is another force 
to effect another possibility一or, there is a force to reconcile these two groups. The 
167 
key to reconcile migrant intellectuals and the locals is something both of them can 
share, materially or metaphorically. 
I would argue that, despite both group's immutable sense of distinctiveness 
between the locals and migrant intellectuals, there is a subtle shift in local cultural 
preferences and practices in Foshan which shortens the distance from the 
"mainstream" culture over the last couple of years. This shift may gradually cause 
the two groups have a sense of sharing this new cultural alternative, and 
consequently, help them share an identity which may bind them together. The key 
are the increasing cultural alternatives in Foshan people's life since the recent 
economic improvement. In this concluding chapter, I will illustrate two examples: 
the gradual shift to bilingualism of Foshan people, and the increasing interest in 
consuming books. 
1. New Cultural Alternatives in Foshan 
I have discussed how regional cultural differences made migrant intellectuals 
have a hard time to find their position in the local society. The cultural distance 
between the two groups is so large that the migrant intellectuals tend to interpret the 
locals' practices as exclusive, and evaluate locals as belonging to a lower level. This 
has been generally true since migrant intellectuals began to migrate at the early 
reform period. However, I came to get another evaluation from the migrant 
intellectuals I talked with. Many of them, although not all, told me that the situation 
in Foshan "has become much better recently." They say that although local 
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Cantonese are still narrow-minded, exclusive, material-oriented, and culturally low 
level, they are changing toward a favorable direction. "Becoming better" means that 
locals began to accept what migrant intellectuals would call "our culture，，，which did 
not originally belong to the locals. Local Foshan people, they evaluate, are becoming 
less exclusive, although partially, when interacting with the non-locals. What 
migrant intellectuals would call “our culture" includes language and other issues 
involving some cultural activities. 
As for the meaning of "recently", the specified time during which "things 
began to get better" varies among informants, but presumably it did not begin before 
the 1990s. Considering one of the statements by the migrant intellectuals, "the 
situation is much better now than it was in 1992," it may bejust this couple of years. 
Yet this is relative by definition; for some of my interviewees, things are still 
desperate and locals are idiotically ignorant and local Cantonese culture does not 
deserve the name of culture. 
Of course, this change is proportional to the increase in the number of 
migrant people in Foshan. Aside from this practical reason, however, I attempt to see 
a subtle and slow qualitative shift of Foshan culture. That is to say, the idea of 
Foshan culture as a part of Chinese national culture, which presumably lies at a 
"higher" level than it has been, is emerging, or being advocated. 
Language Shift: “Getting Better"? 
Language is significant as a cultural apparatus to construct and reinforce 
ethnic or national identity. Not only ethnic groups but also the states attempt to 
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construct an integrated entity through making use of a language (as for the case of 
the state, see Fabian 1986). Thus, the characteristic notion among local Cantonese 
"Anything Cantonese is superior" (see Chapter 5) is naturally seen in terms of 
language. 
There is a term fangyan youyuegan (方言優越感）or “a sense of dialect 
superiority" of Cantonese in the Pearl River Delta (FD June 13 1992). My 
informants Zhang Wangzhao and Lai Xiaohua, who are a non-Cantonese husband 
and a Cantonese wife, told me of a striking experience. They said that Lai's boss in 
the post and telecommunications office wanted Zhang to be able to speak Cantonese. 
They once met Lai's boss somewhere and Zhang greeted him. This local boss did not 
appreciate that Zhang was an outsider who did not even speak Cantonese, and hinted 
it to Lai. Thus, she taught him how to speak Cantonese for a while, but she gave it 
up, because Zhang was not enthusiastic about it. As I mentioned in Chapter 5，Lai's 
workunit was led predominantly by locals, in which a conventional Cantonese 
preference prevailed so heavily that they made all non-locals speak Cantonese in the 
office. Zhang is not staff of Lai's workunit, so he has nothing to do with his wife's 
boss; still, the boss asserted the same preference to him once they met each other. 
Whatever reasons underlie this boss's behavior, this is what is called language 
superiority of Cantonese, without which such event that Zhang and Lai told me 
cannot take p lace , 
°^ We should take into account that the outstanding success of economic reform enables local 
Cantonese to present their sense of superiority without hesitation. This proves the following two 
aspects: first, it highlights the state legitimation of economic advancement. Second，it tells us that 
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These practices upheld by this sense of superiority are changing as I learned 
through both my interviews and participant observation. I have mentioned different 
social meanings of Mandarin in Foshan earlier: Mandarin as a symbol of outsiders 
which conveys a negative social meaning shared by local Foshan people, and 
Mandarin as a marker of cultural elites believed by migrant intellectuals. The former 
has been dominant in the 1980s when the presence of physical laborers was more 
prominent than that of migrant intellectuals. Now it seems that the former notion is 
gradually replacing the latter, or at least the latter is being gradually modified by the 
former. 
Native Cantonese speakers used to be unkind to migrants who speak only 
Mandarin, educated or uneducated; but my informants feel that this is changing. 
Partly, “things have become much better" means that Mandarin become more 
prevalent and fewer people are unable, or reluctant, to speak Mandarin to them than 
before. In the 1980s, it was true that very few people spoke, or, were willing to 
speak Mandarin to them, whether at their workplace or on the street. 
(Song Nanhua) 
We were told that the early migrant lecturers at our university in the 
latter half of the 1980s^ ^ all had a hard time because of language. Local staff, as 
migrant intellectuals have no political power like the Red Guards had. All other statements of the 
migrant intellectuals on language difference I cited in Chapter 5 indicate this point~migrant 
intellectuals are neverpolitical elites. 
51 Foshan University was established in 1985 on the basis of the previous Foshan Normal School. 
Besides the faculty from that school who continued teaching at the university, a body of new 
lecturers was hired at that time. 
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well as students, were reluctant to speak Mandarin. Think about it~even a 
university had such an atmosphere at that time. Now it's much better; we have 
no such thing now. 
52 • • . 
I myself have experienced this as a speaker only of Mandarin living in Foshan 
from 1989 to 1991. By 1994 when I visited there again, I was a fluent Cantonese 
speaker. From 1994 to 1996,1 heard much more Mandarin than in 1991 in all public 
spots: parks, shops, restaurants, stadiums and streets. While the majority of tricycle 
drivers and bicycle repairmen were replaced by Mandarin一or variants of 
Mandarin~speakers compared with five years ago, many of the speakers were not 
migrant laborers but decent white-collar people. The more noteworthy change is that 
Mandarin was spoken not only by migrants but also by locals. They were beginning 
to interact with migrants in Mandarin. I was listening to them almost in disbelief. 
Actual increase in number of Mandarin speakers is of course a reducer of locals' 
language exclusiveness. Yet I would emphasize that it also helped local people 
remember that they are members of Chinese society in which Mandarin is the 
common spoken language. The fact that not a few of Mandarin speakers in the 1990s 
are decent middle to high class people reduced Cantonese people's resistance to 
Mandarin. Increasing domestic trade opportunity made Foshan commercial sector to 
52 l£ I had been recognized as a Mandarin-speaking foreigner, my experience might have been 
different from that of the migrant intellectuals. Yet this was not the case. The people I taUced to 
could not tell that I was not Chinese, so theyjust treated me as a Mandarin speaker, seeing my Asian 
complexion and hearing my Mandarin. Therefore, I assume that I shared basically the same 
experience as my informants had. 
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have more and more contact with non-Cantonese, and any other kinds of interchange 
• • 53 
came to occur much more frequently than it did before. 
Aside from public sites, the media is another arena wherein language conveys 
its sociopolitical meaning. Broadcast journalism is more relevant than print media to 
look at language difference between the officially common spoken language and the 
local dialect. I focus on Foshan radio and Foshan cable TV. Broadcast media in 
Foshan has been predominantly Cantonese-oriented.^^ As one heard only Cantonese 
on the street in the late 1980s, local media provided only Cantonese programs both 
on radio and on TV. 
Foshan cable TV began to broadcast news show of Mandarin version in 
September 1993. Now they provide some other ready-made Mandarin programs such 
as drama. However, the station leaders told me in my interview that they put it into 
practice simply because it was led by the city authority. It was the mayor's intention 
to have some Mandarin programs in order to correspond with the state policy of 
53 At some sites such as some companies and hotels, the increasing presence of Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs is another generator to urge people to use Mandarin. Again, there is a practical 
necessity of speaking Mandarin on the one hand; on the other hand, doing business with Taiwanese 
investors make contribution to the local government as well as the state. Under this mission, 
speaking Mandarin may imply a deeper sociopolitical meaning. 
54 This is universally tme for the Pearl River Delta. Even Guangdong provincial TV has both a 
Cantonese channel and a Mandarin channel. This is a practice conspicuously different from other 
Chinese cities such as Shanghai, for example, which has a distinctive dialect prevalent among local 
people yet has no broadcast media provided in this dialect. I have heard an episode from one 
informant that a large number of Cantonese TV and radio channels astonished the mayor of 
Shanghai when he visited Guangdong. Being one of three municipalities directly under the central 
government or zhixiashi !^：轄市)，Shanghai is clearly under more strict political control than 
Guangdong cities are. 
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popularizing Mandarin as well as to take care of increasing Mandarin-speaking 
audience. The leaders were not eager to have too many new works within the limited 
budget and manpower. They told me this reluctance was a purely practical concern. 
Maybe their statement is true; but maybe there is a deeper implication about 
language issue in local culture. 
Foshan radio also have Mandarin news once every day on the main channel, 
while Cantonese news are available every hour. All programs were Cantonese except 
when Mandarin songs were on, or when they had some Mandarin-speaking guests, 
until last summer when one Mandarin-speaking DJ came to appear on music 
channel. In September he had his own Mandarin program for young migrant 
workers. 
I would not say that these programs immediately mean the decline of local 
Cantonese popular culture and the emergence of the central-oriented culture. As a 
matter of fact, not many people are viewers and listeners of the Mandarin programs. 
One of my informants, who dislikes Cantonese and prefers speaking Mandarin, did 
not know that Foshan radio had a Mandarin news show. He stated that he did not 
listen to Foshan radio simply because the programs were all Cantonese, which was 
actually wrong. Nonetheless, from these changes, I see the sign of facilitating 
Chinese nationalism which is defined as a higher level compared with Cantonese 
local identity. The fact that local broadcast media~the mouthpiece of the Party一 
occupied predominantly by Cantonese now provides bilingual service is significant 
in its symbolic sense after all. 
H 
174 
I should also point out that this shift is not politically generated. Of course, 
official campaign and actual execution of speaking Mandarin has been put into 
practice for many years. Despite this effort, however, it seems to me that the shift 
occurred due to rather practical background than ideological reason. My informant 
Lai Xiaohua told me that people in Gaoming, a county near Foshan city, including 
her parents, had never seen any non-locals in their lives, unless those who had 
opportunities to interact with nanxia ganhu or cadres down to the south. This was 
why Lai's decision to marry a non-Cantonese man shocked her parents. I was told 
the similar situation about Foshan city proper during the Cultural Revolution: at that 
time，Mandarin speakers in Foshan were very possibly activists down from the north; 
thus, people were very careful not to speak out something wrong when they spoke to 
Mandarin speakers. In these situations, Mandarin implied highly political and 
ideological nature. Bilingual communication in Foshan in the 1990s loses this 
ideological implication. More accurately, it takes a much more indirect and subtle 
form to penetrate into people's minds. 
Life with Books: A Higher Culture? 
As early as in 1990, I had heard a statement of one migrant intellectual一 
Foshan had very few books worth reading. During my fieldwork in 1995，many 
informants told me the same complaint~~they could not fmd books for them (see 
Chapter 5). However, some said again: "Things are becoming better than before." 
One needs detailed comparable data which I lack to prove that the selection of 
bookstores in the mid 1990s is better than that in the late 1980s. Yet depending on 
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my observation and experience, I speculate that they were not exaggerating. There 
are many more bookstores in 1995 than in 1990; most of them had a much more 
varied selection than before. Of course, it is fundamentally a result of 
commercialization~"general development of publishing, distribution, and 
consumption of publications in China.^ ^ So it is not true to ascribe the increase in the 
variation solely to cultural change in Foshan. The point is that there is an increasing 
need for books, and this development successfully satisfies the need by supplying 
commodities smoothly. Under commercialization，once it turned out that publication 
business would have a market, the business developed rapidly. Now a considerable 
number, variety, and quality of books are available for people, and Foshan people 
can enjoy them. Intellectual elites are the central group who enjoy this availability; at 
the same time, they tend to ascribe this change to their direct and indirect 
contribution. They would think that it was their presence and high-brow taste of 
books that has “improved” publication distribution in Foshan as well as in the Pearl 
River Delta. 
55 Owing to a poor production and distribution system, it was still a serious problem for people to 
get books. In 1985,1 was told by an institute lecturer in Foshan that he had ordered a set ofbooks he 
needed for his study one year ago. He had not gotten any information for a year and he had no idea 
how long he would have to wait, hi 1990 and 1991，I have been involved in organizing Japanese 
classes in Foshan. It was the hired teachers who were responsible for preparing teaching materials. 
The central concern of their selecting materials was not the content but the availability of them. 
Whichever book they decided to use, they had to be sure that they would be able to get a sufficient 
number of copies for all students and teachers. Ordering was no guarantee as the above example of 
the lecturer shows. And it was not likely that a bookstore~or more than one~had thirty copies of 
any one book. Photocopying a book was out of question~one could buy an ordinary book for the 
cost of xeroxing fifteen sheets. It took me quite a long time to understand all these realistic facts. 
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We can see two newly emerged events symbolizing "life with books" in 
Foshan: shushi (書市）or book fairs and the municipal library. 
Book Fairs: “Oasis of Knowledge，， 
In Foshan Daily, I found reports on this annual book fair held by the state-
owned Xinhua Bookstore since 1993. These articles indicate that the first book fair 
was held in the early 1990s, presumably in 1992. Some details of the fairs described 
in the articles are: held from the end of September to the National Day holidays in 
the early October, the fairs had more than thirty publishers in 1993 and more than 
forty publishers and 1994 respectively, to provide over twenty thousand titles in all 
to buyers, including workunits and individuals. On the first day of the fair in 1993, 
thirty thousand people rushed to the venue and bought almost one hundred thousand 
books. In 1994, the fair was extended for two more days to satisfy a number of 
buyers (FD September 20 1993, September 22 1994, and October 1 1994). One of 
my informants who is a college lecturer especially mentioned this book fair, and 
stated that this would not have been established without the increase of migrant 
intellectuals. I cannot prove the reliability of this statement, but it is true that the 
book fair is a new commercial-cultural activity，which attracted Foshan people pretty 
well.56 
56 It seems that consuming books is one of new options of consumption in the urban Pearl River 
Delta. One sees a typical case in recent Guangzhou. After the Fourth National Book Fair held in 
Guangzhou in 1991, the leaders of the city decided to build a book center so that "Guangzhou has a 
book fair every day." Named as "Guangzhou Book Center", this huge bookstore opened in 1994 has 
23,000 square meters of floor space in four-floored building complex, which is a totally new style 
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We should be aware that Chinese newspapers often convey what the 
authority intends to penetrate the society and individuals rather than reporting news 
objectively. But in case one needs to know the intention of the authority, it is often 
relevant to probe into newspapers. I would like to focus on another newspaper article 
reflecting the general book sales in Foshan in 1993. It features official data of 
Xinhua Bookstore to emphasize that the sales of books in 1993 increased by 46.15% 
in comparison with the year before; book purchase per capita in the city proper 
increased by 42.52% in a year. The report then says: "the categories sold well in 
1993 were: books on veteran revolutionists; economics; educational; science and 
technology, life, and practical matters. Mass novel, kung fu novel, and bizarre 
literature, which were once very popular, were not in that great demand any more. 
This reflects a gratifying change in the mass's taste ofbooks and tendency of buying 
books." (FD January 26 1994，italicized by me) 
This remark indicates how the newspaper—that is, the Foshan authority— 
evaluates different kinds of books differently: positive evaluation of what it thinks 
"enlightening" genre and negative labeling of "popular" genre. However, the 
newspaper could not but also report the buyers' enthusiasm about popular culture 
coming from Hong Kong. One of the articles on the 1994 book fair reports that a 
for a Chinese book store (The Editing Committee for Guangzhou Yearbook [ed.] 1992，1995). Later 
I heard a rumor in Hong Kong that this book center even attracted Hong Kong customers, thus 
caused some Hong Kong bookstores which deal only with mainland books to go bankrupt. 
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Plate 6 News article reporting Foshan Book Fair 
(Foshan Daily, September 20 1993) 
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Japanese comic "Sailormoon"^^ was one of best-sellers, which became a "typhoon" 
that effected as many sales as over 600 sets. The article describes: "Comics from 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan shocked domestic comics." (FD October 1 1994) 
Nonetheless, the reports in general do emphasize the value of "knowledge" which 
one can gain through books. 
Municipal Library: “First Class of the State，， 
In January 1993, the rebuilt Foshan Municipal Library opened taking on an 
entirely new look. It was an incredibly advanced, luxurious, and modernized library 
for a China city, and it is as well at the moment. Having seven floors and 18,000 
square meters of floor space, the building draws people's attention by its novel 
design and elaborate artistic objects in the lobby. A full computer management of 
580,000 books is the pride of this library. It is also unusual that 80% of the staff are 
three-year college graduates or above. In a word, it manifests the image of a 
modernized library, and hence, of a civilized cultural life by putting an enormous 
amount of budget into both initial investment and management. The total number of 
visitors from January 1993 to October 1994 was as large as 2,490,000 (FD January 8 
1993). The Foshan Library was so outstanding for an existing Chinese municipal 
library that it was evaluated as a "first grade" library in 1994 by the state getting the 
highest score among the municipal-level libraries (FD December 1 1994). 
57 Well known in Hong Kong as both translated comic books and TV animation, this comic written 
originally for elementary school girls attracts both children and the young generation in Hong Kong. 
Therefore, it was familiar with Foshan people who watch Hong Kong TV. 
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The articles quoted above praise the library in this way: “A library occupies a 
distinctive position as a marker of the degree of civilization^^ of a city." “...(the 
Foshan Library) joined the first ranks of municipal libraries all over the country." 
"...Mr. Du Ke, director of the library department, Ministry of Culture said at one 
nation-wide meeting: 'we will see a remarkably modernized library on the land of 
the People's Republic of China; it is the Foshan Library, Guangdong.，，， 
What we see here is the intention of the local authority to position Foshan 
within the frame of the state by taking the advantage of being awarded by the state. 
When this is done, it is the terms "civilization" and “modernization，，that are 
repeatedly used to highlight the advantage of this positioning. In other words, 
civilization and modernization are the key to legitimate the positioning. This is done, 
if not very intentionally, to generate the notion "what the state acknowledges is 
good" effectively. 
The above cases show what “life with books in Foshan" means for the local 
authority, migrant intellectuals, and local Foshan people respectively. 
To the local government, ‘‘life with books in Foshan" has two significant 
aspects: one of by-products of material improvement they have already achieved, 
and a certain degree of civilization they should achieve next. The basis of these 
notions comes from the state intention, which has penetrated into the local level 
58 "Civilization" here is a translation of Chinese term wenming (文明)，which does not fully coincide 
with the meaning of civilization in the Western concept. 
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throughout the reform period both in terms ofFoshan's development itself and ofthe 
consequent contribution to the state. 
To migrant intellectuals who claim their higher prestige in intellectual terms, 
such a concept and attitude of the local authority is favorable. On the one hand, they 
appreciate the book fairs and the library because they can enjoy a “more cultural 
life" which they had before in Beijing, Shanghai, or even in a remoter place 
mentioned by one informant which had fewer commodities yet more bookstores than 
Foshan. This is one aspect of what "things are getting better" means. On the other 
hand, they are corroborating the legitimacy of a nation-wide world in which they are 
involved. To those who are unsatisfied with a narrow-minded localism of local 
Cantonese cities called xiaocheng yishi (小城意識）or small-city mentality which 
means insularity, it is a good thing that Foshan goes beyond the circle of Guangdong 
and positions itself within the larger frame of the state. In their mind, this is Foshan's 
"reform", "improvement", and "shift" to the better. And it is them, in some sense, 
who have been pushing this "reform" forward. In other words, they are contributors 
to help Foshan become as culturally advanced as is the mainstream. 
How about the local people, then? They did flock to the book fairs and go to 
the library as well. I would speculate from the above discussion and my own 
research experience that there is a qualitative shift, although slow and subtle, among 
Foshan people's taste in consumption. Since the 1990s when the majority of the 
citizens became fairly rich, different choices for different cultural preferences came 
to be available. Consuming various kinds of foods other than conventional 
Cantonese food is one sign (FD February 9 1995, August 6 1995); watching soccer 
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games between Foshan team and many teams from all over the country at Foshan 
stadium is another example (FD September 15 1995) indicating the expanding sense 
of China among Foshan people. I would like to emphasize another option: "cultural 
consumption". By calling it "consumption", I consider that it is a commercial option 
rather than a fundamental change of their cultural preference. The more various 
commodities are provided, the more of choice people can obtain, often choice of 
higher price and quality. I do of course not mean that all Foshan people are shifting 
their tastes toward the more expensive in a homogeneous way. I even do not mean 
that they are following migrant intellectuals' taste. Nonetheless, more and more local 
people are attracted by the new options, one of which is "cultural consumption" 
which supposedly brings about a "higher"一more discriminating and more expensive 
tastes. Migrant intellectuals interpret this as local Foshan residents' becoming closer 
to themselves, and the local government interpret it as "gratifying". 
2. Reconciliation and Integration: Creating a Common Identity 
Local Identity and National Identity 
As we saw in the above examples, both migrant intellectuals and local 
Foshan people accept and consume these new cultural alternatives for different 
reasons. Although they are accepted for different reasons, this shift as a result helps 
them to have a set of common sense of Foshan一that they have these cultural choices 
in this city. In other words, these alternatives may function to shorten the cultural 
183 
distance between the two groups, or, to reconcile them. In the process of 
reconciliation, a common identity is found, created, and used. 
I assume that migrant intellectuals and the locals may have different 
processes when finding a common identity. The processes involve two different 
levels of identities: Foshan identity on a smaller scale, and Chinese national identity 
on a larger scale. These two do not exclude each other, but the latter often includes 
the former. Or, as Guldin (1984, 1995) proposed, it may be possible to look at them 
as a vertically stratified model wherein national identity is placed at a higher level 
than regional identity. 
I analyzed in the previous chapters how the two groups ascribe Foshan's 
successful development to their respective contribution. Local Foshan people ascribe 
it to their effective community building ability. Migrant intellectuals claim that 
without them no such thing as successful community building was possible. After 
all, both groups made contribution toward the improvement of Foshan, and all of 
them actually know it. 
One means of reconciliation was conducted by the local government. A new 
identity of Foshan shared by all members has been advocated through the local 
media. Selected essays with the titles such as "Love My Foshan" and "Outsider 
Talks about Foshan" were published in the local newspaper from 1993 to 1994. 
However, all these activities are officially promoted campaigns which seem artificial 
after all. Except for these official campaigns, I could find no distinctive "Foshan 
identity" created by both the locals and migrants. Among twenty-four migrant 
intellectuals I interviewed, who consistently claimed their contribution to the 
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development ofFoshan, only one answered my question that he defines himself as a 
Foshan ren. He told me that it was after he made an outstanding contribution to his 
company and became a key person in his workplace that he began to have a sense of 
Foshan ren^^ 
To migrant intellectuals, having a sense of Foshan ren is extremely difficult. 
Then, do they have no way to have Foshan identity? I guess that they flnd another 
way to become closer to Foshan~or, a way to make Foshan become closer to them. 
The cultural shift in Foshan I mentioned in the earlier section does not directly help 
create a distinctive Foshan identity. Speaking Mandarin a bit more or consuming 
some books has little to do with constructing Foshan identity. Rather, I consider, it 
helps make Foshan culture shift toward another set of cultural preferences, taste, and 
choices which embodies a more “nationally standardized" culture, or, the 
"mainstream" culture, which I suspect migrant intellectuals believe is theirs. And this 
may be the key to understand how migrant intellectuals acquire their attachment to 
Foshan. 
To migrant intellectuals, Foshan's development means that this Cantonese 
city is acquiring a "nationally standardized" culture; that is，by its development and 
modernization, Foshan is becoming closer to the mainstream of China. The phrase 
"Things have become much better" shows that they appreciate Foshan's cultural 
shift. They may interpret this phrase as "Foshan is coming closer to us". Of course, 
this does not mean that Foshan is abandoning a distinctive and conventional local 
59 I guess another specific reason for his case is that he established his own home in Foshan by 
marrying a local woman. 
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culture, but that Foshan began to accept the “mainstream，，culture which was too 
distant for the locals to accept before. Foshan is gradually becoming able to 
communicate with the mainstream of China~remember the statement of Liao Hong 
I quoted in Chapter 5: "People never want to share the cultural/political concerns of 
the Beijing intellectuals and the government". Political issues are still difficult for 
the local Foshan people to share with the mainstream，but consuming books is 
probably a starting point for sharing the "mainstream" culture. This is precisely what 
they appreciate as Foshan's cultural improvement. By evaluating its becoming closer 
to the mainstream, they believe that Foshan deserves them. In short, when migrant 
intellectuals try to identify themselves with Foshan, they tend to find Foshan's 
eligibility of being a part of culturally/intellectually high-level China. If they 
evaluate Foshan eligible enough to be, they adopt Foshan as their place; in case they 
do not, they regard Foshan as only a temporary place to stay. 
To local Foshan people, the process of identification is opposite. Foshan does 
belong to them by definition; thus, Foshan's outstanding development automatically 
belongs to them. They are proud of the fact, and this pride continuously reinforces 
their attachment to Foshan. In this thought, migrant intellectuals are only helpers 
who wanted a better opportunity and more money. Gradually, however, it becomes 
more and more obvious to them that Foshan is not an isolated Guangdong city but a 
city positioned within the state, and Foshan even attracts a large degree of attention 
from the central government because of its outstanding fulfillment of the goal. To 
local political leaders, this is an obvious fact; yet to most of ordinary people, it is 
not. Increasing actual interchange with other provinces makes locals begin to 
» 
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redefine their position within the larger range—China. Then they see that Foshan's 
economic achievement is outstanding in China, and that they are contributive to the 
development of the state. This is what leads them to have a national identity. In sum, 
contrary to the case of migrant intellectuals, local Foshan people hold a sense of 
attachment to Foshan first. When they know that Foshan's good achievement of the 
state policy is acknowledged, their attachment to Foshan generates another sense of 
attachment~national identity. 
Two Aspects of Reconciliation: Ethnicity and Class 
When considering reconciliation of the two groups in Foshan, I find that 
ethnicity and class, which I presupposed in chapter 1 would have crucial influence 
on the social relations between them, construct two different aspects. 
Ethnicity is used to provoke the higher level of ethnic identity everyone in 
Foshan shares—"We are all Chinese." Literati and ideologues write articles in the 
printed media such as “Beilao or Guanglao, we are all Chinese", "We are all 
contributing to the development ofFoshan", etc. In this thesis, I consistently focused 
on ethnicity on the local level to highlight intricate social relations between migrant 
intellectuals and the locals. In the process of reconciliation, these local ethnic groups 
are not emphasized, but they are integrated into one Chinese ethnicity. Chinese 
ethnicity is most easily accepted—nobody denies his/her Chineseness. In this sense, 
reconciliation through the common ethnicity is to appeal to people's primordial 
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sentiment of their Chineseness.^^ In the case of the PRC during the reform period, 
this primordial sentiment is also advocated to help nation building within the context 
of material development. 
The idea of class, on the other hand, also has to do with reconciliation of the 
two groups in Foshan, but in another process. "Class" here actually refers to having 
higher social manner and quality after becoming prosperous, which appears as a goal 
to be civilized Foshan people, as well as civilized Chinese,. "Being civilized" 
includes a certain level of education, social manner, interest in high culture, etc. 
Mentioning level, the concept cengci I discussed in Chapter 5 may well explain the 
content of "being civilized": “being civilized" means “being high-c^^gc/" to a 
certain extent. In order to advocate this goal, columnists write in the local newspaper 
that Foshan people should have good social manners，and local radio broadcasts spot 
announcements to advocate the importance of social morality. 
One typical episode often told is "Li Delun incident". In 1987 Foshan invited 
the nationally famous conductor Li Delun to give a classical music concert. No one 
in Foshan was interested in it; at the concert hall, the conductor found that only a 
couple of front rows were occupied by the government leaders who were arranged to 
come and sit, and the rest seats were empty. Thus, he threw down his baton and 
canceled the concert. Seven years later, Li visited Foshan again for a concert. This 
time the hall was full of people, and Foshan people's enthusiasm made Li satisfied 
60 Whether or not the sense of "Chineseness" is a primordial sentiment is controversial (see, for 
example, Tu [ed.] 1994). Here I mean by “having the sense of Chineseness" that one knows one is 
Chinese and never doubts it. 
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very much. This episode sounds fictitious and unreal. There is no doubt that the 
details were exaggerated when the was spread, but this is a tme story. Some migrant 
intellectuals claimed that classical music fans in Foshan increased simply because 
migrant intellectuals increased. But the point is that this episode is continuously told. 
This is told in order to justify and reinforce the legitimacy of "civilized" Foshan 
people. In a larger social sense, this is a higher level of goal than economic 
improvement, or, a goal of the next stage of economic improvement. 
In the advocates' mind, civilized Foshan people actually overlap with 
civilized Chinese people. It is not strange when we think about where the standard of 
civilization comes from: undoubtedly, it is given by the state within the context of 
"mainstream culture". The concept of civilization is defined neither by the local 
society, nor by the local political leaders, but by the state. In this sense, “civilization” 
is a common concept within the range of the PRC. The degree of fulfilling 
"civilization" is another matter; it varies among different places, and generally it is 
not very high so far. One interesting fact is that the local government supports the 
"civilization" of Foshan people as well as sustaining conventional local culture. As 
we know from the example of the book fair, the authority is clearly eager to foster a 
culture which is closer to "mainstream" culture among Foshan people rather than 
popular culture which comes mostly from Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
This point favors migrant intellectuals more room to claim their "cultural 
authoritativeness" which will continuously acquire Foshan leaders' support and help 
improve the city toward a "gratifying" direction. I would like to emphasize once 
again that supporting "mainstream" culture does not mean giving up conventional 
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local culture: local Cantonese culture is taken care of and protected by the authority. 
Even popular culture is not a subject of restraint or ban in Foshan. What is 
happening in Foshan is an increasing diversification of cultural choices. Nonetheless, 
as various cultural alternatives gradually become accepted in Foshan, migrant 
intellectuals acquire larger room to claim their legitimacy, because "mainstream 
culture"—the culture which migrant intellectuals think their own—occupy a certain 
position as one of these alternatives. It is not only the official sector but also more 
and more local Foshan people who give them this room, even though as a result of 
enjoying selective consumption rather than a politically conscious practice. More and 
more people begin to try northern food occasionally like we enjoy different kinds of 
exotic foods in Hong Kong. Soccer games held at Foshan let the fans recognize the 
presence of the teams in the country; out of the stadium positioned at the center of 
the city, the large plate displaying the name ofDalian^^ team may tell non-audiences 
that the range of life in Foshan is expanding. All these alternatives may help remind 
people of a larger imagined community, above and beyond their local Foshan 
community—the community of China. 
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